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ABSTRACT 
Recovery is the least researched and prepared-for phase in the disaster 
management cycle, but the critique of the post-Katrina’s planning has begun to get 
researchers’ attention with an emerging consensus on the value of recovery planning and 
its timing. My dissertation focuses on improving recovery planning by asking “how can 
the recovery planning process and outcomes following Hurricane Ike in Galveston, 
Texas inform theories of recovery planning?” This inquiry is addressed in three articles.  
The first article is an integrative review of the recovery planning literature, 
theories of planning and plan quality to lay out evaluation criteria. Recovery planning 
should be proactive, driven by local leadership, long-term and broad scope based on 
accurate data. Success of a recovery plan depends on setting transformative and 
restorative goals, alternative plausible futures and flexible policies. While federal 
recovery programs use several of these principles, they are criticized for short time 
frame, project-oriented and a prescriptive approach.  
The second article undertakes a qualitative analysis of recovery planning in 
Galveston. Resistance to start planning early reflected a lack of capacity. Hence, when 
planning started, it was based on limited fact-basis and expertise. The planning process 
was open and transparent, yet not adequately representative; and deliberation on 
important issues fell short. The result was a list of projects, not a plan, which failed to 
gain political and legal approval.  
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The third study is an assessment of population, economic, and housing recovery. 
Population of Galveston is slowly restoring its pre-Ike level, but I found disparities 
among neighborhoods and race/ethnic sub-populations. Changes in shares of industries 
from job market and composition of jobs show that Ike was an interruption and 
acceleration to longer and broader trends in the local economy. Recovery of housing has 
either failed or been severely thwarted at the aggregate level. At the disaggregate level, 
the lag is even larger for damaged duplexes and multifamily units. 
Finally, I synthesize the findings of the three studies and suggest lessons for 
recovery planning practice and questions for future research to further inform our 
knowledge of the opportunities and challenges in disaster recovery planning.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Recovery is the least researched and prepared for phase in the disaster cycle 
(mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) (Blanco et al., 2009; Leonard & 
Howitt, 2010; Olshansky, 2005a; Olshansky & Chang, 2009; Peacock, Zhang, & Dash, 
2006; Zhang & Peacock, 2010). Furthermore, long-term recovery planning, particularly 
by localities, has received even less attention. However the widespread critique of the 
post-Katrina’s planning process has recently begun to get disaster researchers’ attention. 
This dissertation will focus of this neglected area of long-term disaster recovery. 
The overarching question of this dissertation is “how can recovery planning 
processes and the nature of long-term recovery following hurricane Ike in Galveston 
inform theories of community planning processes in general and recovery planning in 
particular to improve recovery processes?” This inquiry will be addressed in three 
articles with more specific questions. The first paper will engage in an integrative 
literature review examining theories of community planning, the newly emerging 
literature on post-disaster recovery planning, Federal guidelines for post-disaster 
planning, and the general literature on community recovery asking two primary 
questions: 1) what are the unique features of post-disaster recovery planning that present 
challenges and important considerations for planning theory and 2) what can planning 
theories offer to improve post-disaster recovery planning from how it has occurred 
according to the literature and guidelines specified by the United States Disaster 
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Assistance Framework developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA)? The second article will undertake a qualitative case study analysis of the post-
Ike recovery planning process in Galveston, Texas to answer the questions: how did 
Galveston’s post-Ike recovery planning process unfold, what strengths and weaknesses 
emerged during that process, and does this case inform still further the issues that 
emerged in the first paper. The third paper will engage in a quantitative analysis and 
assessment of recovery at the community level, examining important dimensions of the 
community including its population, economy, businesses, and housing. The key 
question to be addressed is how can we characterize Galveston’s long-term recovery 
after Hurricane Ike? 
Literature Review 
Disasters are significant events which imply major harm and losses for those who 
are exposed to them. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR, 2004: 17) defines a disaster as “a serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic, 
or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to 
cope using its own resources”. Recovery from such events is defined by Smith and 
Wenger (2007:23) as “the differential process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the 
physical, social, economic, and natural environment.”  
Multiple studies have found disparities in disaster impacts as well as recovery 
outcomes shaped by pre- impact conditions including physical vulnerability, hazard 
exposure (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2010, 2014) and socioeconomic factors 
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frequently referred to as social vulnerability (Cutter, Schumann, & Emrich, 2014; Dash, 
Peacock, & Morrow, 1997; Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008; Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010). Social vulnerability considers the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
households that will impact their ability to prepare for, anticipate, cope with, and recover 
from hazard events (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994). Social vulnerability 
indicators such as poverty, race/ethnicity, age, gender, household composition, and 
housing tenure are found to explain the variability in household capacity for both 
mitigation and recovery (Cutter, 1996; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Highfield et al., 
2014; Van Zandt et al., 2012) as well as damage and response (Van Zandt et al., 2012). 
Social vulnerability factors influence success or failure and also rates of recovery 
through various mechanisms (mediators) including access to assistance or resources for 
recovery, mobility, and access to decision making procedures.  
In the disaster literature housing recovery has been thought of as a key 
component of community recovery and is shown to be very inequitable. Recovery of 
housing in the US is largely a market-driven process (Peacock et al., 2006; Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010) which often tends to reestablish inequitable pre-disaster development 
patterns and sometimes fail to reduce preexisting (physical and social) vulnerabilities to 
disasters. Inequalities emerge from what is initially perceived as a common community 
of suffering and further exacerbate by the gains and profit from tragedy(Alesch, Arendt, 
& Holly, 2009). Disasters do not affect everybody equally. Peacock et al. (2007) point to 
the unequal nature of damage among households as one of the most consistent findings 
in the disaster literature: low-income and minority households tend to suffer 
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disproportionately higher levels of damage in disasters (Bates, 1982; Bates & Peacock, 
1989; Blaikie et al., 1994; Bolin, 1982, 1993; Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Dash et al., 1997; 
Drabek & Key, 1984; Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977; Peacock & Girard, 1997; 
Quarantelli, 1982).  
Inequitable patterns of damage can set the stage for very different recovery 
trajectories for minority, and particularly predominantly Black neighborhoods when 
compared to Anglo neighborhoods (Highfield et al., 2014). While receiving higher levels 
of damage, these households have limited access to both private and public resources 
important for permanent housing recovery due to various discriminatory factors such as 
poor language skills and educational backgrounds, lack of mobility, weak capability to 
repay Small Businesses Administration (SBA) low interest loans which is the primary 
governmental program for the uninsured and underinsured households (Berke, Kartez, & 
Wenger, 1993; Bolin, 1982, 1985; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Bolin & 
Stanford, 1991; Dash et al., 1997; Morrow, 1997; Phillips, 1993; Rubin, Saperstein, & 
Barbee, 1985). 
Racial and ethnic populations and the poor in the US are consistently found to be 
more vulnerable to natural disasters, due to factors such as language, housing patterns, 
building construction, community isolation, cultural insensitivities, and social exclusion 
(Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999; Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Marginalized 
racial/ethnic groups are often excluded from community post-disaster planning and 
recovery activities (Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Morrow, 1997; Morrow & Peacock, 1997; 
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Phillips, 1993; Quarantelli, Abetz, & Dynes, 1985) and may be taken advantage of by 
private businesses.  
The connection between aspects of hazard assessment, particularly social 
vulnerability, and differential recovery trajectories emphasizes the need for planning to 
reduce inequalities in recovery. Nonetheless, very little is known about how post-disaster 
recovery planning processes or improvised recovery (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007), 
shape or lead to inequalities. My qualitative case study on post-Ike recovery planning 
process in Galveston will explore this issue.  
Recovery is portrayed as an uncertain, conflict- laden process bounded by time 
constraints and a wide range of stakeholders, interests and funding sources involved; 
hence its outcomes are strongly influenced by decision making and institutional 
capacities (Berke et al., 1993; Bolin, 1993; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Mileti, 1999; Peacock 
& Ragsdale, 1997; Rubin & Popkin, 1990). Previous studies have reported complexities 
and high level of uncertainty in post disaster situations where no single person or 
organization is in charge, and there would be no simple solutions (Johnson & Hayashi, 
2012; Oliver-Smith, 1990; Olshansky, Hopkins, Chandrasekhar, & Iuchi, 2009; 
Olshansky & Johnson, 2010; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997)   From the sociopolitical 
ecology perspective, any outcome in the recovery process would emerge out of the 
interplay of mutual contingencies, competing interests, and coalitions exercised through 
a variety of structural linkages(Bates & Peacock, 1989; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997). 
Disasters have long-term impacts on community conflicts and cohesion in many 
different ways (Bates & Peacock, 1989; Carroll, Paveglio, Jakes, & Higgins, 2011; 
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Morrow & Peacock, 1997). Disagreements on possible changes in the post-disaster 
window of opportunity are found to be one of the sources of conflict. A multitude of new 
suggestions and ideas usually emerge after a disaster. Some have resulted in new ways 
of thinking about communities, enhancing mitigation, and increasing community 
involvement, while others reduced involvement, created dependency and increased 
future vulnerability (Dash et al., 1997). Value orientations shape whether post-disaster 
opportunities are seized upon for the betterment of community such as improved 
efficiency, equity or amenities (Berke et al., 1993; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Olshansky, 
Johnson, & Topping, 2006). The political systems of impacted societies might 
themselves undergo formal and informal changes after a disaster due to emergence of 
new priorities and policy changes that gain support from segments of the community or 
as a result of the mistrust and blame toward authorities associated with the disaster itself 
or the recovery process. There can also be reactions by powerful forces, thwarting 
potential changes (Bates & Peacock, 1989; Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Olson, 2000). 
There is a general consensus among disaster researchers on the value of planning 
for disaster recovery and its timing as a critical factor (Burby et al., 1999; Johnson & 
Hayashi, 2012; Leonard & Howitt, 2010; Olshansky & Chang, 2009; Olshansky, 
Johnson, Horne, & Nee, 2008; Olshansky et al., 2006). Communities need to plan in 
order to deal with situations that include multiple stakeholders, agencies and 
organizations inside and outside the disaster-hit community, conflicts of interests and 
limited resources to fulfill long lists of priorities (Smith & Birkland, 2012). However 
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recovery planning is found to be associated with a number of challenges as well as 
opportunities that make it distinct from normal-time planning processes.  
Recovery processes should be designed with the dynamic and evolving nature of 
communities as complex systems in mind. In a post-disaster situation, normal 
community dynamics are disrupted by the event and yet chronic social vulnerability 
issues are often exposed. Nevertheless, rather than looking to the future, the disaster 
recovery process is typically focused on a return to normalcy. Setting such direction for 
recovery is a result of ignoring what many studies have shown,  recovery is never a 
return to the status quo ex ante, or the conditions as they were before the event; because 
the effects of disasters on communities are complex and long- lasting (Johnson & 
Hayashi, 2012). While there is a growing literature suggesting that planning is critical 
for the success of long-term recovery (Olshansky, 2005a; Olshansky & Chang, 2009; 
Olshansky et al., 2009; Olshansky et al., 2008), there has been little focus on how 
planning actually works under the unique circumstances of each disaster and affected 
localities (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010). We need more detailed examinations of how the 
complexities and conflicts often associated with post-disaster situations play into 
recovery planning processes and influence their outcomes.  
Disaster, according to Olshansky et al. (2012) is an extreme, t ime compressed 
case of the normal process of capital depletion and replacement. One of the challenges 
related to time compression is that decision-making for recovery must occur at a faster 
pace than the information and knowledge necessary for planning generally flows 
(Johnson & Hayashi, 2012; Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012). Disasters often 
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present opportunities to make rapid physical and social changes to a community through 
redevelopment employing an influx of disaster-related resources. Ideally, a community 
should strive to fully coordinate available assistance and funding while seeking ways to 
accomplish other community goals and priorities, using the disaster recovery process as 
the catalyst (Spangle, 1986). However in practice, creating a balance between quality 
versus speed and short-term versus long-term needs is challenging (Burby et al., 1999; 
Olshansky, 2005a; Olshansky et al., 2006). We need a better understanding of how these 
conflicting priorities play out in the planning and decision making process as well as 
how localities decide and plan for creating a new normal while seizing the opportunities 
for long lasting changes. 
Purpose 
The overarching purpose of this study is to improve recovery-planning practice 
and inform recovery-planning theory through the experience of Galveston after 
hurricane Ike. My approach is novel in the sense that I will combine quantitative 
description and analysis of recovery patterns with a qualitative account of recovery 
planning. The important aspects of recovery, including complexities, conflicts and 
contentions, opportunities, time compression, inequalities and disparities and delays will 
be linked thorough a mixed method approach. This study seeks to examine how recovery 
planning can influence the nature of recovery processes based on the experience of 
Galveston. Most studies do one of the two things; they either provide a qualitative 
account of recovery planning and process (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010); or measure the 
recovery outcomes in terms of various dimensions such as gains or losses in population, 
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employment, sales or housing. In this series of articles I will link the quantitative 
assessments of recovery with a qualitative understanding of recovery planning seeking to 
examine how conflicts, compression, and opportunities played out in the recovery 
planning process. This study will have the following contributions: 
 Informing study of disaster recovery planning with planning theory  
 Informing planning theory with insights from post-disaster recovery as a especial 
planning situation  
 Measuring recovery of Galveston from Hurricane Ike 
 Informing recovery planning with lessons from Galveston 
Structure of the Dissertation 
I will first review the emerging literature on post-disaster recovery planning to 
lay out how one would evaluate a good recovery planning process and what issues 
should be addressed in the recovery plan (process and content). Next, I will review the 
theories of planning and evaluate their application in the unique post-disaster situation. 
This review will provide ideas about how to engage in recovery planning, and what 
content to address and include in the recovery plan.   This framework of an ideal process 
and content for recovery planning will be used then to evaluate FEMA’s programs and 
guidelines for recovery planning. The second study, my qualitative case study of 
planning process in Galveston, provides an actual case to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of planning process and content according to theoretical perspectives of 
recovery planning. It will also test the ideas for successful recovery planning and can 
reveal new issues in the Federal recovery planning guidelines and procedures. The third 
 10 
 
study is a quantitative assessment of community recovery in different dimensions. 
Findings of these three independent but related studies will be synthesized in a 
conclusion article. I will speculate about the impact of planning process and content in 
Galveston (from the second study) on recovery outcomes in various dimensions (from 
the third study). The story of planning and recovery processes from Galveston’s 
experience, will offer new understanding of the challenges of post-disaster recovery 
planning and new insights that perhaps will better insure resilience as a long-term 
outcome.  
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CHAPTER II 
1ST ARTICLE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES THAT INFORM DISASTER 
RECOVERY PLANNING 
Introduction 
Disasters are significant events which imply major harm and losses for those 
exposed to them. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR, 2004: 17) defines a disaster as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic, or 
environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to 
cope using its own resources”. In the late 1970s, the National Governor's Association 
(1978) designed a four phase model known as the process of comprehensive emergency 
management to organize the activities of emergency managers. The process of 
comprehensive emergency management can be understood as a cycle metaphor with four 
consequent but overlapping phases including mitigation and preparedness before the 
disaster, and response and recovery (also restoration and reconstruction) after the 
disaster. 
The recovery phase of the emergency management cycle deals with the tasks of 
restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural 
environment over a long time span following the disaster. The goals of recovery are 
rebuilding the damaged structures and facilities effectively and efficiently, making sure 
to rebuild in a safer, more resilient, and sustainable way, as well as rebuilding or 
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restoring the infrastructure and public services and amenities. Recovery from a disaster 
presents both unique challenges and opportunities to communities to address some of 
their pre-existing problems, seek new changes that would not be possible otherwise, and 
improve their disaster resilience. Through planning, communities can tackle their 
recovery challenges and seize the recovery opportunities. Planning, in general, involves 
crafting a consensus-based vision, setting goals, translate them to objectives, and 
proposing ways (strategies, policies and actions) to reach those objectives. To succeed in 
recovery through planning, communities need a set of evaluation criteria for recovery 
planning, derived from a guiding theory of recovery planning. This article aims at 
identifying the success criteria for recovery planning process and recovery plan as its 
product, in order to contribute to a guiding theory of recovery planning. A guiding 
theory of recovery planning should be drawn from theories of planning and take into 
consideration the unique challenges and opportunities posed by disasters during 
recovery.  
Some of the challenges and opportunities associated with d isaster recovery are 
known through previous research. Disaster experts in sociology, planning, political 
science, anthropology, and similar fields have studied recovery processes, particularly in 
the form of case studies, since 1970s from various perspectives. Nevertheless, recovery 
remains the least studied and prepared for phase in the emergency management cycle. 
This lack of attention has lowered the capacity of communities in preparing for disaster 
recovery. While the widespread critique of the post-Katrina planning processes has 
recently begun to get disaster researchers’ attention, long-term recovery planning has 
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received very little attention from local governments (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, 
& Horney, 2014). Providing clear guiding criteria to local governments can encourage 
and help them to plan for disaster recovery.  
There are some disagreements among researchers about the value of planning for 
recovery. While most researchers agree on the benefits of planning for guiding recovery, 
there are studies that blame planning for making recovery slow and inefficient, and 
argue for letting the market and private interests guide recovery (Chamlee-Wright & 
Rothschild, 2007; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). There are also disagreements in the 
literature about physical versus process orientation of the disaster recovery planning and 
plan (Johnson & Hayashi, 2012). The former suggests recovery planning is the act of 
making a physical plan with land-use maps and regulations to decide how and where to 
rebuild what is damaged by the disaster. The latter suggests that the recovery plan should 
document decisions and agreements among responsible agencies for each recovery task, 
cooperations and partnerships that will be enacted after the disaster, timing of 
completion of each task, financial resources, etc. In my synthesis of recovery literature, I 
include these different perspectives, as they each offer insights for setting the success 
criteria of planning process and plan for recovery.  
The relatively limited application of research findings about disaster recovery to 
recovery planning practice could be in part due to the limited generalizability of case 
studies and little effort for synthesizing them. The existing literature on post-disaster 
recovery offers valuable insights for understanding the necessity and opportunities for 
planning as well as the challenging context in which recovery planning is often carried 
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out. Rarely have disaster researchers sought to synthesize findings of recovery studies in 
terms of the challenges and lessons for recovery planning practice after disasters.  
General theories of planning, specifically collaborative planning theory which 
emphasize complexity and diversity in planning, can offer valuable insights to improve 
recovery planning process. To apply theories of planning to the special case of post-
disaster recovery, it is necessary to identify the needs and challenges of the task of post-
disaster recovery planning. Also studies on quality of plans can inform evaluation of 
disaster recovery plans. It is important to adjust general plan evaluation criteria to take 
into account specific issues that recovery plans should respond to, such as the complex 
and evolving nature of recovery needs with time.  
Recovery planning practice by local governments, particularly following large 
disasters, can be influenced and guided by the federal policies and programs which 
regulate and provide expertise, technical, and financial assistance in the aftermath of 
federally declared disasters. Federal policy for recovery planning was formally 
developed by Emergency Support Function 14 (ESF#14) in National Response Plan 
(NRP) in 2004. ESF #14 was created to promote a community-centric, coordinated, 
long-term approach to recovery, with a focus on organizing and leveraging federal 
resources and providing enhanced technical assistance to states and communities.  
NRP was superseded in 2008 by the current National Response Framework 
(NRF), which further outlines the mission and role of ESF #14 with Long-Term 
Community Recovery (LTCR) program. LTCR program was activated for presidentially 
declared disasters to help the impacted communities to identify and coordinate 
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significant recovery resources, undertake impact analyses, facilitate the organization and 
coordination of recovery partners and stakeholders, identify recovery needs and 
opportunities for collaboration and support, and support launching community recovery 
plans (Rozario, 2001). LTCR continued to evolve until 2011 when its work helped 
catalyze the development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). As the 
NDRF was implemented and Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) were developed, ESF 
#14 transitioned to the Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF which 
expanded and replaced the LTCR program. These federal recovery policies and 
programs, that influence (or fail to influence) recovery planning efforts by local 
governments, should be evaluated and, thus, informed by success criteria derived from 
planning and disaster recovery literature.  
In this article, I present an integrative review of the studies on the recovery 
process and the emerging recovery planning literature along with the theories of 
planning, with special focus on collaborative planning, and plan quality literature to lay 
out a set of evaluation criteria of what is a good recovery planning process and what is a 
good recovery plan. Then I apply the resulting criteria from distillation of these bodies of 
literature to evaluate and critique federal policies for recovery planning. More 
specifically, I start with synthesizing the findings of a number of recovery studies in 
search for challenges, opportunities, and considerations for recovery planning. Second, I 
explain what theories of planning are trying to accomplish, and how they relate to and 
inform recovery planning as a special application. Third, I synthesize the findings of 
recovery planning case studies to identify the success criteria of recovery planning 
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process. Fourth, I synthesize the plan quality standards with disaster recovery 
considerations to derive success criteria for a recovery plan. Finally, I apply the distilled 
success criteria from previous research to evaluate the federal recovery policies that 
influence the recovery planning by local governments. I answer four questions in this 
article: 
 What are the unique features of disaster recovery phase that present 
challenges, opportunities, and important considerations for recovery 
planning? 
 What are the success criteria for a recovery planning process?  
 What are the success criteria for a recovery plan?  
 What can theories of planning and studies of recovery planning offer to 
improve post-disaster recovery planning in terms of process and product 
(plan) from how it is guided by ESF14 LTCR program in NRF and 
Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF in NDRF? 
Methodology 
I used integrative literature review method to explore and synthesize the 
literature. The integrative literature review is a form of research that reviews, critiques, 
and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way, such that new 
frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated (Torraco, 2005). Integrative 
literature review is useful when research on a phenomenon emerges in different fields 
(Torraco, 2005). My objective is to identify a set of evaluating criteria, informed by 
theories of planning, for success of recovery planning process and recovery plan. 
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Integrative literature review is appropriate for my objective for two reasons: first, I will 
combine scholarly work from different fields of planning theory and disaster recovery; 
second, new research is emerging on recovery planning by planning scholars as opposed 
to most of the previous knowledge about recovery which have a sociological 
perspective. Integrative literature review method provides an opportunity to synthesize 
findings of the sociological case studies of recovery process with studies of recovery 
planning as well as theories of planning.  
The literature is the data of an integrative literature review. I obtained my data 
through multiple steps. First I searched JSTOR, Scopus, and Google Scholar databases 
with a number of different keywords including disaster recovery, disaster recovery 
planning, disaster recovery plan, hazard planning, disaster recovery policy, national 
response framework, emergency support function, long-term community recovery, 
recovery challenges, and recovery opportunities. Second, I used the same keywords and 
searched the databases of disaster related journals including: International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Disasters, Environmental Hazards, Natural Hazards, 
and Natural Hazards Review. I also searched the databases of planning related journals: 
Planning Theory, Planning Theory & Practice, Urban Affairs Review, Journal of the 
American Planning Association, Journal of Planning Literature, and Journal of Planning 
Education and Research. I searched for both recently published and older literature. 
Reviewing the citations from the articles obtained through the search of selected 
databases was particularly helpful in finding older studies as well as policy documents 
which may not be easily found by searching scientific databases.  
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The retrieved studies and documents were critically appraised to identify relevant 
and robust research. I set inclusion criteria for studies I want to review. These consist of 
clear focus on long-term recovery rather than short-term recovery or response, having 
planning or sociological perspective in the study, using qualitative case study or policy 
analysis approaches, and being published in English. Regarding the studies and other 
sorts of publications on theories of planning and plan evaluation, I searched for the ones 
which provide either a classification of theories with their premises, strengths and 
weaknesses, and implications or the ones which focus on one theory and develop the 
premises, strengths and weaknesses, and implications in detail. In total, I selected and 
reviewed 103 research papers, policy documents, books, and theory essays. 34 of these 
works were then uploaded to Atlas.ti for thorough and systematic analysis through 
coding, while the other 69 documents were reviewed but coded selectively, as opposed 
to comprehensively,  using the coding system I had developed for the first 34 
documents. 
In Atlas.ti every piece of text is called a “Primary Document” which I call 
document hereafter. I grouped the retrieved and selected documents into six “Document 
Families” based on the source and topic of each document. The six Document Families I 
created include FEMA reports and guides, NDRF and NRF critiques, plan quality 
studies, planning theories, studies on post-disaster situation, and recovery planning 
studies. To guide the thematic analysis of the findings and recommendations of the 
selected studies and documents, the first step was developing a coding system. I used the 
questions outlined in the previous section to outline a coding system. My initial coding 
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system consisted of a number of codes and code families related to my questions, such 
as elements of recovery planning process. I identified and marked quotations in the 
documents that responded my questions with relevant codes. As I kept going through 
each document I decided to change the names of some of the codes, merged some of 
them with others, or generated two new codes from one code and split the quotations as 
appropriate. These codes were later collapsed into themes and formed my final coding 
system. My coding system includes five Code Families and 48 codes, presented in 
Appendix 1. Depending on the number of quotations associated with a particular code, 
that code helped me identify elements that were “grounded” in the literature (as my 
data). The analytic functions of Atlas.ti, such as “Code Co-occurrence”, enabled me to 
synthesize different insights associated with the same piece of text. Also, to relate 
insights of various authors on similar issues, I used Codes-Primary Documents Table to 
count quotations for each code by document and by document family. In this way, I 
could count the number of studies that discussed or suggested an issue or element of 
recovery planning. It also enabled me to compare the extent of “groundedness” of 
different elements. The output of Codes-Primary Documents Table from Atlas.ti is 
presented in Appendix 2. The result of my literature review are organized by the themes 
that summarize the literature and respond to the questions of my study.  
Findings  
The themes that emerged in analysis and synthesis of literature fall into four large 
and distinct categories. First category is about the context in which recovery planning in 
undertaken including the need for recovery planning, challenges of planning in post-
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disaster situation, advantages of post-disaster situation for planning, and finally, 
considerations for recovery planning. The second category is the elements of a 
successful planning process according to the various theories of planning, characteristics 
of a successful recovery planning process as recommended by studies of recovery 
planning, and finally, as the federal recovery policy lays it out. The third category is 
concerned with the elements and characteristics of a good recovery plan, first according 
to the plan quality studies, second according to the recommendations of recovery 
planning studies, and finally, as it is laid out by the federal recovery policy in the ESF14 
LTCR and then in NDRF. The fourth category summarizes the critiques of the federal 
recovery policy with respect to the recovery planning process and plan.  
Context of recovery planning 
There is a general consensus on the value of planning for recovery and its timing as a 
critical factor. While studies increasingly show that communities need to plan in advance 
for recovery, recovery planning is most often carried out post-disaster. Post-disaster 
circumstance present a host of challenges and dilemmas, which many of the times 
undermine the value and possibility of planning. Nevertheless, post-disaster 
circumstances are shown to also provide unique opportunities for planning. This section 
starts with circumstances that call for planning to succeed in recovery. Then, I discuss 
challenges and opportunities for planning in the post- impact period, and finally, drawing 
on a combination of challenges and opportunities, a number of important considerations 
for planning are discussed. Table I presents the codes that I developed associated with 
these topics while reviewing the literature.  
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Need for planning and Planners 
Willingham spangle and associates (1991) propose a generic building timeline 
for the rebuilding activities – clearance of the housing, the restoration of infrastructure, 
business recovery, replacement of public facilities, and planning for the overall 
rebuilding effort. Similarly, Haas et al. describe the recovery as an ordered, knowable, 
and predictable process, in which there is a strong community desire to return to 
normalcy following a disastrous event, which can take from two to ten years to be 
completed. While their comprehensive study provided insights that are validated through 
several next cases, their ordered notion of recovery has been strongly disputed (Rubin et 
al., 1985). The reviewed literature describes the recovery process as a complex array of 
overlapping, often uncoordinated activities, differential access to the resources and 
power, disputes, and reliance on adaptive post-events actions (Berke et al., 1993; Bolin 
& Bolton, 1983).  
Through planning for recovery, communities can deliberate and make informed 
decisions on how to seize the space and opportunity provided by a disaster. There is a 
strong emerging consensus among researchers, practitioners, and policy makers that in 
order to better manage such process we should plan for recovery. Disasters can provide a 
space in which signiﬁcant change can occur in socioeconomic, organizational, political, 
and environmental domains (GAO, 2009; Godschalk, 2003). Such changes may not be 
possible otherwise partly because of the expense associated with removing the existing 
undesirable structures, or even social settings in some cases. This space allows for 
unplanned, and often unnoticed, change to occur. It also allows for planned and 
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purposeful change with a set of speciﬁc objectives and interventions to occur (Birkmann 
et al., 2010). Many researchers have noted that the value of the predisaster plans and pre-
existing planning institutions in helping facilitate recovery and presenting consensus 
policies and views about the future (Inam, 2005; Olshansky et al., 2006; Rubin et al., 
1985; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, & Smith, 1998; Spangle, 1986). 
Local governments can manage to secure additional resources for hazard 
mitigation in the aftermath of a disaster by planning. Planners and city officials find 
themselves in a position to accelerate mitigation in the post-disaster period; because, a 
disaster captures people’s attention for such matters like nothing else. This attention span 
can be very short, however, unless local officials are able to focus it quickly and point to 
existing plans to address the problem because there is little time in the recovery period 
for developing plans from scratch (FEMA, 2009). 
 
Table I Codes that characterize circumstances for recovery planning, Atlas.ti 
output 
Codes that characterize circumstances for 
recovery planning  
# quotes / # times 
grounded 
# articles that 
discussed 
post-disaster situation_need for planning 13 6 
post-disaster situation_Dillema: challenge for 
planning 15 10 
post-disaster situation_other challenges for 
planning 11 5 
post-disaster situation_Opportunity: 
advantages for planning 10 6 
post-disaster situation_considerations for 
planning 29 11 
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As mentioned earlier, several other researchers note that the lack of pre-event 
planning for post-disaster recovery leads to various difficulties and missed opportunities 
in recovery. It often limits the incorporation of disaster resilience measures into the 
physical reconstruction of communities because it is difficult to obtain buy- in from 
residents for new regulations, and also, there is not enough time to develop appropriate 
and adequate measures (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Burby et al., 1999). Lack of pre-
event planning also hinders the reconstitution of social networks, especially because 
more vulnerable populations will have a higher chance of displacement. Finally, without 
advance recovery planning achieving long-term goals such as the preservation of 
environmental systems and the rebuilding of local economies will face major challenges 
or even ignored (Berke, 1995; Berke & Beatley, 1997; Berke et al., 2014; Berke et al., 
1993; Cutter et al., 2013; Haas et al., 1977; Rubin et al., 1985; Smith, 2011, 2014; Smith 
& Birkland, 2012; Smith & Wenger, 2007). Moreover, the aftermath of a natural disaster 
can be an extremely difficult period for public officials seeking to restore normalcy to 
the community and to rebuild. In such circumstances, a well-organized plan rooted in 
good factual details can make the process manageable, and give the sense that someone 
is in charge and had the foresight to think through the issues and contingencies that the 
community might face during the long process of reconstruction (FEMA, 2009). 
Challenges of planning  
Recovery has to proceed in an environment often characterized by complexity, 
uncertainty, dilemma, changing conditions, conflict, and tension. It is a process that 
operates within an emotional, reactionary, time-sensitive, expensive, and politically 
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charged atmosphere that is based upon incomplete information, disproportionate needs, 
and the worst working conditions (NaturalHazardsCenter, 2001). Planning under such 
circumstance has to face specific challenges.   
The disaster recovery process is not a set of orderly actions triggered by the 
impact of a disaster upon a community. Rather, it is a set of loosely related activities that 
occur before, during, and after a disastrous event. Therefore, planning for disaster 
recovery must place more emphasis on conditions of high uncertainty, rapid change, and 
complexity to improve prospects for disaster resiliency (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010; 
Olshansky et al., 2008).  
Dynamics of political and economic processes at all of the spatial scales 
influence the directions of the post-disaster reconstruction and redevelopment, and make 
recovery outcomes malleable and by no means over-determined (Johnson & Hayashi, 
2012). The scale of the disaster damage and impacts can also significantly influence the 
recovery process. Catastrophes, in particular, take longer to recover from, and present a 
more complex array of recovery challenges (Glaser, 1992; Tran, Shaw, Chantry, & 
Norton, 2008). Hence, more formally acknowledging the nonlinearity, inevitable change, 
and fuzzy ending of the recovery could benefit recovery related policymaking.  
Relief and short-term recovery efforts should be urgent and rapid; however, 
redevelopment policies should be cautiously developed upon comprehensive, site-based 
assessments of risk and vulnerability, alongside continual consultations with all 
stakeholders (Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006). The desire to return to normalcy 
also competes with the value choices to pursue betterments such as improved efficiency, 
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equity, or amenity (Berke et al., 1993; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Olshansky, 2006). 
Recovery decision-making must go faster than information, knowledge, and planning 
generally flow (Olshansky et al., 2012).  
Disaster recovery is characterized by tensions over how to strike a balance 
between the speed of recovery, the time required to develop and implement sound 
recovery policy informed by ongoing deliberation (Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, & Laska, 
2007), and by the perceived need to ensure accountability in the use of public resources; 
or as Kates put it, between “mixed motivations” (Haas et al., 1977). Bates (1982) sees 
conflicts emerging between bureaucratically run organizations oriented toward relief 
operations and more grass-roots developmentally oriented organizations which assume 
reconstruction tasks over how programs should be implemented (Bates, 1982). 
Bureaucratically run organizations, which implement recovery assistance programs by 
dispensing federal money, are constrained by congressional authorizat ion and 
appropriation provisions to prevent fraud and also local development policies that can 
increase long-term risks to achieve short-term profits. To pursue their proposals, local 
development organizations, in many cases, rely on federal recovery funds, which should 
be spent with accountability and responsibility. While constraints associated with 
accountability can potentially reduce the speed of recovery, dependency on federal funds 
might have potential positive impacts on recovery by refusing to spend tax-payers 
money on potentially harmful local proposals.   
Post-disaster planning is undertaken in an environment that can be hostile to the 
important preconditions of success, such as the meaningful involvement of the 
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community members and stakeholders in a sustained, deliberative process (Smith, 2011). 
Decisions affecting community welfare—some of which may have long- lasting 
impacts—will have to be made under intense pressure and scrutiny, and it will be 
impossible to take into account the views of all the pertinent stakeholders. While people 
and groups are busy trying to seek temporary housing, pick up debris, navigate complex, 
bureaucratic grants and loan options and insurance settlements, and confront a host of 
other problems, decisions that are often made could fundamentally alter the nature of 
communities (Smith, 2011). One consequence is that the community may miss 
opportunities to improve its infrastructure, economy, environment, or quality of life 
(NaturalHazardsCenter, 2001).  
Smith (2011) notes that planners who are assigned after a disaster to participate 
in ESF#14 LTCR often have limited experience in recovery operations _i.e. working 
under the above circumstances_ which undermines their credibility in an environment  
where many FEMA officials question the importance of post-disaster recovery planning. 
To diminish anxiety and frustration associated with uncertainty, planners must aim to 
minimize the time needed for short-term recovery efforts including helping people to 
recover a safe shelter and livelihood security. During this ‘‘transitional’’ phase, it is 
critical that communities are consistently supported, consulted and informed as longer-
term plans are developed (Ingram et al., 2006; Olshansky et al., 2008). 
Opportunities of planning  
Post-disaster situation provides a number of unique opportunities for planning. 
One of the most cited opportunities is for reconstructing an area where, prior to the 
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disaster, the productivity of social assets was far below its potential level, and damage 
allows the community to move on to a more valuable use of some of its remaining assets 
(Leonard & Howitt, 2010)  
The other opportunity is the increased public awareness of risk and motivation 
for action. There are specific times in the cycle of natural disasters when people become 
more receptive to messages concerning change. In communities that endure repeated 
disasters, after one disaster is the same as before the next. The increased awareness 
created by the last disaster can provide impetus for pre-disaster planning for the next one 
including the opportunity to incorporate community building (NaturalHazardsCenter, 
2001). Community members who are struck by a disaster are motivated to participate in 
decision making for the future since the images and memory of destruction stays with 
them for a while, and also, they feel the need to come together to recover in what is 
called by some researchers as “therapeutic community” (Alesch et al., 2009). Once the 
issue has gained that profile, a crucial component of the planning process is to propose 
and organize a multiagency task force that will involve all key players in local 
government in soliciting public input and molding it into a plan of action (FEMA, 2009). 
The immediate aftermath of a disaster may not be the ideal time to start 
constructing a plan for long-term reconstruction, because people are anxious to restore 
normalcy to their lives. However, in most disasters, there is about a 30-day window of 
opportunity to incorporate a planning framework into the disaster recovery effort. It is 
also an ideal time to raise awareness that a process needs to be undertaken to reexamine 
land-use patterns and to plan for the aftermath of future disasters (FEMA, 2009). The 
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reason I would suggest behind this statement from FEMA is that public support for 
acting to reduce the risk of future disasters will diminish with time as people and even 
officials will forget the destruction by disaster and importance of the issue. There is a 
strong tendency among disaster victims to return to normal life, and forgetting the 
destructions is a necessary part of returning to normalcy.  
The 30-day window of opportunity suggested in the FEMA guide (2009) could 
be referring to the approximate time before a community returns to some degree of 
normal life. However, the desire for restoring normalcy should not lead to forgetting the 
importance of disaster risk reduction. To ensure disaster risk reduction stays on the 
agenda, while the window of opportunity is still open, local governments with help of 
planners, policy makers, and grass-root community groups should try to incorporate a 
planning framework to develop appropriate recovery policies and actions. It is 
reasonable to say that the window of opportunity for establishing a planning framework 
and obtaining support for planning could be as short as a month; however, the planning 
process itself is suggested to take a longer time (Nelson et al., 2007; Olshansky & 
Johnson, 2010; Olshansky et al., 2008; Olshansky et al., 2006). If there is no pre-disaster 
plan for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, then, the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster is a time for planners to look toward fostering an ongoing and probing 
discussion of how the community will address its vulnerabilities in the future.  
Considerations for planning 
Post disaster period involves a high level of uncertainty, confusion and conflict, 
both at the community and the individual level. At the community level, confusion 
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among those who are expected to lead the recovery process can cause challenge. One 
possible source of confusion at the community level, could be local officials assuming 
and expecting certain kinds of assistance from particular State agencies that are not or 
are no longer the responsibility of those agencies. There can be confusion at the 
individual level too. For example citizens who are eligible for receiving federal 
assistance to rebuild or repair their damaged houses are sometimes confused and 
uninformed about regulations that dictate how to spend that money, and therefore, 
become ineligible due to duplication of benefits. Therefore, one of the important 
considerations for planning in the aftermath of a disaster is setting clear standards and 
procedures for communication among the many partners and stakeholders involved in 
planning. Quarantelli (1999) calls attention to the necessity, whether by planners or 
operational personnel, to specify what they mean when they use one and/or all the 
different labels for recovery including but not limited to restoration, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and recovery. Likewise, others to whom the terms are directed must also 
have the same meaning in mind. Otherwise there will be miscommunication at best and 
conflict at worst (Quarantelli, 1999). Clear definition facilitate communication, prevents 
unrealistic expectations, and also conflict.  
Size of the disaster is another important consideration for planning. One major 
difference between the community level and regional or national level disasters is that, 
the larger the disaster, not only is there more likely to be greater short and long run 
needs, but also certain kinds of nearby assistance that would be present in smaller type 
disasters are less likely to be available. A policy implication of this is the need for 
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different kinds of planning and managing for catastrophes compared with disasters.  This 
is as true, if not more so, for recovery processes as it is for anything else (Quarantelli, 
1999).  
A successful recovery planning process 
Both general theories of planning, particularly the collaborative planning theory, 
and more recently, case studies of recovery planning offer valuable insights to 
understand what are the characteristics and elements of successful recovery planning 
process. I used two separate Family Codes (PLANNING THEORIES and RECOVERY 
PLANNING PROCESS) to summarize these insights from two different Document 
Families including “recovery planning studies” and “planning theories”. Table II 
presents the codes that identify success criteria for recovery planning process with the 
number of quotations associated with each code (groundedness) and the number of 
studies that discussed it.  
Theories of planning for evaluating planning process 
I outline my discussion of success criteria for planning process around five major 
theoretical perspectives that have the most relevance and inspiration for recovery 
planning, and principals of which have penetrated the field of recovery. The 
classification I present are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive.  
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For several decades, the traditionally dominant paradigm in urban planning was 
the rational model, whose defenders’ have faith in scientific method and positivism. 
Within planning practice, it has primarily been used for forecasting impacts and program 
evaluation. A good planning process, according to rational planners, is one that relies on 
sound data and scientific analysis. This model is suggested to be sometimes more 
concerned with the process of planning at the expense of its distributional outcomes. 
Positivist mental model skips the step of deliberation over the dynamics of change or the 
practicalities of proposals. The technical/bureaucratic planners, driven by rational model 
Table II Codes that identify success criteria for recovery planning process 
Codes that identify success criteria for recovery 
planning process 
# quotes  
# articles that 
discussed 
recovery planning process: adaptive/learning 13 8 
recovery planning process: address conflicts 26 10 
recovery planning process: build capacity 23 8 
recovery planning process: collaboration-
cooperation 59 14 
recovery planning process: data 6 1 
recovery planning process: deliberation 5 4 
recovery planning process: diversity 6 4 
recovery planning process: inclusive 34 13 
recovery planning process: integrate 
vulnerability 10 7 
recovery planning process: leadership 7 3 
recovery planning process: local 49 13 
recovery planning process: multiobjective 5 3 
recovery planning process: proactive 44 10 
recovery planning process: long-term 21 8 
recovery planning process: partnership 2 2 
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thinking, typically discuss goals and projects with citizens, but bypass substandard 
policy issues. Consequently, citizens and stakeholders who don’t have the technical 
expertise will get only more confused and alienated, feel as outsiders in the process, and 
lose their interest and motivation (Innes & Gruber, 2005).  
Inspired by postmodernist cultural critique and by the move among philosophers 
away from logical positivism toward a substantive concern with ethics and public policy, 
planning theorists have reframed their debates over methods and programs to encompass 
issues of discourse and inclusiveness. The new planning theorists sought to understand 
planning in phenomenological and critical theory traditions rather than to develop laws 
or principles on how to do planning (Charmaz, 2006).  
Three approaches that stemmed from the movement toward inclusiveness and 
discourse are the communicative model, the new urbanism, and the just city (Fainstein, 
2000). The first approach, sometimes called the collaborative model, emphasizes the 
planner’s role in mediating among “stakeholders” within the planning situation (Innes, 
2004; Innes & Booher, 2004); the second, frequently labeled neotraditionalism, paints a 
physical picture of a desirable city to be obtained through planning, and the third, which 
is derived from the political economy tradition, although also outcome oriented, is more 
abstract than the new urbanism, and presents a model of spatial relations based on equity 
(Fainstein, 2000).   
Each theory of planning has certain implications for guiding recovery planning.  
Collaborative dialogues are suggested and used as new ways to decide on public action, 
ways which are more inclusive of interests, and more open to new actions and 
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opportunities (Innes & Booher, 2003). Implication of collaborative model for recovery 
planning is engaging key stakeholders, anticipates the conflicts that can emerge in the 
aftermath of a disaster, and try to build consensus around a recovery vision. Advocates 
of collaborative policymaking suggest that it is a way to establish new networks among 
the players in the system and increase the distribution of knowledge among these 
players. This recommendation has been echoed by disaster recovery scholars who 
emphasize the need for stronger collaboration in the disaster assistance networks based 
on increased understanding of the needs and responsibilities of other agencies, local 
governments, and the local stakeholders (Smith, 2011, 2014; Smith & Birkland, 2012; 
Smith & Wenger, 2007) This includes knowledge of each other’s needs and capabilities 
and of the dynamics of the substantive problems such as disaster risks.  
The rational model calls for incorporating sound, reliable, and objective data, 
undertaking scientific analysis and projection techniques in hazard, and risk assessment 
as well as damage prediction. The political economy perspective or just city model has 
inspired the disaster scholars/planners who more recently emphasize understanding the 
impact of social vulnerabilities on recovery disparities and the spatial distributions of 
physical and social vulnerability, hazard exposure, response, and recovery.  
New Urbanism has also provided insights to disaster recovery planning in terms 
of proposals for rebuilding in a more sustainable and resilient way. Berke and 
Campanella (2006), among others, discuss new urban models as a potentially useful 
approach for improving resilience as an antidote to low density developments in hazard 
prone areas. However they noted that location of these new urbanist developments 
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should be carefully decided to avoid putting high density compact developments in 
harm’s way (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Berke et al., 2014; Berke & Glavovic, 2012).  
One of the terrains of planning thought is concerned with the ability of planners 
to make a real difference in the form and development of communities. This body of 
literature has important lessons for recovery planning, since the role of planners has been 
traditionally minimal in recovery management. Many planners today avoid engaging in 
value discussions (Campbell & Marshall, 2002), prefer to refer to their role as neutral 
(Bazeley & Richards, 2000), and seldom make any claims for greater professional 
autonomy (Campbell & Marshall, 2002). This is in part due to the relative dominance of 
positivist approach which does not typically incorporate the reality of politics and its 
many interests, leading to a big disconnect between professional analysis and getting 
things done (Charmaz, 2006). Coupled with the traditional dominance of emergency 
managers in recovery efforts, assumed neutrality of planners in the typically contentious 
post-disaster environments has further weakened their potential for making sound 
policies among the conflicts and tensions. To get planning out of this weak situation 
some authors have emphasized the need to situate the actions of planners within their 
wider discursive contexts to better articulate the underlying values of planning, and 
further problematize planners’ judgments and responsibilities. All of these authors seem 
to agree that what is needed is recognition of the importance of planning being engaged 
with politics, rather than becoming a tool for it.  
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Elements of a successful recovery planning process 
Recovery planning studies constitute the second group of documents I reviewed 
to find success criteria for recovery planning process. Resilience and sustainability are 
frequently suggested as the overarching goals of recovery; therefore, criteria of good 
planning process and good plan for recovery can be derived from sustainability and 
resilience. Resilience implies the adoption of pre-event measures that prepare a 
community for a disruption, and prepositions the community—and other members of a 
larger disaster assistance network—to act in a coordinated manner when a disaster 
strikes. Indeed, Godschalk (2003) argues that resilience should include developing 
strong social networks that are armed with current information about a community’s 
vulnerability, lessons derived from past events, and the resources to confront the 
challenges associated with the disaster recovery (Godschalk, 2003).   
Resilience is the most agreed upon goal or vision for disaster recovery planning 
among disaster scholars. A successful recovery planning process can be evaluated in 
terms of the extent to which it can advance disaster resilience. To strive for resilience 
entails building back to be safer, healthier, and more equitable, and better able to absorb, 
recover from, and successfully adapt to future adverse events (Berke, 1995; Berke & 
Beatley, 1997; Berke & Campanella, 2006; Berke et al., 2014; Berke & Glavovic, 2012; 
Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Birkmann et al., 2010; Burby et al., 1999; Horney, Berke, 
& Van Zandt, 2015; Ingram et al., 2006; Olshansky & Chang, 2009; Peacock et al., 
2006; Smith, 2011, 2014; Smith & Birkland, 2012; Smith & Wenger, 2007). 
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Studies and essays about long-term recovery suggest recovery planning would 
benefit from setting a long-term and broad scope for itself. Reliable accurate data and 
analysis, along with input from a diverse group of citizens should inform the recovery 
planning process from crafting a vison to proposing specific actions. At the same time, it 
is suggested that planning process requires a capacity to adapt to the new emerging 
needs, constraints or opportunities, particularly during post- impact recovery planning. 
Recovery planning may be more successful if it is based on a collaborative process with 
strong leaders who recognize and seek consensus around conflicts. Finally and perhaps 
most frequently researchers call for adopting a proactive approach to recovery planning 
(i.e. establish the process pre-impact) which could be argued to be the prerequisite for 
achieving several of the aforementioned elements of success.  
Since early 1990s, disaster researchers have attempted to draw attention to the 
opportunity recovery period offers to strengthen local organizational capacity to 
facilitate economic, social, and physical development long after disaster. However, the 
dominant approach of the aid and recovery programs, they observed, has been toward 
short-term relief, with little linkage to long-term development, local roles and capacities 
and diverse social, economic and cultural conditions. External programs do not always 
successfully match local needs or cannot be successfully implemented without intra-
local and intergovernmental collaboration and cooperation. Based on these observations, 
researchers call for greater understanding of community needs and capacities, and how 
to put into practice those understandings by relevant institutions before disaster strikes 
(Berke et al., 1993). 
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Accurate data is the foundation for recovery planning  
The starting point of the planning process must be an identification of the hazards 
facing the community, and the risks they pose to life and property (FEMA, 2009). 
Empirical research by French et al. (1984) indicates that “high-quality information 
(hazard data, mapping, interpretation, etc.) would translate reasonably into less damage 
from earthquakes,” (French, Ewing, & Isaacson, 1984) and, by extension, for other well-
researched hazards as well. Most important data requirement which should be addressed 
in the planning process are related to hazard identification, vulnerability assessment, and 
risk assessment (FEMA, 2009). 
The choice of appropriate strategies will depend on the technical data concerning 
the feasibility of specific strategies for coping with local hazards, political preferences 
for specific approaches to the problem, and cost implications. Because predicting the 
future is strictly a matter of probabilities, the only certain data come from past 
experience. Thus, planners documenting risk must include in their reports the history of 
previous natural hazards events, their magnitudes, and an inventory of the human and 
property damages that occurred. They should also conduct surveys of representative 
samples of the community and collect data on public needs in different phases of a 
disaster, such as preferences and perceptions about various approaches to disaster 
mitigation in the aftermath.  
Recovery planning must be a local responsibility, based on local needs   
Disadvantaged communities are often more vulnerable to disaster impacts not 
just because of the inherent lack of wealth, but because decisions were made about 
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features of risk and vulnerability in these communities without their input or consent 
(Dash et al., 1997). Recovery planning is an opportunity for such communities to take 
more control on these matters. Planning can also help stakeholders understand that 
federal and state goals are not necessarily the same as community goals.  
The existing socioeconomic dynamics within a given community are more 
important than the models used for designing recovery programs (Christoplos et al., 
2010). Aid intervention initiatives are found to be successful when program goals and 
policies are responsive to community needs, and build a strong inter-organizational 
capacity for assessing needs and carrying out appropriate goals and policies. Pre-disaster 
planning and post disaster rebuilding and recovery offer opportunities to strengthen local 
organizational capacity to facilitate long-term social, economic, and physical 
development. If relevant institutions are in place before the disaster strikes, local people 
will be able to define their own goals, exert control over the use of incoming aid, and 
tailor the design of recovery programs to domestic needs and capacities (Berke, 1995).  
Robert Kates (1977), summarizing the work of other disaster scholars, notes that 
advisory services provided by outside technical experts rarely alter the pre-event growth 
patterns and post disaster development strategies that are advocated by entrenched 
development interests (Haas et al., 1977). Also, governmental centralization in the form 
of elite professional direction of the process, is shown to lead to forms of reconstruction, 
particularly in housing and urban design which do not conform to local needs and 
culture (Geipel, 1991; Oliver-Smith, 1990; Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 1999). The 
findings were consistent with the experience of several professional associations that 
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attempted to alter development patterns in New Orleans and coastal Mississippi after 
Hurricane Katrina (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Olshansky & Chang, 2009). However, there 
is much local government can do with the assistance of federal government and states, to 
reduce losses from natural disasters through land use planning and management. 
Limitations can be overcome, if localities are encouraged to plan for the development 
and redevelopment in hazardous areas prior to undertaking risk-reduction programs 
(Burby et al., 1999). 
Recovery planning must be proactive  
In their discussion about acting in time against disasters, Leonard & Howitt 
suggest that there may be actions that can be taken in advance of the event that will 
prepare for a more rapid recovery: Advance recovery efforts are designed to make 
whatever recovery does need to take place more efficient, rapid, and effective (Leonard 
& Howitt, 2010). Planning is one of the most important preparations for recovery. Many 
planning scholars argue that recovery outcomes are improved when pre-disaster 
planning and coordination occurs. They ground these in the idea that planning for all 
dimensions of emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes has been shown to improve 
outcomes, and communities that plan for disasters, before and after the events, are more 
successful than those who do not, other things being equal (Basolo et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the federal government and state government generally do not provide all 
or even most of the range of the sources needed for pre-event planning. 
Communities, states, and nations, often seem to think that time-consuming 
activities, like planning and other consensus-building techniques, are primarily 
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employed after a disaster, and therefore, slow the overall pace of recovery. In practice, 
many stakeholders have resigned themselves to this reactive approach. However,  
deliberation may not slow recovery, particularly if it is practiced pre-event (Smith & 
Birkland, 2012). When no disaster is in the horizon, communities have time to create 
decision support tools for scenario building and testing to improve their pre-disaster 
recovery plans (Berke & Glavovic, 2012). 
Recovery is more efficient and more effective when planning and partnership 
development precedes a disaster, rather than following it. Pre-disaster recovery planning 
can increase local capacity to recovery through providing an opportunity to improve 
horizontal and vertical integration among aid providing and local agencies, assess local 
needs, and improve the timing of recovery (Smith, 2011). Planners can most effectively 
use the data skills during the pre-event phase as the timing of assistance provided by 
planners is crucial to their successful involvement in recovery.  
Recovery planning must have a long-term focus and broad scope 
Successful recovery, sometimes referred to as holistic disaster recovery, should 
have both immediate and lasting impacts that are self-supporting, and will make a 
community better off than before. This ideal disaster recovery process is one where the 
community proactively manages recovery and redevelopment decisions to balance 
competing interests so constituents are treated equitably, and long-term community 
benefits are not sacrificed for short-term individual gains (NaturalHazardsCenter, 2001).  
Recovery planning should incorporate a balance between short-term and long-
term development objectives. To accomplish the objective of long-term strategic 
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planning, multi-year and multi-sector policies need to be developed to facilitate the 
sustainable management of coastal resources, livelihood support, strengthening 
infrastructure, urban planning, insurance tools and disaster preparedness at the national, 
regional and community level (Ingram et al., 2006).  
Recovery is interrelated with several other aspects of community development 
and planning. Planning for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction needs to be well 
integrated into the community’s comprehensive plan and stitched into its larger vision of 
its own future. Not only does this open up much larger options for attracting outside 
resources to aid in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, but it also helps the  
community itself to identify more creative solutions to a range of problems exposed by 
the damage wrought by a disaster. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to identify a 
range of resources to assist in dealing with ongoing or pre-disaster mitigation issues 
(FEMA, 2009). 
Recovery planning needs strong local leadership 
Addressing the issues of recovery requires the active involvement of local 
officials. But often left unresolved is who at the local level should take responsibility for 
developing a long-term recovery plan – or, for that matter, managing long-term recovery 
efforts (Smith, 2011). An interdisciplinary reconstruction planning task force is the best 
way to guide the process of constructing the plan. Who organizes the planning task force 
,and ultimately, takes responsibility for driving the process is a question central to the 
success of the entire planning process. Ideally, this role should fall to the community’s 
chief executive, whether that be a mayor, city or town manager, or county executive or 
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board president. It is vitally important that the lead agency or official in the planning 
process has the clear support of the mayor or town manager in order to ensure the full 
cooperation and support of the other participants. (FEMA, 2009) 
Organizing appropriate representation on the planning task force is important in 
such an interdisciplinary effort as recovery planning. Two considerations enter into 
forming the task force: whose participation is essential in guaranteeing technical 
accuracy and thoroughness for the plan? And whose participation and support will 
enhance its political acceptability? In soliciting public input and building public support 
for the plan, it is suggested to involve some nongovernmental representatives in the task 
force (Schwab et al., 1998). 
Recovery planning must involve diverse voices 
Disaster resilience according to Berke and Campanella (2006) applies to the 
process of recovery planning in which all affected stakeholders—rather than just a 
powerful few—have a voice in how their community is to be rebuilt (Berke & 
Campanella, 2006). By involving and consulting residents in all phases of planning, the 
pre-disaster recovery planning process helps creating a knowledgeable constituency that 
is more likely to support redevelopment policies and programs that take effect once a 
disaster strikes. By gaining such community buy- in before the disaster, communities can 
avoid making decisions in the aftermath that may compromise what the community 
might achieve in the long term (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Haas et al., 1977; Oliver-
Smith, 1990; Perry & Mushkatel, 1986; Rubin et al., 1985; Schwab et al., 1998). 
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Powerful interest groups, particularly from the business community, are found to 
be able to take advantage of recovery aid because of their strong pre-disaster control 
over local institutions and ties to central authorities (Berke et al., 1993; M. Bolton, 
1997). Hence, pre-disaster recovery planning should engage vulnerable populations or 
stakeholders that are potentially affected by the plan (Berke & Glavovic, 2012; Johnson 
& Hayashi, 2012; Olshansky et al., 2006).  
Failing to include the relevant local stakeholders who are potentially affected or 
possess resources, including the deep local knowledge-base and trusted relationships, 
can limit the search for creative solutions and the development of enduring agreements 
and plans, and can lead to further fragmentation and conflict among those who have not 
been engaged in the decision-making process. Moreover, failing by a community to fully 
participate in its own recovery efforts and decisions can lead to a problem of long-term 
dependency, which can hinder successful and complete recovery (Birch & Wachter, 
2006). 
Recovery planning should establish collaboration and cooperation  
Since recovery is a multi-objective and multi-dimensional process, a wide range 
of stakeholders should work together to reach success or holistic disaster recovery. 
Therefore, one of the major elements of pre-disaster recovery planning should be 
establishing collaborations and strengthening cooperation among various recovery 
stakeholders from emergency management teams to local chamber of commerce. These 
stakeholders should collaboratively plan prior to disaster for post-disaster recovery.  
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Through collaborative planning, various stakeholders in any local network can 
gain a greater understanding of local needs over time and integrate the resources 
(financial, policies, and labor) into a collaborative recovery effort that meets local needs. 
Smith suggests that recovery planning based on consensus-building approaches provide 
the means to change the procedural characteristics of the disaster recovery assistance 
framework (Smith, 2011; Smith & Birkland, 2012).  
Mileti (1999:10) describes recovery as a collaborative process, entailing 
decision-making and interaction among all stakeholders (Mileti, 1999). It should draw 
on local and traditional sources of knowledge and the best available scientific knowledge 
to inform stakeholders in the formulation of alternative recovery strategies (Berke & 
Glavovic, 2012). Establishing collaboration among recovery stakeholders depends upon 
horizontal integration among local players and vertical integration with higher level 
agencies (Berke et al., 1993). Communities with poor horizontal integration lack the 
stakeholder involvement needed to develop a collective vision of recovery. 
The long-standing schism between emergency managers and land-use planners 
calls for more collaborative efforts that engage both groups prior to and in the aftermath 
of disasters. interstate and local agreements for shared use of personnel for response 
related activities following disasters, have great potential role in recovery (Smith, 2011). 
Diversifying such collaborative efforts to include disaster recovery planners and others 
who have dealt with long-term recovery issues would enable systematically addressing 
recovery, and also promoting a greater level of trust through repeated and susta ined 
interaction over time. Collaborative planning for recovery should aim at fostering 
 45 
 
relationships by enabling participants to identify common interests in pre-disaster 
recovery planning, share unique perspectives, and discuss the resources they can offer to 
address mutually agreed-upon goals and objectives (Innes & Booher, 2003), such as 
resilience.  
It should be noted that sometimes mutually agreed-upon goals end up being goals 
that would either increase long-term risk to pursue short-term profits or goals that do not 
reflect the needs and priorities of the community (i.e. irrelevant). Goals that increase 
long-term risk may result from limiting community engagement to a like-minded group 
of local elites who are interested in their own short-term profits. The irrelevant type of 
goals might result from a process that is poorly informed with respect to data, analysis 
and local knowledge of the needs of everybody. A community engagement process 
might suffer from both of these issues but what is common is failure to include diverse 
voices especially the marginalized citizens.  
Recovery planning process must recognize and build consensus around conflicting 
issues 
As discussed in the previous section, collaborative model of planning engages 
stakeholders in processes of consensus-building based on diversity and interdependency 
of their interests, and aims at reaching win-win sustainable collaborations. Due to the 
contentious nature of recovery process, it is argued that recovery planning must be 
undertaken through alternative dispute resolution and collaborative planning strategies. 
Addressing the challenges of disaster recovery requires an environment that will 
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facilitate the emergence of collaborative problem solving among a network of 
stakeholders and assistance providers (Smith, 2011).  
National hazards Center also recommends using consensus-building to achieve a 
holistic disaster recovery process (NaturalHazardsCenter, 2001). Murosaki (2007) 
proposed reaching a solid consensus on the goals and vision of the construction as one of 
the major construction principles. Also, Berke et al. observed that in communities with 
more diverse distribution of power and resources, conflict and confrontation often must occur in 
order for long term recovery to be effective (Berke et al., 1993). 
Planners’ training to analyze issues and identify potential solutions, facilitate 
policy dialogues, use participatory techniques, and resolution of conflicts are skills that 
are all uniquely suited to the challenges surrounding the coordination of long-term 
recovery and reconstruction activities. The collaborative approaches and plan making 
techniques that planners regularly use can generate multiple reconstruction options for 
consideration, and if these options can be discussed openly and well in advance of the 
disaster, local officials, the business community, and the public can weigh the merits of 
different recommendations, each informed by reliable information (Olshansky et al., 
2009; Olshansky & Johnson, 2010; Smith, 2011, 2014; Smith & Wenger, 2007). 
Recovery planning must aim at capacity building 
In the aftermath of federally declared disasters, state emergency management 
agencies are often overwhelmed, lacking the resources needed to match F EMA staffing 
levels. In addition, their recovery capabilities, in most cases, are limited to grant 
managers and often do not include people with planning skills and expertise that is 
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particularly relevant to long-term recovery. Planning should include development of 
strong pre-event relationships and the sharing of information through both formal 
institutional ways, such as the disaster recovery committee, and informal information 
dissemination channels such as nonprofits, community groups, and faith-based 
organizations to help position communities to better confront the substantial challenges 
of disaster recovery.  
Capacities, especially those related to the social capital, are more important than 
capitalization for benefiting from recovery investments (Christoplos et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the ability to receive and effectively use assistance is an important aspect of 
recovery policy. Several scholars suggest pre-event assessment of local recovery 
capabilities and the strengthening of identified weaknesses through plan making and 
targeted public investments (Birkland & Waterman, 2008; Christoplos et al., 2010; 
Johnson, 1999; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014). Pre-disaster planning should especially 
focus on mitigation efforts in high-risk areas, which are communities and neighborhoods 
left vulnerable because of social characteristics (Dash et al., 1997; Highfield et al., 2014; 
Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014; Van Zandt et al., 2012), and involve 
residents of such areas in advance recovery planning to enhance their ability to recover 
when the disaster hits.  
Recovery planning should adapt and evolve with new input 
Recovery planning process should be adaptive in two directions: past and future. 
On the one hand, it should learn from the last disaster and apply those lessons to plan for 
the next one. Strong social capital is important for beginning the collaborative, 
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cooperative recovery planning process that would learn from the last disaster and plan 
for the next.  
On the other hand, recovery planning process should also evolve with the new 
input from the actual post-disaster assessments. Recovery planning can use alternative 
potential scenarios to predict the post-disaster needs and conditions, which can be highly 
unpredictable. Therefore, the disaster recovery plan, once created, will need to evolve 
over time, and respond to new circumstances  (FEMA, 2009; Rubin et al., 1985). 
Gaining an effective mix of representation can be a prelude to some creative cross-
breeding of perspectives and adaptations in the planning process over the long term. 
Recovery planning process should enable a community to respond flexibly to the 
unexpected challenges of recovery, create decentralized and adaptive capacity, and, in 
doing so, minimize social disruption that results from uncertainty and lack of directio n. 
The process of influencing decisions as an essential aspect of disaster recovery is viewed 
as the decision process that involves planning, organizing, leading, and controlling a 
comprehensive recovery vision, and influencing the many simultaneous decision actions 
required to achieve them as effectively and efficiently as possible. Flexible and forward 
thinking approaches similar to decentralized models used in crisis management can 
provide the capacity needed to influence these decision actions while also keeping pace 
with the compressed time frames of recovery.  
As conditions inevitably change over typically  lengthy time frames of recovery, 
the vision set forth in any post-disaster recovery plan need to be continually reviewed to 
ensure that activities are on track, a series of recovery plans may be necessary over time, 
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or new plans may need to be adapted to reflect new and changing conditions (Johnson & 
Hayashi, 2012). Rubin et al. (1985) observed that leadership with creative and flexible 
style of problem solving and decision-making, which allow for ad-hoc behavior rather 
than a by-the-book mentality, facilitate managing the complexities of recovery (Friese, 
2012; NaturalHazardsCenter, 2001; Smith & Wenger, 2007). 
Recovery planning must integrate vulnerability analysis and involve vulnerable citizens  
There is an emerging emphasis in disaster literature on the importance of social 
vulnerability for disaster impact, recovery, and resilience (Bolin, 1982, 1985, 1993; 
Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; M. Bolton, 1997; P. Bolton, 1979; 
Comfort et al., 1999; Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2013; Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter et al., 
2003; Cutter et al., 2014; Highfield et al., 2010, 2014; Lindell & Prater, 2003; Peacock et 
al., 2014; Van Zandt et al., 2012). There is evidence in the literature that shows the 
transient poverty (as one of the indicators of social vulnerability) created by the disaster 
can initiate vicious cycles that will trap a significant proportion of the population in 
chronic poverty, especially in poor communities. This is a challenge for recovery 
planning that can be tackled only by acknowledging the capacity gaps that exist in 
vulnerability analysis (Christoplos et al., 2010).  
Consequently, a growing number of scholars have developed composite 
measures of vulnerability with spatial dimensions and call for integrating vulnerability 
analysis and involving vulnerable citizens in recovery planning, particularly in advance 
of an event (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Berke et al., 2014; Berke & Glavovic, 2012; 
Comfort et al., 1999; Cutter et al., 2013; Cutter et al., 2014; Highfield et al., 2014; 
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Horney et al., 2015; Peacock et al., 2014; Van Zandt et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
vulnerability reduction is sometimes seen as a task that is too ambiguous and 
overwhelming to analyze, and there is a perceived absence of tools to integrate 
vulnerability analysis into development planning.  
A successful recovery plan 
Plan quality studies have offered several principals for evaluating plans in 
various planning domains (e.g. transportation planning, environmental planning, 
mitigation planning, etc.) (Berke, 1996; Berke & Conroy, 2000; Berke & French, 1994; 
Berke & Godschalk, 2009). From the convergence of these works, a number of core 
principles of plan quality have emerged that represent the main functions of a plan 
including goals, fact base, policies, implementation, and interorganizational 
coordination. These principals have measurable indicators that can be adapted to 
particular planning domains (Baer, 1997; Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Friesema, 1979).  
Planning and disaster scholars are starting to apply concepts of plan quality to 
disaster-related plans (Berke, 1996; Berke et al., 2014; Berke et al., 2012). To adapt 
these concepts to pre-disaster recovery plans Berke et al. (2014) integrate the well-
established plan quality principles with the anticipatory governance model. They argue 
that adaptive plan quality principles are suited to address highly complex and uncertain 
planning problems associated with rebuilding after a disaster. Accordingly, they offer six 
principles for evaluating quality of pre-disaster recovery plans: direction-setting 
principles that form the foundation for achieving future vision of disaster resilience 
include 1) goals that are transformative and restorative, 2) a fact base of alternative 
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plausible futures, and 3) ﬂexible policies. Action-oriented principles which establish the 
uses and inﬂuence of the recovery plan consist of 4) interorganizational coordination to 
adapt to change, 5) participation practices to engage the public before and after the 
disaster event, and 6) implementation and monitoring to track actions and evaluate and 
adapt policies (Berke et al., 2014). These principals are consistent with the 
characteristics of a successful planning process I distilled from the recovery literature 
and general theories of planning. For example, in technical-bureaucratic style which is 
inspired by positivist-rational model, a good plan is one that meets all the requirements 
of legislation, is consistent with official agency goals, in this case FEMA, and has all 
needed backup information (Innes & Gruber, 2005; Lauria & Wagner, 2006). 
Various approaches in recovery planning studies are used to suggest and prepare 
elements of disaster recovery plans. Table III presents the codes I used to summarize the 
elements of a successful recovery plan suggested by recovery planning studies. One of 
the critical, potential disagreements in the field of recovery research can be seen as a 
difference in viewing plans as physically orientated or process oriented recovery plans 
(Johnson & Hayashi, 2012). A recovery plan can be viewed as a policy document that 
should guide short-range emergency and rehabilitation actions (temporary housing, 
damage assessment, debris removal, restoration of utilities, re-occupancy permitting, 
reconstruction priorities) and long-range redevelopment decisions (building moratoria, 
re-planning of stricken areas, and relocation of housing to safer sites). A well-conceived 
process-oriented recovery plan conveys a sense to the public that local officials with 
recovery responsibilities are organized and in charge, because they had the foresight to 
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carefully consider the issues and contingencies throughout the recovery process (Berke 
& Campanella, 2006).  
With respect to the dimensions of a recovery plan, there is an emerging call in 
the recovery literature for paying more attention to social and cultural aspect of recovery 
rather than focusing only on physical reconstruction. Disaster management policy, as  
observed in many countries focuses mainly on the physical part of the vulnerability, and 
Table III. Codes that identify success criteria for recovery plan 
Codes that identify success criteria for recovery 
plan 
# quotes  
# articles that discussed 
this issue/code 
recovery plan: dimensions 8 6 
recovery plan: informat ion 11 8 
recovery plan: mitigation  7 3 
recovery plan: special regulations 3 2 
recovery plan: troubling 8 1 
recovery plan: agreements 15 8 
recovery plan: allow public input 1 1 
recovery plan: clear priorities 2 2 
recovery plan: commitment 3 3 
recovery plan: consistent 7 3 
recovery plan: direction 5 3 
recovery plan: flexib le  9 7 
recovery plan: implementation 7 3 
recovery plan: importance 3 1 
recovery plan: needs 4 4 
recovery plan: resources 12 9 
recovery plan: sustainability 4 3 
recovery plan: vision  17 8 
recovery plan-land use 2 1 
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social aspects are often missing. Consequently, the reconstruction plans following major 
disasters focus mostly on the physical recovery and more visible impacts, and the plans 
often lack attention to social recovery (Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Shaw & Goda, 2004).  
With respect to preparation of a pre-disaster recovery plan, local governments 
have used two approaches. One involves preparing a recovery plan as a stand-alone plan. 
The other entails a recovery plan as one element integrated into a broader comprehensive 
plan for an entire municipality, county, or region. Each approach has its own advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to quality. A standalone plan can be easier to revise, has 
more technical sophistication, is less demanding of coordination, and is simpler to 
implement. An integrated plan brings more resources together for implementation, 
broadens the scope of understanding about interactive effects of recovery issues with 
other local issues (e.g., transportation, housing, land use, environment), and provides 
access to a wider slate of planning and regulatory tools (Berke & Campanella, 2006). 
However the community arrives at the decision to develop its plan, four simple 
constant factors pervade the process: goals, strategy, priorities, and criteria (FEMA, 
2009; Schwab et al., 1998). An essential purpose of the plan for post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction is to provide some vision that serves as a beacon for decision-makers, 
and some framework within which decisions will be taken. Moreover, having goals that 
are transformative and restorative is the first principal for evaluating the quality of a 
recovery plan. On the one hand, research shows that uncertainty among local officials 
regarding pre-and post-disaster goals hinders the overall recovery process. On the other 
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hand, some researchers warn against overambitious post-reconstruction plans which can 
lead to unrealistic expectations, bitterness, and disappointment (Haas et al., 1977).  
To be sure, it would be foolish to make detailed plans for a recovery before a 
major event took place – every event is different, and most major events have a high 
variability in intensity (Leonard & Howitt, 2010). Hence, no plan developed in the pre-
disaster period can anticipate the precise nature of the next disaster. But it can provide 
decision-makers with some general guidance as to the policy objectives their decisions 
must aim to achieve. This serves to minimize unintended consequences, and to keep the 
maximum number of players working toward the same ultimate goals. Communities that 
develop plans for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction can highlight what they 
regard as their most essential objectives in what is sometimes called a vision statement 
in other types of plans. The vision statement should be clear but broad in its view of the 
positive consequences for the community if the plan is properly implemented (FEMA, 
2009). The plan should remain open and flexible to change through feedback from the 
public and specifics of the event (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). 
Pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation should be two parts of a seamless whole 
in a sound plan for the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction (FEMA, 2009). By 
studying some of the mitigation options before disaster strikes, a community is better 
prepared for recovery. The recovery plan should precisely document the anticipation of 
the consequences of a disaster, like potential hurricane paths and wind veloc ities, in 
relation to the vulnerability of housing stock, industrial property, and commercial 
buildings, as a means of identifying the mitigation and recovery strategies and resources 
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needed to make it happen (FEMA, 2009). Projections should also estimate all possible 
indirect losses, such as the loss of economic activity, and transportation-related 
economic losses.  
The recovery plan, including associated agreements and policies, can and should 
emphasize the importance of acting collectively over time, and thereby, optimizing the 
use of resources (funding, technical assistance, and policy) that the disaster assistance 
network can provide. As part of the pre-event recovery planning process, members of the 
assistance network should develop a series of temporarily coordinated pre- and post-
disaster actions (Smith, 2011). Examples of such arrangements to be documented in the 
plan are rules and regulations that might need to be suspended in order to allow rapid 
rebuilding, a permitting mechanism that is designed to be nimble in the aftermath, 
financial arrangements that would facilitate access to resources after an event, ans 
experiences of local leadership groups in organizing their neighborhoods that can be 
applied in the aftermath of  a disaster (Leonard & Howitt, 2010).  
Focusing on the details of implementation is at the heart of preparing the 
elements of the plan for long-term post-disaster reconstruction (FEMA, 2009). For 
example, to address the issue of nonconforming uses after a disaster, in a way that long 
term recovery goals are not compromised and reconstruction is not hindered, the 
recovery plan should establish clear criteria for allowing the reestablishment of 
nonconforming uses under disaster-related circumstances (FEMA, 2009; Schwab et al., 
1998). 
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Federal recovery policy 
Recovery planning practice by local governments, particularly following large 
disasters, can be influenced and guided by the federal policies and programs which 
regulate and provide expertise, technical, and financial assistance in the aftermath of 
federally declared disasters. Federal policy for recovery planning was formally 
developed by National Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Function 14 (ESF#14) 
in 2004. Prior to that, the federal government had provided planning and policy-based 
recovery and redevelopment assistance, focused on regional and community-wide 
recovery planning and interagency coordination in large, multi-state, or unique disasters. 
Drawing on these experiences, ESF #14 was created to promote a community-centric, 
coordinated, and long-term approach to recovery, with a focus on organizing and 
leveraging federal resources and providing enhanced technical assistance to states and 
communities.  
The NRP was superseded in 2008 by the current National Response Framework 
(NRF), which further outlines the mission and role of ESF #14. ESF#14 LTCR 
assistance was activated for a presidentially declared disaster at the request of a Federal 
Coordinating Officer in coordination with local officials. The mission of LTCR was to 
help the impacted communities to identify and coordinate significant recovery resources, 
undertake impact analyses, facilitate the organization and coordination of recovery 
partners and stakeholders, identify recovery needs and opportunities for collaboration 
and support, and support launching community recovery plans (Rozario, 2001). 
 57 
 
LTCR planning is action-oriented and should support existing planning efforts in 
the community. The final outcome of this support is a list of projects with specified 
priorities that should lead the communities’ recovery. Determining priorities in 
achievements plays an important role in the community's perception of LTCR's success. 
(FEMA, 2005). The key principles of LTCR are intended to assure community recovery 
is: 
 Community driven 
 Based on public involvement 
 Locally controlled 
 Project-oriented 
 Incorporates mitigation approaches and techniques  
 A partnership among local agencies, jurisdictions, officials, and the state 
and federal government 
 Focused on projects that most contribute to community recovery from the 
disaster (FEMA, 2005) 
LTCR program was designed to help communities manage their recovery process 
without a pre-disaster recovery plan, therefore, it has a very practical and outcome 
oriented approach. LTCR support could include: 
 Providing advisors and subject matter experts for consultation 
 Facilitating key community leadership meetings 
 Advising on public engagement  
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 Providing full planning teams to work on-site within the community to 
help facilitate all steps in the process.  
Technical assistance provided for recovery planning by LTCR was tailored to the 
unique conditions, disaster impacts, and needs of the community. Other than being 
project-oriented, all other key principles of LTRC were echoed in the literature. LTCR 
also intended to respond to the community’s capacity, helping to deve lop a coherent 
strategy in a timely manner, engaging the public, and building partnerships to create an 
environment for successful recovery. Generally, the LTCR planning activities should be 
initiated 4 to 8 weeks after a disaster, and be completed within 6 to 12 weeks depending 
on the severity of the damages and the resources. The 6 to 12 weeks timeframe does not 
seem to be a reasonable time for developing a coherent recovery strategy, engaging the 
public, and building partnerships even in a timely manner. The typical LTCR steps are: 
Step 1: assessing the need for long-term community recovery planning 
Step 2: selecting the leader and design of LTCR process 
Step 3: securing outside support 
Step 4: establishing a community involvement campaign  
Step 5: reaching consensus and obtain buy- in 
Step 6: identifying issues and opportunities  
Step 7: setting the vision and goals 
Step 8: identifying, evaluating and prioritizing projects 
Step 9: developing a recovery plan 
Step 10: choosing projects’ champions  
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Step 11: preparing a funding strategy for projects 
Step 12: implementing the plan 
Step 13: updating the plan 
In such short timeframe, reaching some of the steps above seem very difficult, if 
not impossible, as documented in a number of cases reviewed by Government 
Accountability Office (GAO, 2010). Even though LTCR program was designed based 
on the premise that taking the time to move through its process allows the community to 
make the most of the opportunities created by the recovery process, there was not 
enough time and capacity for deliberation, consensus building, and sound information 
analysis under the LTCR program.  
LTCR continued to evolve until 2011 when its work helped catalyze the 
development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). As NDRF was 
implemented and Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) were developed, ESF #14 
transitioned to the Community Planning Capacity Building RSF. Like NRF, NDRF 
governs interactions of various governmental and non-governmental recovery partners 
and private sector for all types of disasters. NDRF aligns with NRF, which since 2011, 
primarily addresses actions during disaster response. NDRF replaces NRF Emergency 
Support Function #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery. Key ESF #14 concepts are 
expanded in NDRF include recovery-specific leadership, organizational structure, 
planning guidance and other components needed to coordinate continuing recovery 
support to individuals, businesses and communities (Guidry, 2014). 
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RSFs comprise NDRF’s coordinating structure for key functional areas of 
assistance. RSFs are organized into six manageable components, and through RSFs, 
relevant stakeholders and experts are brought together during steady-state planning and 
when activated post-disaster to identify and resolve recovery challenges (Guidry, 2014).  
NDRF marks a shift in federal recovery policy toward putting more emphasis on 
pre-disaster recovery planning and building capacity for recovery in communities. The 
mission of the Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF, which is the first RSF, 
is supporting and building recovery capacities and community planning resources of 
local, state, and tribal governments needed to effectively plan for, manage and 
implement disaster recovery activities in large, unique or catastrophic incidents.  
NDRF’s approach to recovery planning is more proactive and mitigation-oriented 
than NRF ESF#14. It aims to coordinate the provision of preparedness planning and 
technical assistance support to aid tribes, states and local governments to develop 
effective pre-disaster recovery plans that guide the full range of recovery efforts, both 
short- and long-term, and ensure all affected  populations are included.  Community 
Planning and Capacity Building RSF has an emphasis on integration of hazard 
mitigation throughout the continuum of pre- and post-disaster recovery planning and 
implementation.  The Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF also serves as a 
forum for helping to integrate the nongovernmental and private sector resources into 
public sector recovery planning processes. NDRF has changed the time frame of 
planning too: Whereas ESFs typically operate within a time span of weeks and months, 
Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF operational timeframe is months to 
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years. RSFs will likely activate before all ESFs demobilize; therefore, they may coexist 
within the same operation for a period of time.  Neither ESFs nor RSFs have a 
predetermined point at which they demobilize.  
NDRF Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF describes key principles 
and steps for community recovery planning .  It recognizes that local, state and tribal 
governments have primary responsibility for the recovery of their communities, and play 
the lead role in planning for and managing all aspects of community recovery. The pre-
disaster planning guidelines emphasize that all stakeholders should be involved to ensure 
a coordinated and comprehensive planning process, and develop relationships that 
increase post-disaster collaboration and unified decision-making. Another important 
objective of pre-disaster recovery planning in NDRF is to take actions that will 
significantly reduce disaster impacts through disaster-resilient building practices. NDRF 
strongly encourages innovation among the states, tribes, localities, and the private sector 
in working together to identify state, tribal and locally generated tools and resources, 
pre-disaster, that will serve to support and sustain disaster mitigation and recovery 
efforts (FEMA, 2011). 
NDRF has also a stronger emphasis on making recovery planning inclusive and 
transparent, aimed at advancing resilience. It is critical that disaster recovery officials 
recognize the importance of partnership, and create coordination opportunities during 
pre-disaster planning with private sector leaders. The resources and capabilities of the 
private-sector, including utilities, banks, and insurance companies, can play an important 
role in encouraging mitigation and creating greater resilience in a community. 
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Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF unifies and coordinates expertise and 
assistance programs from across the Federal Government to aid in restoring and 
improving the ability of tribes, states and local governments to organize, plan, manage, 
and implement recovery (FEMA, 2011). NDRF incorporates an integrative approach to 
recovery planning. It integrates mitigation, recovery, and other pre-disaster plans and 
activities into existing local, state and tribal community-wide planning and development 
activities, such as comprehensive plans, land use plans, economic development plans, 
affordable housing plans, zoning ordinances and other development regulations through 
technical assistance.  
ESF14’s approach to designing the process was more prescriptive with a number 
of steps; however, NDRF is more flexible by stating that each community determines its 
own process. NDRF only suggests some elements, modified from LTCR planning 
process, to consider for designing the planning process. Each community determines its 
own process for post disaster recovery planning.  
Improving federal recovery policy 
Reviews of the federal recovery policy raise three major issues: first, federal 
government has provided limited support for proactive recovery planning. Second, the 
design of the federal recovery planning support has been prescriptive, and can limit 
creativity at the local level. Third, the federal recovery planning policy does not facilitate 
incorporating long-term development and disaster resilience into recovery planning.  
ESF #14 LTCR has worked with more than 180 communities across the Nation 
since it officially became an Emergency Support Function in late 2004. As a result, some 
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90 community recovery plans, strategies or documents were produced, 18 local 
community recovery organizations were formed, and assistance was provided to 11 
states to organize for recovery (FEMA, 2005; GAO, 2010). LTCR program is intended 
to improve coordination among federal agencies’ programs and help communities to 
develop post-disaster recovery plans. However, while it represents a first step toward the  
adoption of recovery planning procedures, it has been troubled by a lack of support with 
the FEMA and limited understanding among federal and state agencies’ staff in the field 
after a disaster (Smith, 2011; Smith & Birkland, 2012).  
The lack of locally derived and clearly defined goals and objectives might hinder 
recovery efforts because sometimes local governments perceive that they have a limited 
set of options (Smith, 2011). It is reported that most of the ESF#14 personnel deployed 
after a major federally declared disaster are private sector contractors from outside the 
community, and although many of them are practicing planners, they may have little or 
no experience in the post-disaster environments, especially in the local context of the 
disaster-stricken communities.  
The federal planning support might provide both expertise in planning and 
experience with disasters but still fall short in obtaining support for the plan. Planning 
consultants that FEMA sends to communities to support recovery planning efforts are 
often unfamiliar with local power dynamics, pre-existing problems, or social and cultural 
fabric of the community. They offer planning resources and expertise but simply do not 
know very well the people with and for whom they are working. Without reflecting and 
considering social and power dynamics, it is suggested that the resulting plan can gain 
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limited support and chance of implementation, and may fall short of directing long-term 
development and resilience.     
Since the LTCR program is triggered by a federal disaster declaration, LTCR 
personnel are sent to help states and local governments create post- impact recovery 
plans. The limited investment of resources in pre-event capacity-building strategies, 
including planning and alternative dispute resolution techniques, results in a greater 
dependence on federal funding when a major disaster occurs. Moreover, communities 
are less prepared for smaller events that do not merit federal assistance given that they 
have not engaged in a meaningful pre-event planning process, and thus, lack an 
understanding of both local needs that may emerge and limitations of the disaster 
assistance framework to meet them. They do not have an incentive to proactively 
address pre-event planning for post-disaster recovery as the federal government has 
provided increased levels of assistance following disasters over time, especially in areas 
subject to repeated events (Smith, 2011). Consequently, narrowly defined recovery 
programs, over-reliance on disaster programs, and low capability and commitment 
impede sustainable disaster recovery (Johnson & Hayashi, 2012).  
If federal funding supports and encourages pre-impact recovery planning, the 
amount of funds needed to recover decreases, and consequently, dependence on federal 
post-impact recovery funding decreases as well; because by pre-disaster recovery 
planning _especially if it is integrated with mitigation planning_ communities can reduce 
the damage in several ways: by studying their vulnerabilities and vulnerable populations, 
and predicting the losses due to the vulnerabilities they can prepare for. For example 
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they can prioritize and invest in reinforcing vulnerable structures, which probably costs 
less than repairing or rebuilding after the disaster.  
Even if pre- impact recovery planning is not integrated with mitigation planning, 
it can potentially reduce the cost of recovery. For example, confusion around changing 
responsibilities and resources of various agencies, regulations associated with federal 
assistance programs, etc. are suggested to make recovery slow and inefficient. Recovery 
planners can predict and reduce post-disaster confusions to make recovery more efficient 
by designing and establishing a communication procedure for sharing knowledge and 
information. Citizens and organizations can trust and become comfortable with using 
such communication procedure through pre-disaster exercises. Hence, investing in 
planning and preparation activities would most probably reduce the wastes of public 
assistance that is provided after the event, even if it does not reduce the amount of 
needed public assistance. Moreover, since the aftermath of every disaster is a prelude to 
the next one, investing in recovery planning pre- and post-disaster would help improve 
resilience, and consequently, costs associated with damages from the next disaster in a 
longer time frame.  
Limited pre-event expenditure on capacity building techniques, including plan 
making, public participation, and facilitated policy dialogue among members of the 
assistance network degrades the effective use of recovery funding for the creation of the 
coherent recovery strategy (Nelson et al., 2007). Federal disaster policy has long 
neglected the steps that could be taken in advance to make recovery quicker, less 
expensive, or more complete. Federal policies have emphasized risk reduction (e.g., 
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seawalls, dams, and levees) and risk-sharing strategies (e.g., disaster relief payments, 
income tax write-offs for lost property, and subsidized flood insurance) rather than risk 
avoidance strategies that involve land use. These strategies discourage local 
governments to adopt local controls on development in hazardous areas that could 
prevent destruction (Burby et al., 1999). Recovery and actions to support recovery, like 
planning and community mobilization, are understood to take place after the fact. 
Traditional recovery discussions, thus, focus on one set of actions (rehabilitation and 
reconstruction) and on one time period (after the event) (Leonard & Howitt, 2010).  
There is an emerging consensus among disaster scholars that one of the premises 
of an improved disaster recovery assistance framework is an increased emphasis on 
planning for disaster recovery. But it is suggested that the current disaster recovery 
assistance framework does not encourage such an approach. Most disaster recovery 
training and educational programs are conducted on an ad hoc basis, and focus on the 
administration of federal programs rather than on a collaboratively designed, locally 
tailored training agenda that emphasizes a long-term commitment to capacity building 
for planning (Smith, 2011). In my discussion of NDRF, I noted the improvements made 
into Community Planning Capacity Building RSF to address this need for a proactive 
recovery planning approach. While FEMA is the responsible agency for the planning 
RSF, no agency appears to have an extensive mandate to invest in advance recovery 
planning.  
Disaster recovery is sometimes understated by communities as the pursuit, 
distribution, and management of financial resources (Friesema, 1979). This approach has 
 67 
 
resulted in skewed metrics of success and recovery outcomes that are shaped by largely 
prescriptive grant programs that do not meet local needs, and are inappropriately timed. 
The reason for these policy failures include the lack of preparedness planning in state 
and local governments, and failure of the federal government to support such planning 
(Birkland & Waterman, 2008; Smith & Birkland, 2012).  
It is suggested that the current emphasis on the delivery of post disaster grant 
programs and the weak commitment to build collective capacity to plan for recovery has 
marginalized the role of practicing planners in recovery. This reactive approach has led 
to spending too much on response to and recovery from events that local, state and 
federal governments should have instead figured out how to p revent or mitigate. 
Recoveries are generally slower than they should be, exacerbating social losses; because 
the necessary or useful infrastructure for rapid recovery are not created in advance 
(Leonard & Howitt, 2010). Creating and maintaining recovery and mitigation 
infrastructure in advance is a shared responsibility among federal, state and local 
governments.  
Reactive decisions with narrow focus may fail to protect against actions that may 
not be in the community’s best interests; actions such as attempts to derive short-term 
profits through redevelopment practices that result in an inequitable distribution of 
outcomes, and the equation of success with the speed of recovery rather than with a 
more deliberative approach that reflects pre-and post-disaster social, economic, and 
environmental conditions. Hence, federal recovery policy can potentially help to prevent 
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some of the adverse consequences of reactive recovery decisions of local communities 
through encouraging a proactive approach by local governments.  
To encourage local governments to engage in pre-disaster recovery planning, 
Berke et al. (2006) suggest that federal recovery policy should make increased and 
sustained investments in pre-event aid contingent upon increased accountability of local 
governments for pre-and post-disaster planning and preparation. Given that any 
community in the United States will demand aid in an emergency, the federal 
government should also require every community to produce a meaningful performance-
based mitigation and recovery plan. 
Implications of the above comments can be summarized as three suggested 
alterations in Federal recovery policy. First, the planning support should move from the 
reactive approach in LTCR and NRF to a proactive approach that provides incentives 
and support to communities and local governments for engaging in pre-disaster recovery 
planning. This shift can help to reduce dependency and high cost of recovery assistance 
in the aftermath. Second, the federal recovery policy should provide planning support in 
a bottom-up manner respecting the local needs, value, priorities and internal power 
dynamics. Third, federal recovery policy should build planning capacity in local 
government and local community level in such a way that they can address long-term 
community goals through disaster recovery planning.  
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CHAPTER III 
2ND ARTICLE: RECOVERY PLANNING AFTER HURRICANE IKE: 
GALVESTON, TX 
Introduction 
Recovery planning is gaining more attention from disaster and planning 
researchers, especially since the widespread critique of the post-Katrina’s planning 
process. There is a general consensus on the value o f planning for disaster recovery 
(Johnson & Hayashi, 2012; Olshansky, 2005b; Smith, 2011; Smith & Birkland, 2012). 
This emerging consensus is mainly based upon several case studies in the United States 
(Schwab et al., 1998; Spangle, 1986), and abroad (Berke & Beatley, 1997; Bolin & 
Bolton, 1983; Oliver-Smith, 1990), which suggest some of the possibilities in recovery 
planning. Through planning, communities can potentially increase the opportunities in 
recovery for coordination of land uses and infrastructure, and promote physical designs 
that will improve the quality of residents’ lives, account for the concerns of all citizens, 
and seek cost-effective solutions (Olshansky, 2005a). It is also suggested that planning 
for post-disaster recovery can help establish critical priorities and objectives, traceable 
milestones, essential leadership, and community commitment for recovery (Olshansky, 
2006; Schwab et al., 1998). 
While disaster scholars emphasize the need for long-term disaster recovery 
planning, few studies (Rubin et al., 1985) have explored the experiences and challenges 
of post-impact recovery planning, particularly in smaller cities. Hence, research is 
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needed to increase our understanding of planning processes in the wake of disasters 
(Kim & Olshansky, 2014). The influences of planning on urban rebuilding and 
ultimately on community disaster resilience also needs more attention from recovery 
planning scholars. Such knowledge can help better understand the post-disaster 
environment, and provide insights to help planners operate more effectively in this world 
(Berke et al., 2014).  
This study attempts to understand the challenges, successes, and failures of 
recovery planning in Galveston, Texas following Hurricane Ike. Through a qualitative 
case analysis of Galveston’s Long Term Recovery Committee (LTRC) planning process, 
I inquire whether and how this case informs the literature on recovery planning, and 
draw applicable lessons for practice in other communities.  
Literature Review 
A number of case studies that explore post-disaster recovery planning 
experiences provide insight on elements of success and different ways of overcoming 
challenges in practice. While lessons from specific cases can only be applied to other 
disasters with caution, they can provide helpful perspectives and insights. In this section 
I summarize some of the important findings and lessons learned from the following 
cases: 
 Los Angeles, CA following 1994 Northridge earthquake 
 Grand Forks, ND following the 1997 Red River flood 
 New Orleans, LA following the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita  
 Kobe, Japan following the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake  
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 Watsonville and Oakland following 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake 
Los Angeles benefited from having a citywide pre-event recovery plan, prepared 
by the Emergency Operations Organization of the City, which was approved by the city 
Council five days after the Northridge Earthquake (Olshansky, 2005a). The pre-disaster 
response and recovery planning has been credited as a positive factor in the City’s inter-
organizational and multi-governmental relationships. There seems to be some evidence 
that indicate this plan helped to familiarize key city departments with their likely roles 
and responsibilities, information needs, and funding sources and procedures for 
obtaining them (Johnson, 2014b; Olshansky et al., 2006). Furthermore, continuing work 
begun in the pre-earthquake recovery planning process, Los Angeles developed a limited 
vision of recovery and housing repair program in the first year after the earthquake. The 
mayor, a recovery committee in the City Council, and the Chief Administrator’s Office 
(CAO), had significant management roles in the recovery (Johnson, 2014a).   
The Red River of the North experienced record flooding in late April 1997, 
devastating the downtowns of Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, 
Minnesota, and damaging 83 percent of homes in these communities (GAO, 2009). 
Following its 1997 flood, the City of Grand Forks adapted the Incident Command 
System (ICS) structure for its recovery management organization (Olshansky & 
Johnson, 2014).  This may be the first-ever application of ICS in recovery. 
Shortly after the April 1997 flood, Grand Forks mayor and city council charged 
the heads of the city’s urban development, public works, and finance departments (“Tri-
Chairs for Recovery”) with developing priorities for recovery, submitting action steps 
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for approval, and collectively managing the city’s recovery resources. In the first month 
following the flood, the mayor and these “Tri-Chairs for Recovery” worked together 
with city staff, elected officials, and local community and business leaders to sketch out 
a basic vision for recovery focusing on reducing future flood risks and promoting 
downtown economic development (Johnson, 2014a). By early June, the mayor and tri-
chairs, working with federal officials, had formulated a strategic plan for using 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds and submitted an application for 
hazard mitigation grant funds from the FEMA for voluntary buyouts. By late June, 
Grand Forks leaders, working with a technical assistance team from the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), had drafted a set of policies and programs 
in the form of a Recovery Action Plan for the period of June to November 1997 (the 
“first season of recovery”).  
Based upon the Recovery Action Plan, the city also conducted weekly action 
planning sessions modeled after daily situation planning sessions generally performed by 
emergency responders using the ICS management approach (Johnson, 2014a). Federal 
and state representatives attended the weekly planning sessions in Grand Forks and 
many program restrictions and issues were often resolved there. Nonetheless, over the 
next few years, residents criticized city leaders for relying too heavily on “traditional 
public participation” techniques such as workshops, Round Tables, and public meetings 
which often lack a clear structure and aim to the meeting. Consequently, citywide 
elections in 2000 ousted the mayor and two of the “Tri-Chairs for Recovery” resigned 
soon after (Kweit & Kweit, 2007). The study by Kweit and Kweit (2007: 421) on 
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experience of Grand Forks indicated that, “at least for major decisions, officials should 
make sure that there is a very visible participation process.  
Following the devastation by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, New Orleans 
went through a protracted planning process that lasted nearly two years to develop a 
recovery vision and management structure (Kates, Colten, Laska, & Leatherman, 2006; 
Olshansky et al., 2008). Time had a critical impact on the success and quality of 
recovery planning in New Orleans. On the one hand, unanticipated resident distrust of 
government and professionals and the failure of city officials to designate quickly a 
single agency with the authority to guide a comprehensive recovery planning process 
slowed the development of a citywide rebuilding strategy (Nelson et al., 2007). 
Olshansky et al. (2008) suggested that the city administration could have taken a more 
active leadership role in planning and information management earlier (Olshansky et al., 
2008).  On the other hand, groups of planners were in a rush to develop multiple plans 
quickly, partially because there was not an officially designated New Orleans plan 
sanctioned by the local government. Planning and decision processes were constrained 
by the speed of information flows. Most of the planning processes kept moving ahead 
without adequate information about what others were doing and even in the face of 
discord (Colten, 2008). Researchers point out that had the planners who came to New 
Orleans not felt so compelled to complete recovery plans quickly, they might have been 
more effective at providing reasoned analysis over time to support community actions 
and engaging a broader public in resolving difficult questions of restoration versus 
betterment through deliberative planning (Nelson et al., 2007; Olshansky et al., 2008).  
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Limited planning capacity introduced a set of challenges for post-Katrina 
planning efforts. In New Orleans, the city’s p lanning department was cut for financial 
reasons at a time when increased capacity was needed. It is suggested that reducing the 
city’s planning capacity undermined its ability to apply existing institutional resources to 
the challenges of post-Katrina reconstruction (Olshansky et al., 2008). The City had to 
rely on technical assistance from consultants both inside and outside the disaster area.  
In the spring of 2006, and after three major and multiple smaller planning 
processes had either failed or were not recognized by the city government and a full xx 
months after Hurricane Katrina hit the area, the Greater New Orleans Foundation started 
the Unified New Orleans Plan process in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of previous 
plans. Consequently, given the tight four-month timeframe of the UNOP process, the 
planning teams designed the process with a series of citywide and district-level planning 
meetings that simultaneously provided input on key elements of the plan development 
process, and set expectations for the next phase in the process (Olshansky & Johnson, 
2010). By pivoting between city- level and district- level discussions, the series of 
meetings essentially served as critical focusing, validation, and hand-off points for the 
simultaneous citywide and district planning efforts.  
After the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the long-term recovery process began with the 
formulation of disaster recovery plans by the City of Kobe – the most severely impacted 
municipality – and an overarching plan by Hyogo Prefecture which coordinated 20 
impacted municipalities; this planning effort took six months.  
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In six months, Kobe had a 3-year housing reconstruction plan approved, and 
began the neighborhood planning processes. Planning consultants were hired by the 
local government to work with neighborhood groups. These consulting planners were 
involved throughout the planning process to negotiate the complex agreements needed to 
implement the plans. They also helped to shape ideas for recovery, and brought 
government and ordinary people together (Olshansky et al., 2006).  
The City of Kobe’s recovery plan is, in large part, an adaptation of the 1995-
2005 general plan. On January 13 of 1995, the City of Kobe formally approved its new, 
1995-2005 general plan which had been developed over the course of three years with 
full citizen participation. City officials responsible for drafting the City of Kobe’s 
recovery plan have later admitted that they were able to prepare the city’s recovery plan 
in six months because they had the preceding three years of planning for the new general 
plan with citizen participation before the Earthquake. In addition, the two-month 
moratorium on rebuilding in Kobe city provided time for the city to formulate a vision 
and policies to guide the various levels of government, private investors, and residents in 
rebuilding. Having numerical targets was critical to directing and motivating all the 
stakeholders including the national government’s investment, and it proved to be the 
foundation for Japan’s fundamental approach to recovery following the 1995 earthquake 
(Charmaz, 2006). 
After the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake in Watsonville and Oakland, planning 
evolved from weekly staff meetings, prior plans and practices, and key policy decisions 
made along the way. Neither Watsonville nor Oakland developed a comprehensive 
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recovery plan as it would be expected in a rational process. Instead, community leaders 
were proactive, organized several meetings, and had positive attitudes which according 
to Johnson (1999) were contributed to the success of recovery. In addition, both cities 
benefited from public-private partnerships that emerged after the earthquake and helped 
to provide community forums and develop consensus (Johnson, 2014a). Managers in 
both cities also lamented the lack of time to create a vision for recovery and 
systematically define priorities (Johnson, 1999).   
The lessons for recovery planning based on the brief discussions of the findings 
of previous studies can be summarized under four major themes including time, 
resources, inclusion, and local leadership.  
Time: All of the recovery planning studies found a dilemma between the need to 
plan quickly to provide the community with a vision to proceed, and the time necessary 
for deliberation before making decisions with long lasting effects. Taking the time to 
plan for post-disaster reconstruction when adequate information becomes available is 
important, in order to make the new ‘permanent’ city, based on sound data that inform 
analysis. But, if planning takes too long, it will be ineffective or simply too late to be put 
in to effect. Olshansky et al. (2008) suggest that planning and action should be 
considered as simultaneous activities, so that deliberation can occur without halting vital 
recovery actions (Olshansky et al., 2008). Time also introduces a dilemma between 
short-term and long-term planning. Eadie (1998) warns planners that it is difficult for 
staff to balance both long-term recovery planning and short-term urgent activities like 
expedited permit processing (Schwab et al., 1998). Smith and Deyle (1998) propose that 
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communities should emphasize a distinction between planning for short-term and long-
term recovery to reduce community mistrust of long-term planning as being intrusive 
and make it easier for planners to participate in the important activities of short-term 
recovery such as permit processing that can have long term consequences for the 
community.  
Local leadership: Innovative, proactive, and committed local leadership has been 
suggested to be one of the important if not critical resources for recovery planning.  
Post-disaster recovery is not a rational process that can proceed from a checklist, 
therefore local leaders and planners should be prepared to alter and adopt recovery 
planning guidelines based on their specific needs. Recovery after large disasters involves 
multiple plans by multiple actors. Alesch et al. (2009) describe effective post-disaster 
planning as balancing different directions at various junctures, depending on how things 
are going. Recovery planning should be led by local governments and assisted by state 
and federal governments. Of all levels of governments, local governments have the 
greatest knowledge of the situation and history of the locale, potential experience in 
integrating citizen and business input into local planning and visioning processes, and 
providing information for citizen and business decision-making (Johnson, 1999). Well 
organized and economically strong local governments with good leadership, knowledge, 
and the power to act have been found to promote successful community recovery (Dash 
et al., 1997). 
Resources including financial, information and expertise : Olshansky et al. (2005) 
suggest that post-disaster planning – to be fast, effective, equitable, and provide some 
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improvements over pre-disaster conditions – requires well- funded planning processes, 
rich in information and communication. The effectiveness of recovery planning is driven 
by the information used to establish policy and spur action. Information systems that 
include inventories of parcels, structures, and hazards can greatly facilitate the recovery 
process (Olshansky, 2006). Specific information needed to develop a recovery plan 
includes hazard characteristics and impacted areas; damage assessment; local needs 
assessment; affected population size, composition, and distribution; resources available; 
powers, programs, and responsibilities of local, state, and federal governments as well as 
nonprofits, businesses, and other relevant stakeholder organizations; current and 
projected land-use patterns; the type and location of existing and projected building 
stock and infrastructure, including its interconnectivity to existing and projected 
development (Mileti, 1999).  
Disaster management information systems, particularly databases, 
interdepartmental networking, and geographic information systems (GIS), should be 
integral to local recovery planning and decision-making. Tran (2008) identifies the 
contributions of GIS, integrated computer software, data warehousing, automated 
budgeting systems, and citizen relationship management programs—that aggregate and 
disseminate information to residents on behalf of the city. All of these are critical 
resources for local recovery planning, management, and decision-making (Tran et al., 
2008).  
Outside technical assistance (with disaster experience) is another critical resource 
which should be used to augment local staff, especially when staff is unfamiliar with 
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disasters and disaster regulatory compliance (Alesch et al. 2009). Local governments 
typically augment their post-disaster staffing capacity to help with evaluating and 
assessing the disaster consequences, in devising and evaluating recovery strategies and 
programs, managing programs that involve several agencies, and coordinating with 
granting agencies (Johnson 1999; Schwab 1998). Some communities, as discussed 
above, have hired consultants to provide recovery expertise; others have turned to 
academics and volunteers, especially in post-disaster recovery planning and community 
design (Johnson, 2014).  
Inclusion: Local, citizen-based processes for making and reviewing recovery 
decisions are essential to the success of recovery (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Haas, 
Kates, & Bowden, 1977; Johnson, 1999; Olshansky, 2005; Rubin, Saperstein, & Burby, 
1985; Schwab, 1998). Stakeholders who will be affected by post-disaster decision 
making should provide input and policymakers should obtain buy- in from them. This 
will reduce conflict and aid in the development of a plan that reflects local needs. Berke 
and Campanella (2006) argue that to improve disaster recovery planning and adva nce 
more resilient communities, the federal government should require that communities 
take citizen participation seriously.  
Study Area 
City of Galveston was incorporated in 1839 and was one of the major cities of 
Texas and largest ports in the United States during 19th century. The devastating 
Hurricane in 1900, the deadliest in American History, and frequent hurricanes have tied 
this barrier island to natural disasters. The major economic activities of the city current 
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include the port of Galveston and related maritime interests, tourism, financial and 
insurance institutions, and the island’s largest employer, the University of Texas Medical 
Branch at Galveston (UTMB). Galveston has been experiencing population decline since 
1960s. Ike made landfall near Galveston as a strong Category 2 hurricane, on September 
13, 2008 and 75% of the structures on the island received some degree of damage  
primarily from surge. Almost every resident on the island was was affected in one way 
or another.  
While many Galvestonians were unprepared for the strength Hurricane Ike and 
the depths of the surge, its threat was sensed prior to the storm. In August 2008, Tropical 
Storm Eduardo provided what some called the City’s “dress rehearsal” for preparing an 
emergency response. During a city council meeting in August 2008, the late council 
member, Danny Weber, announced during deliberations over beach re-nourishment that 
the buffering effects of sand deposits guard against the encroachment of storm surge 
from the next major hurricane to hit Galveston, “not if, but when” (Glaser, 1992).  
Galveston was equipped with a number of disaster related plans prior to Ike. 
After seeing the extent of damage brought by Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, 
local leaders created a Disaster Response for Historic Properties Plan as well as a 
comprehensive plan update, complete with a disaster planning element. Unfortunately, 
the comprehensive plan update was two weeks out from adoption when Hurricane Ike 
hit. Although a hazard-specific plan for the city was not in place, recovery planning 
following Ike saw a remarkable resident participation.  
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The Galveston City Council initiated the recovery planning process two months 
after Hurricane Ike with the first appointments to the Galveston Long-Term Recovery 
Committee (LTRC). Galvestonians formed an especially large recovery committee with 
330 members which is exceptional in terms of public involvement for post-disaster 
recovery planning. FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery (LTCR) program, which 
provides support to local recovery planning efforts, was also involved in the planning 
process. 
Methodology 
Qualitative analysis was conducted on data collected through semi-structured 
interviews as well as secondary data including media reports and public documents. In 
general, the goals of this analysis are to understand how Galveston’s post-Ike recovery 
planning process took place and progressed, as well as strengths and weaknesses that 
emerged during that planning process. Another goal for my qualitative analysis is to 
examine whether or not the case of planning in Galveston informs further the issues that 
emerged in the first article and what does it add to our knowledge of challenges in 
recovery planning as well as how to improve it.  
Data sources 
This research was based on qualitative semi-structured interviews. I conducted 
formal and semi-structured interviewing with and initial sample of institutional actors 
whom I initially identified through articles and a guest columns in the Galveston County 
Daily News and other sources discussed below and then employed a snowball sampling 
technique to expand the sample. I also engaged in numerous informal conversations that 
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were converted into field notes after the fact. The qualitative interview data and field 
notes were further supplemented by relevant information gleaned as I collected media 
content and formal meeting agendas and minutes from Galveston City Council and the 
Galveston Long-term Recovery Committee. 
I used several other sources of data to keep track of the recovery debates and 
events as the case unfolds. I analyzed official documents of governmental, quasi-
governmental, and non-profit agencies involved in recovery planning; including the 
Galveston Long-term Disaster Recovery Plan document, minutes, meeting and 
workshops agendas (from FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery team which 
helped Galveston with preparing the long-term recovery plan). I also used popular data 
sources that include newspaper and other forms of media reporting like blog posts and 
documentaries. 
Sample of interviewees 
Newspapers, website information and personal connections through the 
university and previous research activities were used to identify local organizations and 
individuals involved in the recovery planning and policy making. Interviewees were 
selected based on the importance of their role in the course of decision making and 
managing the recovery process in Galveston. For example, individuals who were 
frequently cited in the media reports and debates about the recovery related issues in 
Galveston including housing recovery program, business recovery, long-term 
community recovery, mitigation planning, etc. were contacted and interviewed.  
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I used an emergent snowball sampling design which cannot be drawn in advance 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Phillips, 2014). The fieldwork process reveals the next 
participant, site or document that is needed to be sampled (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). 
In this method each person interviewed is asked to recommend another person who can 
also shed light on the research question until reaching the point of theoretical saturation 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985; in Phillips, 2014).  
Data collection: interview guide 
The set of questions in my interview guide were open-ended to give the 
opportunity to informants to share information and express viewpoints without being 
restricted by the interviewer. Answers they provide to these questions often yielded 
interesting and important insights that were then followed up on by the interviewer using 
probes to stimulate further insights and information. The general areas of inquiry in my 
interviews were Hurricane impact, community’s post-Ike recovery experience, and the 
informant’s role in post-Ike recovery management, recovery planning and policy 
making, evaluation of recovery planning and policy making and its inclusiveness, 
evaluation of recovery outcomes. For the complete interview guide see Appendix 3.  
From May through September 2012, I conducted 18 interviews in Galveston. 
Interviewees represented six city officials (elected or appointed), and personnel from 
three local government agencies including planning department, two local non-
governmental agencies, two local nonprofits, three churches and charities and two 
universities. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours, and were conducted at 
the place of the interviewees choosing, most often interviewee’s office. I conducted all 
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of the interviews. All interviews were audio recorded and all of them have been 
transcribed verbatim for analysis. Immediately following the interview, detailed notes 
were written about the interview and uploaded for analysis.  
Analysis strategies 
All transcribed interviews, meeting agendas and minutes, Long-term Recovery 
Plan document, fieldnotes, newspaper articles and blog posts were uploaded into Atlas.ti 
for qualitative analysis. Qualitative data analysis involves reducing massive amounts of 
data and moving toward deeper, richer, and more nuanced insights, generating 
increasingly focused understanding of the social setting and its cultural elements 
(Phillips, 2014). I coded my data using grounded theory technique.  Coding is the 
process of applying a shortened name or phrase to a portion of data within transcripts, 
notes, documents, or even visual images. According to Phillips (2014) the most 
commonly used approach within qualitative disaster research is grounded theory.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967) created a systematic approach to generating theory 
from qualitative data, though ultimately each author went to separate directions (Glaser, 
1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Their qualitative explanations emanated from systematic 
efforts grounded in coding the data. Grounded theory begins by analyzing data as they 
are gathered, and by comparing bits of information systematically to discern similarities 
and differences. The coding process then proceeds to move the researcher from general 
insights to increasingly specific foci, honing in on and understanding the core concept 
embedded in people’s stories. Doing so requires the analyst to read, read, and then read 
again the interview transcripts, observation notes, or research documents. The ultimate 
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goals include “parsimony and scope”, two essential elements of good scientific work.  
Parsimony means you can encapsulate content efficiently, perhaps within a single 
concept and scope means that you can account for wider amount of data.  
Descriptive analysis (coding) 
Several authors describe coding qualitative data analysis as a process that 
consists of at least two stages: descriptive and conceptual (Bazeley, 2009; Bazeley & 
Richards, 2000; Charmaz, 2006). First-stage includes first cycle and second cycle of 
coding. First cycle of coding consists of noticing and collecting ideas in the first round 
of coding on only part of the data material (Saldana, 2009). I started by open-coding five 
of my interviews and ten of my newspaper articles. In open coding, initially I was 
generating lots of new codes, then I started to reuse more and more of the codes that I 
already had until I reached the first saturation point.  
At that point, I started the second cycle of coding by reviewing my codes and 
developing a coding system. My objective at this step was to push my codes from a 
descriptive to a conceptual, more abstract level. According to Corbin and Straus (1998) 
analysts need to start early in the analytical process differentiating lower- level 
explanatory concepts from the larger ideas or higher- level concepts that seem to unite 
them. Saldana (2009: 149) suggests that the main goal of second cycle coding should be 
to develop a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization 
from the array of first cycle codes. Hence, I started developing my codes into categories 
and subcategories.  
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I merged all codes with the same name or meaning. On the one hand, I had codes 
that had different labels but were similar in meaning and could fit together under one 
code. For example I had several codes denoting strong community engagement in the 
Long-Term Recovery Committee. I merged all of those codes under LTRC_ community 
involvement. On the other hand, I created more abstract category names that conta in no 
data but provide a common label for the subcategories united underneath.  
I developed subcategories in my data to achieve a good description of 
heterogeneity and variance in the data material. In principal, two approaches can be used 
for developing subcategories: subcategories can be developed based on previous 
knowledge (known aspects from the theoretical literature), or found empirically on the 
basis of the data material (Friese, 2012). I used the second approach. For example, I 
broke the category “housing program challenges” to HOUSING PROGRAM_ regulation 
changes, HOUSING PROGRAM_ duplication of benefits, etc.   
Sorting and structuring the codes prepared them for the next level of the analysis, 
where I began to look for relations and patterns in the data with the ultimate aim of 
integrating all findings to tell a coherent story. During the second stage coding, I applied 
the structured code list to the rest of the data which allowed me to alter the developed 
categories and suggested some missing aspects to look for. I ended up with 136 codes, 
17 categories and 56 subcategories to describe my data. Appendix 4 presents the coding 
system I developed. This coding system provided me with an overview of what is in the 
data. Moving on to the analysis step, I started more reflection through querying my 
codes, writing memos and making diagrams.  
 87 
 
Conceptual analysis 
I created research question memos and theory memos to organize the conceptual 
analysis. Memos like codes are containers: code containers collect quotations, memo 
containers collect ideas. Theory memos were used to add information from relevant 
literature, main theoretical concepts, etc. serving as reminders. These memos helped to 
gather empirical evidence in the data material for theories proposed in the literature.  
Research question memos were used to develop my interpretations in response to 
the research questions in a systematic way. While I entered the study with a number of 
questions, systematic writing and development of these memos occurred after coding. I 
developed several research question memos, one for each research question and sub-
question. Memos are working and living documents. When an analyst sits down to write 
a memo, a certain level of analysis should occur (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Having research question memos helped me approach the data analysis in a 
systematic way by formulating precise queries for each question. At this stage I used the 
Query tool, Code Cooccurrence Explorer (similar to cross-tabulation in quantitative 
statistical analysis) and the Codes-Primary-Documents Table (similar to creating a 
correlation matrix in quantitative statistical analysis) to find relations and patterns in my 
data. Research memos played a major role in this analytical process where I wrote down 
my thoughts on data as descriptions, interpretations, or ideas for further question ns and 
queries (Bazeley and Richards, 2000).  
The Query tool can process complex queries by combining codes in different 
ways, more specifically through fourteen (14) distinctive operators. Queries are 
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formulated using the principle of reverse Polish notation (RPN) that all arguments 
(codes or code families) are written first, followed by an operator. For a comprehensive 
view of research memos with data queries used in this analysis see Appendix 5 of the 
dissertation.  
The output of memos became the building blocks of my findings section. Using 
memo outputs adds transparency to the analysis by enabling others to rerun the queries 
that led to my answers to the research questions. It is expected to add to the analysis in 
terms of trustworthiness, credibility, transparency and dependability (Friese, 2012: 146).  
Results 
Looking back at their post-Ike planning experiences after four years, my study 
informants discussed their insights and challenges in recovery planning and what they 
would want or do differently if a similar event occurred. All informants emphasized 
need for planning before the disaster and more deliberation and conflict resolution in the 
planning process. 
Recovery planning process by LTRC 
I start my discussion of LTRC planning process by asking when LTRC planning 
started, who started it and how.  Communities with federal disaster declaration have to 
produce a long-term recovery plan according to the Emergency Support Function 14 in 
the National Response Framework to decide how to spend the federal recovery funds.  
Starting the planning process: When? Who? How?  
FEMA wanted to start ESF14 process in less than a month after Hurricane Ike 
which had hit in September 2008, but the City government officials felt unprepared to 
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start planning because they were still dealing, day to day, with overwhelming amount of 
response and initial recovery related tasks such as issuing permits. The permitting 
process which occupied so much time and effort from the Planning Department in the 
first months following Ike, was perceived as a long and difficult process by some  
homeowners. At a Town Hall meeting with residents in October one speaker from the 
planning department countered anticipated criticisms of time delays when she began by 
stating: 
“I want to start with a few numbers compared to what we normally give out. We 
have a temporary site at the Justice Center. Yes, the lines are long. We 
appreciate your continued patience. Keep in mind we average 500 permits per 
month. As of today since September 22, we’ve issued 2900 permits: 1600 for 
electrical; 80 for commercial, 863 for residential repair” (Quoted in Lord, 
2011).  
The perception of incompetence within the planning department, mixed with a 
general sense of post-Ike frustration, was one of the most recurring criticisms by 
residents following the storm. Reflecting on these perceptions about the post-Ike 
permitting process, one local planner said: 
“If you go from your annual number permits to that being in a monthly, nobody 
is prepared for that kind of volume. Even though we were as well prepared as we 
could have been we certainly couldn’t be prepared for that volume and people 
have long memories.” 
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From local planners’ perspective, planning for long-term recovery was not a 
major priority in the first few weeks following Ike but FEMA had a different 
perspective. Looking back at that immediate post-storm situation, another planner told 
me she thought FEMA was putting the city in a rush to start strategic planning for 
recovery when they were not ready: 
“There was sort of a pressure for the city to engage that process very early on 
and we were still dealing with very basic issues, we were not even in our offices 
utility and we were very much trying to be the support function for people getting 
their permits to get back to their structures.” 
However, previous case studies such as Grand Forks, North Dakota following the 
1997 Red River floods have shown the value of starting strategic recovery planning early 
on to provide a direction for recovery efforts in both actual and symbolic ways. The 
inability or perhaps resistance of the City of Galveston to engage in long-term recovery 
planning in the aftermath of Ike also reveals the value of having a pre- impact disaster 
recovery plan and planning process.  
The local planners I interviewed described how overwhelmed they were during 
the months following Ike with issuing permits, damage assessments, updating GIS maps. 
The planning staff describe these tasks as short-term probably because there was a 
sudden massive increase in the volume of the work the staff had to complete in a short 
time. While short-term tasks are just as critical for long-term recovery, local planners 
argued they could have used high quality planning assistance to free some time and be 
able to better engage in long-term recovery planning by LTRC. Volunteer assistance was 
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not very helpful and was even a burden in some cases as they had very limited time to 
train incoming planning aid, no space and very limited equipment that volunteers needed 
to work. Therefore the local planning department was not able to take advantage of the 
help provided to them. Pre-disaster partnership among planning and development 
departments in neighboring communities with two elements can potentially enable local 
planners to help and get help with overwhelming volume of post-disaster work. The first 
element should be training programs that prepare planners to undertake disaster related 
tasks in an efficient and effective way within their partner community. The second, 
preparing the capacity to using the available assistance, for example by deciding what 
types of space or equipment needs the incoming planners might need and who is going 
to provide what to support them.  
Had the City of Galveston had such mechanisms in place before Ike, they might 
have been able to respond to FEMA’s call to start the process earlier and perhaps avoid 
the future conflicts between city councilmembers and mayor that led to a scramble in 
setting up the planning process. According to one the planning department staff: 
“We told them (FEMA) we would be willing to do this plan starting in January 
and so that is when we started doing the recovery planning process because by 
that time things had at least calmed down enough that we could move forward 
with having more normal… three months to let us get a little bit more settled and 
in December they created that committee and made it such a large committee 
and then we started meeting in January.”  
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This perception among local planners about FEMA’s rush to start planning is 
confirmed in Government Accountability Office’s study of FEMA’s Long-term 
Assistance in Texas following Ike: LTCR and local officials in Galveston reported that 
LTCR attempted to engage the local community in long-term recovery planning about a 
month after Hurricane Ike. However, because the city was still overwhelmed with 
emergency response activities, it had to delay acceptance of this assistance for about 6 
weeks (GAO, 2010).  
Galveston City Council started the ESF14 process by appointing the chair and 
members of the Long-term Recovery Committee on November 20th. That appointment 
process finished six weeks later and resulted in a committee that included 330 residents. 
The first core of the LTRC was comprehensive plan committee with 35 members that 
was responsible for bringing community input into revising process of Galveston’s 
comprehensive plan at the time Hurricane Ike happened. However, neither the chair, nor 
the members of comprehensive plan committee were initially asked whether or not they 
are willing to serve on LTRC which denotes to ignoring the importance of 
communication by the council as the Local government body that intended to take the 
lead on post-Ike planning process. Part of this approach might have been a result of 
disagreements and unresolved conflicts inside the council that led them to act quickly in 
order to win the conflict. One of the LTRC members told me:  
“I think we began to get mired in politics in the late October, early November of 
2008 we had a tug of war between the mayor and the city council about who is 
going to appoint a long-term recovery committee to do any kind of planning on 
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behalf of the city. The mayor had made an appointment of the chairman and she 
had council members were saying that you don’t have the right to do that and so 
she resented this guy`s appointment… 
What happened was I find out the Comprehensive Plan Committee is being 
appointed as the core of the long-term recovery committee,…the first thing we 
did was ascertain which Comprehensive Plan Committee member felt they would 
serve on long-term recovery committee and there were several that said we 
cannot do it. Our houses are in pieces, our businesses are in disaster, and we 
can’t do that. 
Literally unbeknownst to me _ at the time of the storm I chaired the 
comprehensive plan committee_ at a council meeting in November they 
appointed the comprehensive plan committee as the long-term recovery 
committee. I got a phone call, I remember I was grocery shopping and a friend 
called saying that you might want to turn on the television, I think they just 
appointed you chair of the recovery committee. I said I don’t know. That is really 
bad, I mean that is a bad plan, you don’t even ask the chair, you don’t ask the 
person or the people , nobody talked to anybody on the comprehensive plan 
committee and they just appointed us.” 
The city council’s approach to initiating ESF14 and forming LTRC was top-
down on the one hand, and inclusive on the other. The Chairperson herself criticized the 
initiation from the very beginning but after accepting the position she had no control on 
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the rest of that appointment process which later affected the credibility and impact of the 
LTRC plan. 
Community engagement in LTRC 
ESF14 guidelines and procedure support involving the public in long-term 
recovery planning, however Galveston's style of public engagement was unique and new 
to the FEMA LTRC team that was assigned to support this process on the Island. As 
LTRC's chairperson put it: 
"Usually the model or the template is that some FEMA consultants come in and 
they meet with 15 to 20 community leaders and then they go off and they write a 
long-term recovery plan... that is not Galveston Style... it was a process that I say 
they had never seen before." 
LTRC's style, that later became known as "Galveston Style" started to take form 
in October 2008, when Councilperson Beeton publicly accused Mayor Thomas in 
session of assembling a select committee of prominent citizens to secretly guide long-
term redevelopment. This concern could have been related to two things, disagreement 
between the mayor and city council about mayor's selected LTRC chair (whom she 
dropped later) and also to the public housing conciliation agreement that GHA signed 
with housing advocates and HUD to rebuild public housing units demolished by Ike. 
Councilperson Beeton might have been concerned that recovery planning also leads to 
unfavorable decisions since a number of councilmembers including herself were against 
rebuilding the public housing projects as promised in that conciliation agreement. 
Therefore, city council, in an effort to ensure an inclusive open process, decided to take 
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the lead in the recovery planning by forming a very big committee during six weeks 
from November 20th until January 6th. Hence, internal conflicts among local 
government officials and seeking more local control over recovery decisions are  perhaps 
two of the reasons for including 330 Galvestonians directly in recovery planning, as one 
of the LTRC leaders said: 
"I went to the council and said ‘I had 35 people [and now] I am down to 25. I 
need some more [committee members] and here is who I would like to have.’ 
This council member come back to me and says ‘well you are just hand picking 
people. People should have the right to sign up.’ I said fine. 330 [members had 
signed up] later when they stopped appointing. So we went from a committee of 
25‐30 people to a committee of 330 people.” 
The procedure of the LTRC was described as “deliberately ground-up” to 
welcome a broad range of participation and input. It is suggested that the politicization 
of the disaster shock galvanized certain residents (Lord, 2011) into action. In the 
recovery environment, people share urgency for recovery speed; because of this, they 
demonstrate an urgency for participation (Chandrasekhar, Zhang, & Xiao, 2014). 
Interviewees who had served on LTRC offered positive evaluations of the inclusion and 
diversity among the members.  For example one LTRC member said:  
 “a whole lot of people both young and old that had never been engaged civically 
before but they wanted to do something for their community and for many it was 
the first experience in a public service and that was neat! “ 
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However, from a critical perspective, the participatory dynamics showed a divide 
between a small but committed group engaged in the planning process, and a vast 
majority of Galvestonians who were not. The group who were engaged represented a 
“culture of participation” also prior to Ike since several of them were members of local 
groups and organizations. Lord (2011) observed that of the approximately 20 black 
Galvestonians who participated on the LTRC, many tended to serve doubly on the 
Northside Galveston Taskforce. He adds that Hispanic and Vietnamese Galvestonians 
were significantly under-represented and there were no advocacy organizations 
representing Hispanics’ recovery interests, despite the fact that Hispanics comprise 31% 
of the population according to the 2010 Census (Lord, 2011).  
While there was no formal boundary for inclusion or exclusion in LTRC, 
participatory exclusion occurred due to a number of reasons such as lack of personal 
interest, time availability, marginalized situation and skepticism about the procedure. 
Lord (2011) reported that at several open houses which were designed to collect public 
input, the number of committee members in attendance far exceeded “the general 
public”. Talking about challenges of including marginalized citizens in participatory 
processes in a meaningful way, Director of a non-profit that serves poor Galvestonians 
on a daily basis alluded to this issue: 
"…when you're finished (with work) you got to go and get the kids. And then ... 
often times people (who) are marginalized don't speak because they don't know 
what to say...They are not able to articulate it in a way that is received by 
someone who doesn't understand." 
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Marginalized residents tend to be concerned most about day to day needs; and 
according to what Galveston advocates for the poor shared with me, they perceive little 
power to change anything. They generally do not know clearly what to say and know 
how to say it if they attend public engagement forums. Hence LTRC public forums 
might not have had much success in collecting input from these people by focusing on a 
public conversation about visions for the future of Galveston.  
Previous studies found that using procedural forums like recovery committees 
can lead to more formal agreements and plans provided that they engage key decision 
makers and facilitate open dialogue on critical issues. Nevertheless, one LTRC member 
observed that 
“…to some extent the people who run City Council didn’t participate in this 
process. We had one or two city Council people. Mayor never came, maybe just 
came to make a speech. They were not engaged.” 
Apparently those who were engaged in LTRC planning can be best described as 
Galvestonians who were willing to and had the ability to devote considerable amount of 
time and effort, motivated in part by optimism about the opportunity to affect recovery 
decisions and more broadly bringing change. This group also had a capability to seize 
that opportunity to make their voices heard. Consequently, skeptical residents and/or 
officials and marginalized and/or displaced residents did not take part in LTRC planning 
process.  
In their accounts of community engagement in the committee, informants 
expressed both positive and negative opinions. Positive evaluations point to the hope, 
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perception of control, pride (Galveston Style), possibility, unity and the voice it gave to 
citizens through political participation, openness and transparency; commitment and 
hard work by members. For example, one of the planning department staff said: 
"I would say it was successful for a couple of reasons. One because it allowed 
people to have a voice and allowed people to feel they are doing something to 
help their community and if for nothing else that was really valuable at that point 
for them. It was just giving them a voice and giving them a way to help their 
community was a huge benefit; just sort of to people psyche. It was good to be 
able to come together and feel like you are helping to rebuild the community." 
Negative evaluations of involvement of a large group in LTRC shows that 
different observers were skeptical about whether such inclusive process will yield 
meaningful outcomes from two different perspectives. The first group point to difficulty 
of deliberation (which is vital for successful planning) with a large committee and 
difficulty of sorting out unrealistic ideas and focusing on real priorities. The second 
source of skepticism came from marginalized groups. The comment below from an elite 
resident and advocate for the poor illustrates the skepticism among African American 
community towards involvement in LTRC: 
"I have felt that all those hope that we had right after the storm, all of the hope 
that white people thought would change this island, the African American 
population were skeptical because … they never have done that and it ain't going 
to happen, and it didn't. " 
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Procedures of LTRC  
In January 2009 when LTRC started its work, the chairperson and the 330 
members on board worked hard to make and keep the process inclusive, transparent and 
open to the public. This view was echoed by a number of informants, such as the 
director of one of the local government departments who participated in several of 
LTRC workshops: 
"What I saw, of course I wasn’t involved in every (workshop) but what I saw was 
that nobody`s idea was turned down. They tried to get every thought, be as 
inclusive as possible." 
In her report to city council while presenting the LTRC plan, the chairperson 
said: 
“What we’ve figured out is that we live on one island and that we need to be one 
community,… It isn’t about the East End vs. West End, or people who live behind 
the seawall vs. people who don’t. We figured out that we’re one Island and we 
need to work together.” 
Despite the strong claims of unity, committee members were observed to be 
roughly divided into “pro” and “anti” real estate development, or industrial 
“development” versus “quality of life” factions. In general there was a large divide 
between development and quality of life advocates; the latter being disparaged as “pie in 
the sky” visionaries by the former as stated in the quote below from a member of a local 
pro-development group: 
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“we gonna go out start fixing streets and sidewalks in this community, [but there 
were some people who] sit on the [committee],  and say well, dream your new 
vision city. “Well, I think we need bike paths, we need trees here”, meanwhile 
I’ll leave the streets as are unpaved and there is no curb in a lot of places and 
there is grass growing up through the cracks in the sidewalks and there is litter 
everywhere.” 
In contrast to real estate proponents, there were members who argued for 
feasibility of incubating a biotechnology research sector mainly because of UTMB’s 
presence. These divergences of interests and visions for Galveston would reemerge 
during public deliberations of long-term redevelopment planning; inevitably discrediting 
the assertions of post-Ike “unity” in Galveston (Lord, 2011). The size of the committee 
and its short time frame (12 weeks) limited the possibility for meaningful deliberation 
and consensus building around various and sometimes conflicting visions. Chairperson 
of LTRC decided to manage the overwhelmingly big committee by two strategies: 
accepting and adopting every idea.  
LTRC had to finish and present projects to the city council on April 9. To 
manage the LTRC process, the 330 group was divided into five subcommittees based on 
the interests collected in public meetings. Each subcommittee was assigned to provide 
visions, objectives and projects for a particular subject area and finally everything was 
accepted by the larger committee, even the conflicting ideas. Deciding early on that they 
“can’t control the process for that many people” the committee decided to “just accept 
what is coming in and think on it and adapt”.  This approach explains part of the 
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contradictions and disagreements over some of the recovery projects proposed in the 
LTRC plan. Lack of consistency in the plan reduced its feasibility and support from city 
officials while the process brought cohesion and hope to the committee by bringing them 
together for a while.  
Johnson (2014) suggests that the two considerations in deciding the stakeholder 
group’s composition in recovery planning should be first, whose participation is 
essential in guaranteeing technical accuracy and thoroughness for the plan? And second, 
whose participation and support will enhance its political acceptability? (Godschalk, 
2003). With respect to the first consideration, throughout the LTRC planning process, a 
number of the planning department staff attended and assisted in meetings, or provided 
limited data. However, I could argue that they were not leading the LTRC planning, 
rather they were supporting a public engagement process that could potentially generate 
input for planning. With regard to the second consideration suggested by Johnson (2014) 
as one LTRC member concluded “Not having some of the key players on board hurt the 
credibility of the process and plan.”  
A team from FEMA assisted Galveston LTRC in communications, running 
public forums, keeping records of meetings, writing the projects, providing background 
knowledge, and perhaps most importantly ranking the recovery projects. While the 
technical and logistical support from FEMA’s Long-Term Recovery Team was 
significant and appreciated by the LTRC members, the local control on the procedures 
was maintained.  
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FEMA’s LTCR team provided and applied a ranking tool for categorization of 
projects in terms of the relative value of the projects in relation to the recovery 
objectives. The categories assigned to recovery projects were intended to communicate 
which projects have a direct value to support recovery objectives, as opposed to broader 
community interests that do not support recovery challenges and needs. However, LTRC 
members seemed to (mis)understand the ranking of projects by FEMA’ team as 
assigning implementation priorities to them; a perception the committee stated in the 
recovery plan. While the assigned recovery values were not intended to reflect priorities 
of Galveston and suggest an order for implementation of the plan, the committee 
members and citizens in general (unreasonably) expected that projects with high 
recovery value get funded and implemented.  
Creating unreasonable expectations for implementation of projects might be in 
part due to the limited understanding of the utility of the tool among LTRC members.  
According to FEMA’s LTCR officials the tool was intended to be used to communicate 
relative recovery value of the projects but not actually prioritize them. The FEMA 
officials said that they were unable to more effectively communicate the purpose of their 
recovery value tool as it related to the recovery plan or assist the City of Galveston with 
the plan’s implementation (GAO, 2010).  
The federal support for this local planning effort was limited to the short life of 
LTRC and did not continue. Government Accountability Office (2010) reports that 
LTCR program officials recognized that additional long-term recovery support would be 
needed by the city after they left, and accordingly developed a demobilization plan that 
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transferred oversight of remaining recovery duties to a regional FEMA staffer. However, 
the regional staff member met with city officials only once and had little additional 
interaction with them afterward (GAO, 2010).  
As a result of the hasty assistance, FEMA’s team made only an incomplete 
transfer of recovery planning guides and tools to the local planners. They were asked by 
FEMA leadership to end their assistance immediately after developing the recovery plan.  
 Challenges of LTRC 
LTRC started to engage the community in long-term recovery planning through 
developing a vision, goals and recovery projects to guide Galveston on the recovery 
road. In reaching its purpose, LTRC faced a number of challenges and burdens. One of 
them is lack of planning expertise and skills for crafting realistic goals and 
implementation strategies for recovery. Planners can improve participation and make it 
“meaningful by providing citizens with information about problems and alternative ways 
of solving them and by providing opportunities for dialogue among citizens and between 
citizens and planners” (Burby, 2003).  
A recurring issue in the LTRC planning, as in many other planning efforts, was 
finding funding sources for the proposed projects. The committee did not have and were 
not provided with adequate information about available funding opportunities for the 
projects they were proposing. Lack of “creativity in proposing funding resources”, as 
one of my interviewees in a local government agency described it, limited the feasibility 
of the recovery plan.  
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Limited background information and expert knowledge about issues LTRC were 
supposed to plan for, insufficient time, and planning expertise for conducting analysis 
were also weakened the recovery planning by LTRC. Lack of fact-basis for decision-
making was the reason there are several “study projects” proposed in LTRC plan. Those 
projects were proposed to create the fact-basis and inform future decisions of the local 
government.  
Another challenge of LTRC was using local planning expertise. Planning 
department staffs tried to engage and support LTRC planning but not as much as they 
wanted to. According to the department head if the process had started 6 months later 
they would have been done with basic planning functions such as issuing permits and 
could discuss long-term recovery issues better. However, it can be argued that 6 months 
later might have been too late for post-impact recovery planning. I could suggest, based 
on the reflections of planners I interviewed, that perhaps if planning department was 
better prepared for undertaking short-term day to day recovery functions such as damage 
assessment, mapping, etc. with outside planning help, local planning resources would be 
more available and devoted to long-term planning and decision-making for recovery.  
Engaging and obtaining support from the key stakeholders, specifically local 
government officials was difficult in the post-Ike planning effort. Despite rejecting 
politics in recovery planning, one of the LTRC members acknowledged the need for 
engaging local politicians, particularly the councilmembers in the planning process: 
” … on the one hand I wish it wasn’t so political and on the other hand if it’s got 
to be practical to get implemented they needed to participate.” 
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In disaster recovery planning, self-conscious and inclusive deliberation can help 
community leaders make better decisions that reflect the broader understanding and 
respect for the lives and well-being of all the affected people (Birch & Wachter, 2006). 
True deliberation is more than discussion, it has a clear end point—a decision—and it is 
important to know that it is not always pretty or easy and, when done effectively has a 
good deal of controversy built into it and can be really tough (Birch and Wachter 2006). 
However, there are many advantages to having a true deliberative recovery planning 
process. As noted earlier, it seems that limited planning skills, short time frame, and 
disengaged local officials created circumstance in which the “accepting every idea” was 
perceived as the best strategy for managing the LTRC planning process. With this 
strategy, LTRC inevitably ignored controversies without deliberation.  
Accomplishments of LTRC 
LTRC showcases a community practicing bottom-up decision-making after a 
disaster.  The relative openness of the participatory process of the Long-term Recovery 
Committee may ultimately be its most significant achievement, in spite of the 
impossibility of a Habermasian ideal of full access. 
While planning rush limited deliberation and consensus building, several 
interviewees noted that early start of community engagement through LTRC helped with 
uplifting public spirit, optimism and empowerment. It created bonds and gave a sense of 
control to citizens that helped with psychological aspect of community recovery. People 
felt they are doing something important for their community and that would have helped 
them feel stronger and deal with their individual recovery challenges. 
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Those who were involved in LTRC take pride in it and believe that the 
“committee did a great job” of providing some priorities for recovery. The committee 
leaders argued that if there was a planning process already established, LTRC would 
have had more success: 
” a process should have been in place already. I mean if you know you know you 
are prone to disasters, vulnerable to disasters, then figure out how you are going 
to function post disaster.” 
The recovery plan by LTRC 
The Long-term Community Recovery Plan was submitted and presented to the 
City Council in April 2009 and was only accepted rather than adopted, although not 
without disagreements. Within the Galveston Long-Term Community Recovery (LTCR) 
Plan, FEMA itself is not mentioned as an author, although the team from FEMA 
provided assistance to the committee in conducting the process and to some degree in 
writing parts of the plan. One of the planning department staff noted: 
“We [Galveston locals] are strong on our own. This plan was crafted by our 
residents, with wonderful assistance from the government, but we wanted it to be 
ours. We were proud that we created it instead of an outside entity. We are the 
only LTCR Plan so far which was written in this manner.”  
The projects in the LTRC plan 
LTRC plan summarizes 42 recovery projects that the committee proposed to 
achieve sustainability and resilience as their vision for Galveston. In the testimony to 
City Council before presenting the plan, LTRC chairperson said: 
 107 
 
“We learned that it wasn’t going to be good enough to just take our community 
to where we were on September 12 of last year. We needed to plan to be 
stronger, more sustainable, and more resilient. We knew this plan needed to take 
Galveston to a better place. What we heard loud and clear from the hundreds of 
Galvestonians who talked to us was that our citizens want a community that 
behaves in an environmentally sensitive manner that protects its people, its 
infrastructure, and its natural resources.”  
Directed by this vision, the subcommittees each developed a number of projects 
(total of 42 projects) that could be classified in five groups:  
 Green or sustainability projects such as “The Trees Project,” and the West 
Galveston Island Conservation project” 
 Community service projects to attract middle class population such as 
“multi-used high athletics complex”, and a housing needs assessment 
along with projects that aimed the lower income population such as 
“transition from being renters to homeowners”, “Neighborhood Learning 
Centers”, as well as the UTMB-affiliated public health needs assessment 
project 
 Controversial “development” projects like paid parking on the seawall 
and casino gambling feasibility study 
 Infrastructure project such as sewer system enhancements, the 
enhancement and hardening of drinking water systems  
 Historical preservation projects 
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Housing recovery among the projects 
Housing recovery assistance, especially for low to moderate income 
Galvestonians, was often mentioned as one of the major struggles of the local 
government. While housing recovery was not adequately addressed by LTRC, even the 
proposed projects seem to have yielded limited outcomes for the Galveston. Local 
housing advocates involved in LTRC called for facilitating housing recovery for 
underinsured, low-to-moderate income homeowners in innovative, cost-effective ways. 
This call led, for example, to the initiative proposed by LTRC housing subcommittee to 
establish between one and three neighborhood “drop-in” for application assistance, 
design standards, and “green” building guidelines which unfortunately did not 
materialized (Lord, 2011).  
A housing market assessment study was conceived in the LTRC housing 
subcommittee and incorporated into the LTRC plan. This proposed study could 
potentially provide some solutions to two problems that existed before Ike: increasing 
number of middle income families working in Galveston who left the Island for better 
housing and school options on the mainland, and the very high ratio of vacant housing 
on the Island. A third problem emerged after Ike with arguments against rebuilding 
public housing while there so many vacant units to meet the housing needs.  
Housing market assessment project was contracted to CDM, the Massachusetts-
based consultant hired to administer CDBG housing program as well. City staff, housing 
subcommittee members, and council members, had eager expectation for the anticipated 
market knowledge. However, the document that was eventually released by CDM in 
 109 
 
June 2010 was just another hasty assemblage of facts and figures and recommendations 
that largely corroborated knowledge of city staff (Lord, 2011).  
It could be argued that local planners might have been better situated to 
undertake a housing market study compared to CDM who had limited local knowledge 
and appropriate expertise1. Given the contested nature of housing issue in Galveston, 
local planners might also be more likely to possess relevant skills needed for building 
consensus among the housing stakeholders, such as apartment complex owners, 
homeowners associations, council members, housing advocates, UTMB as one of the 
biggest employer on the Island, etc. However, it should be noted that local planners may 
have not had the ability, staff, and particularly time needed to undertake a sound 
comprehensive study under the post-Ike circumstances.  
Support for the plan 
The fact that FEMA did not put their logo on LTRC plan denotes that the agency 
did not want to approve a recovery plan which was written only with their team’s 
assistance and not their full control and authorship. As one local planner said:  
“One interesting [issue] that came out is ESF 14 FEMA folks refused to put their 
logo on the Galveston recovery plan and the reason … is because the Galveston people 
insisted that they have the final editorial rights because they wanted to ensure that what 
they wrote was what the committee said and because of that FEMA wouldn’t allow their 
logo to be put on their plan.” 
                                                 
1
 CDM is better known for its expertise in infrastructure 
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The pride community and local government took in the LTRC plan had various 
degrees. While most committee members, planners and a number of local government 
officials were proud or approving of the LTRC plan and insisted that the city council 
accept it in its entirety, there were councilmembers, including one who had a role in 
forming and participated in LTRC process, who at the first round of voting refused to 
accept the plan for issues they had with two of the recovery projects. They objected to 
the acceptance of a document that they believed implicitly supported two projects whose 
premises they disagreed: Casio feasibility study and Ike Dike. Eventually the council 
accepted the LTRC plan. City Council held a number of workshops in May to review the 
plan for possible adoption but it was never officially adopted. Both LTRC chair and 
members who attended that city council meeting were disappointed by the objections: 
“…we (committee) wanted them (city council) to accept this whole plan and 
there were people in the committee that disagreed with parts of the plan,… but 
when we got to city council some council members started picking it apart but 
the committee rose and said we don’t agree with all the aspects of it but we want 
you to accept these as a whole.” 
Ranking the projects: recovery value versus priority  
As noted earlier, FEMA’s Recovery Value Tool is used as a standardized 
methodology for assigning proposed projects a recovery value of high, moderate, or low. 
FEMA had a primary role in assigning recovery values to each project. However, 
according to the recovery plan, in addition to FEMA’s application of its Recovery Value 
Tool’s assessment, additional input was gathered from the numerous public venues and 
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the committee meetings and incorporated into the determination of a project’s Recovery 
Value. These two different assessments were not always consistent.  
According to the FEMA’s guidance, a project that is categorized as having 
“moderate” value “provides benefits for some economic sectors,” but “does not have 
communitywide or regional impacts, has limited community support and benefits, is 
difficult to achieve and sustain,” and/or “has less definable outcomes.” In this context, it 
could be unexpected that improving drinking water system and restoring the city’s five 
wastewater treatment plants received moderate priority. The latter serve approximately 
22,000 homes and can potentially attract population to the Island.  
FEMA’s team assigned a lower recovery value to infrastructure projects intended 
to restore the basic function and services of the city than to projects whose goal was to 
beautify Galveston. All of the city’s infrastructure projects, such as rebuilding the city’s 
water distribution system, sewer lines, and major bridges, were ranked as a lower or 
equal priority compared to projects intended to augment the city’s beauty, such as 
enhancing the main beach area or redeveloping historic parts of downtown. For example, 
it is surprising that infrastructure recovery projects like providing sewer system to a part 
of town gets equal priority to “Take A Seat” project.  The “Take A Seat” project 
proposed to rebuild and expand availability, visibility, reliability, and use of bus, trolley, 
and other mobility options for people to conveniently and quickly get everywhere on the 
Island without needing a car.  
It is noted in the recovery plan that the size and complexity of some  projects 
actually lowered their recovery value based on the FEMA tool. Infrastructure projects 
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are among the most expensive and complex projects in the plan. Therefore, it seems that 
the cost and complexity of projects might have been given more weight than 
communitywide or regional impacts and definable outcomes in determining the recovery 
value.  
There seems to be some degree of disconnect between perceived utility of the 
recovery value tool by FEMA officials and the committee. FEMA’s LTCR officials told  
GAO (2010) that their categorization of projects is intended to communicate to 
stakeholders only the relative value of the projects in relation to the recovery objectives, 
but not actually prioritize them. Nevertheless, the recovery plan stated that those values 
need to be considered when assigning priorities and time frames for implementation. The 
result was raising expectations. The committee and other Galvestonians expected to see 
“high priority” projects in the plan funded and implemented while some state and local 
officials preferred to use the limited funds for projects that they ranked as actually 
important. 
Implementation  
As noted earlier lack of information and consequently “creativity” for proposing 
funding resources, was one of the challenges of LTRC and limited the feasibility of the 
recovery plan. Moreover, since the plan was only accepted, no entity was required to and 
had allocated money specifically for implementation of the projects. As a result, some of 
the projects were implemented based upon personal or group interests and if there was a 
champion (with higher socio-political position) for them. Also projects that were already 
proposed before Ike had a higher chance of implementation.  
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The recovery plan had a number of indirect impacts. Some of “green” building 
guidelines from LTRC plan have been incorporated into the latest Comprehensive Plan 
that was finished in 2011 and that the recovery projects informed allocation of the first 
round of CDBG funds to some extent. However, perhaps because it was not adopted by 
the city,  officials emphasized the positive indirect impact of the LTRC planning process 
in bringing the community together rather than any direct impact the plan may have had 
for actually guiding the recovery process in terms of implementable projects. For 
instance a local official noted:  
“…it felt good at the time… I feel like there’s been a bit of disconnect, and, but 
you know I think it informed … our identification of what we want to spend our 
CDBG money on.” 
Conclusion 
The Galveston LTR process showcases community engagement and cooperation 
after Ike. The focus on cooperation and engagement reinforced positive planning goals 
like empowerment, sense of ownership, optimism, unity, and yet there were negative 
consequences like ignoring conflicts, accepting every idea without consensus building, 
rush and little deliberation, and limited support from authorities. The biggest 
accomplishments of LTRC process in Galveston are perhaps the strong community 
involvement and transparency which were found to be vital for the support and 
credibility of this process in the community.  
Galveston sets a good example for other communities in undertaking a bottom-up 
grassroots decision-making process despite the challenges and limitations it faced. On 
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the one hand, it shows the value of providing the opportunity for citizens to have a voice 
in the recovery decisions. The wide community engagement could be interpreted as an 
opportunity for better planning following a disaster since it may not be easy to attract 
wide public participation in normal time planning, as several of research informants 
suggested too. 
 Community engagement experience in Galveston, on the other hand, could 
potentially strengthen recovery planning by generating ideas and support from citizens. 
However, perhaps because of the failure to actually develop consensus and political will 
on the part of the committee, the plan was never officially adopted by the city and as a 
consequence many of the 42 projects presented by the Long-term Recovery Committee 
remained unimplemented. Therefore, the hope embedded in recovery initiatives decided 
by the community, had increasingly given way to distrust especially of the local 
government.   
Study of recovery planning in Galveston revealed the importance and challenges 
of planning for recovery at the local level.  several of the informants suggested that the 
recovery plan could have been more effective if it had financial feasibility, political 
support and community buy- in. To seize the window of opportunity (massive 
community engagement and availability of federal recovery funds) Galveston needed a 
strong planning process.  While replacing what was damaged by Ike, Galveston used the 
opportunity to finish the comprehensive plan with a disaster mitigation element, 
demolish the old and vulnerable public housing units to rebuild quality housing for low 
income residents, to replant the trees, clean the beach, etc.  
 115 
 
One of the most important lessons that the post-Ike experience of Galveston 
echoes is to bring a proactive approach to recovery planning. My findings demonstrate 
the need to encourage localities to inclusively plan in advance for seizing the post-
disaster opportunities for the interest of community rather than passively react to the 
conflicts or simply ignoring them. Galveston has demonstrated the importance of not 
only engaging the citizens, but also key stakeholders who, through their expertise and 
influence, can potentially help generate ideas based on actual deliberation on difficult 
issues. Furthermore, inclusive does not mean accepting every possibility, it also means 
developing consensus on central ideas and providing some focused goals.  It is more 
feasible to establish such inclusive and deliberative planning processes with a wide 
range of participants before a catastrophic event than afterwards.  
Local planners and organizations noted a range of possible improvements 
particularly towards advancing disaster resilience that could have been achieved during 
the window of opportunity after Ike. Recovery funds could have been effective in 
seizing that opportunity while addressing some of the old issues as well. However, 
unlike what some of the LTRC members imagined, federal assistance and the recovery 
projects (if they were implemented) probably could not change the underlying forces 
that have shaped Galveston on a barrier island.  
One of the shortcomings of recovery planning after Ike was failing to develop a 
fact-based and consensus-based vision for future that is supported by key stakeholders. 
Lack of such vision limited LTRC`s effort to a successful engagement process that 
generated ideas rather than a deliberative inclusive planning process. However, such 
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vision and process might have been out of reach with the circumstances in which LTRC 
was working. 
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CHAPTER IV 
3RD ARTICLE: PLANNING FOR LONG-TERM COMMUNITY RECOVERY: 
LESSONS FROM MEASURING RECOVERY AFTER HURRICANE IKE 
Introduction 
With the increasing emphasis on the need for preparing for long-term recovery 
(Leonard & Howitt, 2010; Smith, 2011; Smith & Birkland, 2012), it is crucial to conduct 
more systematic analyses of recovery outcomes and processes. Quantifying community 
recovery to establish empirical patterns, and describing the overall picture of recovery 
can inform recovery and mitigation planning. Comparing sectors within a disaster helps 
to understand, track and compare recovery, identify assistance needs, and inform post-
disaster decision making. 
Commonly-available statistical data provide useful tools for quantifying 
recovery; however, these tools remain underutilized (Chang, 2010). Capturing overall 
community recovery requires well-defined recovery measures and indices as well as 
historical or regional databases. Population change, median household income, 
economic structure, housing value, and number of businesses are among the most 
frequently used indicators to measure the community recovery.  
Researchers have either compared the disaster-stricken city with a reference 
region, which was not affected with respect to recovery indicators, or used time series to 
build long-time trends of recovery indicators for the affected area. Attempts at 
developing multiple indicators to measure different dimensions of recovery mostly focus 
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on catastrophic disasters in large metropolitan areas, for which time series data are more 
regularly published. Hence, there is a gap with respect to measuring recovery in smaller 
communities that are extensively affected by disasters.  
Very few studies have systematically examined long-term recovery of different 
sectors and subpopulations within communities using time series statistical data (Chang, 
2010; Zhang & Peacock, 2010). Quantitative studies of recovery have rarely addressed 
various aspects and recovery of different sectors together; the focus in the literature is 
either on modeling disaggregated housing recovery, or examining long-term aggregate 
level population, business, and economic recovery in larger communities affected by 
catastrophic events. Hence, it is necessary to develop a measurable definition of 
recovery that integrates significant sectors of this phenomenon, in such a way that 
community recovery can be comprehensively understood, and apply this definition to 
smaller communities that are extensively affected by natural disasters.  
Research Question and Hypothesis 
This article presents a quantitative assessment of recovery in Galveston, Texas 
following Hurricane Ike (2008) with two purposes. First, I developed a measurable 
definition of recovery that integrates significant dimensions of community recovery. 
Second, I quantified community recovery to describe empirical patterns of population, 
economic, and housing recovery. The central questions of this study are the extent of 
which Galveston has recovered from the impact of Hurricane Ike at the aggregated a nd 
disaggregated levels, and what is the relationship between social vulnerability and rate of 
recovery. More specifically, I will address these questions: 
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 To what extent has Galveston has recovered from the impact of Hurricane Ike 
with respect to its population, economy, and housing? 
 Did different forms and types of housing and across all neighborhoods recover 
at similar rates and levels?  
 If there were differential in recovery trajectories, what aspects of social 
vulnerability were associated with slower housing recovery? 
As can be seen in Figure 1, Hurricane Ike made landfall on the east end of 
Galveston Island, after decreasing in intensity from a Category 4 to a Category 2 storm 
following its path over Cuba, in the early morning of 13 September 2008. Twelve 
fatalities in Galveston and Chambers Counties are directly attributable to Ike (Berg, 
2009). Total financial damage from Ike in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas is estimated 
at $24.9 billion dollars, making it the 4th costliest hurricane in U.S. history, after 
Katrina, Sandy and Andrew (Berg, 2009). While Ike was only classified as a category 2 
hurricane in terms of wind speeds, when it hit the Galveston area, its surge was much 
larger than what would be normally attributed to such a storm. Much of that surge 
overtopped Bolivar peninsula, scouring away homes, foundations, and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the surge traveled up the Houston ship channel, and flooded Galveston 
Island from the bay side, flooding much of the city’s urban core. The maximum high 
water mark recorded by FEMA was 17.5’, located on Bolivar Peninsula (Highfield et al., 
2010; Van Zandt et al., 2012). This surge event caused severe damage to structures on 
Bolivar Peninsula. 
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In undertaking this analysis there are a number of factors, related to the unique 
aspects of the Galveston area, which should be considered. The spatial development 
patterns and pressures, as well as hazard risks that occur in areas such as Galveston 
Island and Bolivar Peninsula, may be considerably different from those found in typical 
urban and rural areas. Development pattern in Galveston Island is bifurcated with a 
denser and much older urban core on the island’s east side, which was protected by a 
sea-wall erected after the infamous 1900 storm, and newer development, primarily 
devoted to vacation and retirement homes, utilizing better building codes, on the West 
End. On Galveston Island, 7.5% of housing is counted as vacation or recreational by the 
 
Figure 1. Location of Galveston Island 
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2000 census, and a disproportionate share of its housing is renter-occupied (56.4%) 
compared to owner-occupied. In addition, Galveston has experienced steady population 
decline since the 1960s, which, as we shall see, was accelerated, at least temporarily by 
Hurricane Ike. As a result, many households left the Island, either because they were 
forced to find housing off the island, or, in the case of many middle class families with 
children, were able to find more affordable housing options while still commuting to 
Galveston for work. It is also noteworthy that the global economic and real estate crisis 
occurred in 2008, the same year as Hurricane Ike. In this context, refinancing and 
financing housing recovery might have been particularly difficult.  
Measurement, Data and Analysis Methods 
The first step in measuring recovery is defining it with respect to a reference. 
Disaster can be viewed as setting an urban system into at least a temporary instability, 
wherein the system experiences rates of change that exceed the pre-disaster normal 
range. From this viewpoint recovery occurs when rates of change return to normal (pre-
disaster) range. This perspective will allow for structural changes in the system where an 
indicator is stabilized at a new level but the rate of change is back to the norma l range. 
Chang (2010) suggested that measuring recovery with this new normal approach should 
focus on flow variables measured at given periods of time, with an inherent dimension of 
temporal change. However, she also recognized the applicability of stock variables, 
measured at a given point in time, when comparing recovery of sub-populations within a 
disaster.  
 122 
 
Deciding which indicators to use for measuring recovery depends on availability 
of the data as well as particularities of the community/disaster under study. The most 
important criterion is that the indicator should be meaningful from the point of view of 
policy and decision making in the affected community (Chang, 2010). It is also crucial 
to distinguish the effects of the disaster from other exogenous trends that affect regional 
growth and change, such as the global and national economic crisis that occurred within 
days of Hurricane Ike. This can be achieved by normalizing local levels to the regional 
levels, and also through comparing local rates of change to the pre-disaster local rates of 
change. Inquiry into recovery differentials across sectors, neighborhoods, and population 
groups is required, because effects of disaster may not be apparent from aggregate 
statistics.  
Chang (2010) proposed a set of criteria and indicators for measuring and  
comparing disaster recovery across different disasters, and within segments of a 
community affected by one disaster. That set of indicators was then used to quantify 
recovery of Kobe, Japan after the 1995 catastrophic earthquake in terms of population, 
businesses, economic production, income, and port traffic.  For this study, I applied the 
principles suggested by Chang (2010) to select appropriate indicators from the ones used 
in previous studies based on particular characteristics of Galveston and Hurricane Ike as 
well as availability of data. I measure recovery of Galveston in three dimensions of 
population, economy, and housing. Depending on the specific recovery indicator and 
objectives in each part of this assessment, a combination of descriptive and bivariate (or 
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partial) correlation analysis was used to track changes or build trends, compare changes, 
examine relationships, etc. 
Table IV summarizes the indicators and data sources I used to track the post-Ike 
recovery in Galveston at aggregate and individual levels. The population levels of the 
city were tracked for a 13-year period, which covers eight years prior to Ike and five 
years after Ike. It is assumed that the five years after Ike is long enough for the city to 
reestablish the pre-Ike rate of change, so that the contextual trend of population decline 
since 1960s is distinguishable from the recovery of population lost by Ike, which is the 
subject of interest in studying the trend. 
The population recovery may not have similar patterns in different segments of 
the city and among different race and ethnic groups as well as across different spatially 
located neighborhoods. To assess changes across neighborhoods .Block group was used 
as an equivalent to a neighborhood. However, due to lack of annual population data at 
block group level, and the number of block groups (68), which makes comparison of 
trends rather difficult, I compared population of block groups at two points: before and 
after Ike. ACS 2005-09 population data are used as the pre-Ike population data, and ACS 
2009-13 data are used as the post-Ike population data. The problem with these data are 
of course that 2009 data (when population is expected to be at the lowest level) are 
included in both 5-year estimates, which are meant to represent two comparable periods. 
Therefore, it is difficult to separate the effects of the disaster from pre-disaster (2005-08) 
changes and long-term trends independent of the hurricane. Therefore these data are 
supplemented by using Census 2000 and 2010 data as well as ACS 3 year estimates, 
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which have better precision in capturing changes due to Ike. ACS 2005-07 represents 
pre-Ike racial/ethnic composition of the city and ACS 2011-13 along with ACS2008-10 
represent post-Ike racial/ethnic composition respectively immediately after Ike, and 3-5 
years following Ike. 
Economic recovery is assessed in terms of the diversity and share of industries in 
terms of employment and earnings. Inflow-outflow analysis is also helpful in exploring 
the impact of Ike on the one of the major challenges of Galveston: population loss in 
spite of employment growth. Changes in the share of each industry in employment and 
the types of jobs by earnings demonstrates the disparities in economic recovery across 
economic sectors. The shares of 2008 were compared to the shares of 2011 for the city, 
and then, the changes were compared with the changes in the same period for Galveston 
County and State of Texas. By comparing the local changes to the regional economy, 
effect of contextual trends are taken into account. If the pattern of changes is different in 
size and direction from those of the county or state, it can be attributed to the hurricane.  
  
 
125 
Table IV. Indicators of recovery 
Dimension Indicator Level Type Data source Data Interval 
Population Population change Ci ty  Time series Intercensal population 
estimates 2001-13 
Annual 
Population change  Block 
Group  
Before/after 
Dis tribution: 
map 
ACS 2005-9  w/ ACS 2009-
13 
5 years 
Population 
composition 
change by 
race/ethnici ty 
Ci ty  Before/after ACS 2005-07 w/ACS2008-
10 w/ACS 2011-13 
Census 2000 w/census 
2010 
3 years 
Population 
composition 
change by 
race/ethnici ty 
BG ACS 2005-09 w/ACS 2009-
13 
5 years 
Economy # jobs  by industry 
(main industries) 
Ci ty  Time series On The Map (LEHD)  Annual 
2002-11 
share of industries 
from total number 
of jobs  (main 
industries ) 
Ci ty  Time series On The Map (LEHD)  Annual 
2002-11 
Jobs  by earning Ci ty  Time series On The Map (LEHD) 
Inflow of workers  Ci ty  Change in % 
Time series 
On The Map (LEHD) Annual 
Housing Average appraised 
value  
Ci ty by 
housing 
type 
Time series Galveston County Appraisal 
Dis trict 
(GIS parcel shapefiles and 
attribute tables) 
Annual  2008-
12 parcels 
aggregated to 
ci ty 
Average appraised 
value loss 2008-09: 
Damage  
Parcel  
by 
housing 
type 
Galveston County Appraisal 
Dis trict 
Annual  2008-
12 parcels 
aggregated to 
block groups 
damaged housing 
reaching 
restoration levels   
Parcel  
by 
housing 
type 
Dis tribution 
by type 
Galveston County Appraisal 
Dis trict 
Annual  2008-
12 parcels 
aggregated to 
ci ty 
Average #years to 
restore pre-Ike 
appraised value 
Parcel  
by 
housing 
type 
Dis tribution: 
map 
Galveston County Appraisal 
Dis trict 
Annual  2008-
12 parcels 
aggregated to 
block groups 
# years to restore 
pre-Ike appraised 
value and 
appraised value 
change 2008-10, 
2008-11, and 
2008-12  
Parcel  
by 
housing 
type 
Partial 
correlation 
with 
neighborhoo
d social 
vulnerability 
indicators 
Galveston County Appraisal 
Dis trict and ACS 2009 5-
year estimate 
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The data for housing recovery analysis are drawn primarily from the Galveston 
County tax assessment parcel data for Galveston island and the Bolivar Peninsula. 
Specifically, I selected residential parcels with single-family, multifamily, and duplex 
designations for the five years from 2008 through 2012 based upon the 2008 land use 
designation.2 Simply because a parcel is designated as residential with one of these 
classifications, does not necessarily mean there is actually a structure on the property. 
Hence I focused on only each parcel’s “improvement” assessment value, which captures 
the tax assessed value of the structure on the property, not the land value itself. Parcels 
were included in this analysis if they were single family or duplexes with improved 
values of $7,500 or above, multi- family structures valued at $30,000 or above, and either 
remained with their 2008 land-use classification, or became vacant through each of the 5 
years3. The final sample size consisted of data on 24,667 parcels of which 23,587 are 
single-family, 140 are duplexes, and 940 are multi- family structures. 
A parcel’s assessed improvement value is the basis upon which hurricane 
damage and recovery is measured. Damage is assessed in relative terms by calculating 
the loss in assessed value between 2009 and 2008 assessed. 4 Different authors have 
measured housing recovery in a variety of ways. Wu and Lindell (2004) and Henry 
2 Appraised value assessments are drawn from Galveston County Appraisal District tax data 2008-2012. The 
improvement values are assessed by property appraisers during the first half year, and the initial property appraisals 
are sent to all property owners in late August and early September. Property owners can challenge the appraisals 
during the following months, and the adjustments can be made through December. Therefore, the appraisal values of 
2008 reflect the appraised values during January 2008 to June 2008, about 3 to 8 months before Hurricane Ike. 
According to Texas Constitution, all property is taxed each year as of its status on January 1. 
3
 There were also approximately 20 single-family s tructures that were reclassified as multi-family because their 
internal structure was subdivided into apartments that remained in the analysis .   
4
 Damage = [(2008 assessment – 2009 assessment)/2008 assessment] * 100 
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(2009) measured the speed of housing reconstruction by the time at which rebuilding 
permits were issued (Wu & Lindell, 2004). Zhang and Peacock (2010) and Peacock, Van 
Zandt, Zhang and Highfield (2014) used appraised improvement value changes (Peacock 
et al., 2014; Zhang & Peacock, 2010) and Cutter et al. (2014) relied on the in situ 
observation of a structure to determine the level of recovery in a longitudinal study 
(Cutter et al., 2014). I used the parcel’s appraised improvement values to track recovery 
and restoration. Restoration is defined as returning to pre-Ike appraised value, and I 
tracked how long, on average, it took various forms of housing to reach restoration 
levels. Recovery is measured as relative gains toward meeting and exceeding pre-impact 
assessed values. 
Extent of damage, as well as recovery of different housing types, might vary due 
to effects of social vulnerability, which are not accounted for by the average patterns. To 
understand the relationship between social vulnerability and rate of housing recovery in 
Galveston I used partial correlation analysis between damage as well as recovery with 
social vulnerability indicators that I obtained from ACS 5-year estimates at block group 
level. 
Analysis and Findings 
Population recovery 
Total population 
As noted above, Galveston has experienced population decline since 1960s. The 
population trend for the 2000-2013 period is presented in Figure 2 which covers eight 
years prior to Hurricane Ike and five years after Ike. During the eight years before Ike 
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the average annual rate of change was -1.64% with the maximum decline between 2000 
and 2001 equal to -1.88% and minimum decline of -1.19% between 2001 and 2002. In 
the year following Ike (with more than nine months in the July 2008-July 2009 
estimations period) Galveston recorded the biggest population loss across the thirteen-
year period presented here with 3.79% decline. That is 2.32 times the average population 
loss the city had suffered during the eight years prior to Hurricane Ike. 
The population trend after Ike however, is different from that of before Ike as we 
can see in Table V. The average loss in the eight years prior to Ike is -1.64% while in 
the five years post-Ike it reduced to -.61%. If Ike had not happened, and population 
Figure 2. Population trends: with and without Ike 
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continued to decline with the same average rate of 2000-2008, in 2013 the population 
should have been 46,300 which is significantly (2,433) lower than the estimation for 
2013. 
Hurricane Ike was an anomaly in the long-term trend of population decline. 
Before reaching a new normal state, which is defined as a state where post-impact rates 
of change are similar to pre- impact rates of change, Galveston’s population rate of 
change is fluctuating: it can be seen in Table V that from 2010 to 2011 annual growth 
rate is 1% and from 2012 to 2013 it is .9% which may indicate return of some of the 
residents that had temporarily left after Hurricane Ike. By 2013, population of Galveston 
has not stabilized at a new normal state compared to the pre-Ike period; perhaps because 
on the one hand, five years is not long enough for stabilizing a population trend after a 
Table V. Total population estimates, Galveston, TX 
year population annual change Note 
2000 57376 0 estimate July1st 
2001 56297 -1.88 post-estimate 
2002 55628 -1.19 post-estimate 
2003 54861 -1.38 post-estimate 
2004 53950 -1.66 post-estimate 
2005 53122 -1.53 post-estimate 
2006 52141 -1.85 post-estimate 
2007 51181 -1.84 post-estimate 
2008 50281 -1.76 post-estimate 
2009 48374 -3.79 post-estimate 
2010 47963 -0.85 estimate July1st 
2011 48444 1.00 annual estimate 
2012 48310 -0.28 Quick facts, annual estimate 
2013 48733 0.88 quick facts, annual estimate 
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shock, and on the other hand, the post-Ike trend has a different rate of change from the 
pre-Ike period. Galveston might see steady population gain instead of steady decline as 
evident in the present fluctuation.  
Table VI shows that the total population has declined by 16.6% between 2000 and
2010 censuses. In absolute terms, all of the racial-ethnic groups have lost population 
Figure 3. Galveston population: annual exponential change rate 
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Table VI. Population composition change from Census 2000 to Census 2010
race/ethnicity census 
2000 
 % census 
2010 
 % absolute 
change 
share change 
(percentage 
points) 
% 
change 
 Total 
population 
57247 47743 -9504 -16.6% 
Hispanic/Lat ino 
(of any race) 
14753 25.8% 14925 31.3% 172 5.5     1.2% 
 Not Hispanic 
White 
25277 44.2% 21500 45% -3777 0.8 -14.9% 
 Not Hispanic 
Black 
14422 25.2% 8895 18.6% -5527 -6.6 -38.3% 
 Not Hispanic 
other 
2795 4.9% 2423 5% -372 0.1 -13.3% 
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except for the Latinos, who experienced an increase of 172 individuals or 1.2% between 
the two censuses. African-American minority experienced the largest population loss in 
both absolute and relative terms, respectively, by 5,527 individuals and 38.3%. Not-
Hispanic White population has the second rank in population loss, and decreased by 
3,777 individuals or 14.9%. 
The racial composition of Galveston has changed from 2000 to 2010, potentially 
as a result of the population displacement following Hurricane Ike. This is shown in 
Table VI. While not-Hispanic Whites’ share of population has remained almost
unchanged, the share of Hispanic population has increased by 5.5 percentage points 
while share of African-American minority has declined by 6.6% points. That means the 
group that was most affected by Hurricane Ike was African-Americans, partly as a result 
of slow housing recovery program and long delays in rebuilding public housing. 
If we now turn to American Community Survey estimates of the population by 
race and ethnicity, we can compare the pre-Ike and post-Ike population composition 
Figure 4. Population census 2000-census 2010 
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better and in a more meaningful time frame. The pre-Ike racial-ethnic composition from 
2007 ACS 3-year estimates were compared to the post-Ike racial-ethnic composition 
three-year estimates from 2010 ACS 3-year estimates and the 2013 ACS 3-year 
estimates. Table VII presents the absolute and relative change in the population of each 
category along with its aggregate margin of error (margin of error for the difference). 
The first four columns of the table show the absolute population change estimates with 
margins of error. The difference Values with large margins of error mark where the 
estimated difference might be zero at 90% confidence level (no change from pre-Ike to 
post-Ike). 
During the first three years following Hurricane Ike, total population is estimated 
to have decreased by 4961 ±2568 individuals from the 3-year period of 2005-07 to the 3-
year period of 2008-10. During the second three-year period following Hurricane Ike 
(2011-13), total population decreased by 5589 ±2569 individuals compared to the 2005-
07 estimate. The continued population loss in the second 3-year period following 
Hurricane Ike could be attributed to the historical and long-term population decline in 
Galveston that was occurring even before Hurricane Ike. Comparing these ACS 3-year 
estimates indicate continued population loss, contrary to the fluctuations in total 
population level after Hurricane Ike (see previous section) which indicate populat ion 
growth. 
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The absolute changes show that between the three-year before Ike and the three 
years after Ike, non-Hispanic White population decreased by 2967±2146 individuals and 
non-Hispanic Black population decreased by 2367 ± 1723 individuals. The 90% margins 
of error for Hispanic and non-Hispanic other populations are larger than the estimated 
difference. Therefore, there might be no statistically significant change for those two 
categories. To further explore the changes in the racial and ethnic composition, relative 
changes by population group are presented in the last two columns of Table VII.
The analysis of change in population composition may be somewhat limited 
because ACS estimates are provided for raw numbers and not the percentages of each 
racial/ethnic group with margins of error. Consequently, I cannot estimate the change in 
the share of each racial-ethnic category. Instead, I calculated the relative changes based 
on raw number estimates only (without margins of error). While absolute changes of the 
Not-Hispanic White and Black population following Hurricane Ike are similar, the 
relative change in Black population is almost twice that of White population: 22% loss 
of Black population versus 11.8% loss of White population during the three years 
Table VII. Population composition change (estimates) from ACS 3-year 2007, to ACS 3-
year 2010 and to ACS 3-year 2013 
change 
ACS2007-
ACS2010 MOE 
change 
ACS2007-
ACS2013 MOE 
%change 
 ACS2007-
ACS2010 
%change 
 ACS2007-
ACS2013 
Total: -4961 ±2568 -5589 ±2569    -9.2% -10.4% 
Hispanic     631 ±2433 -1275 ±2197     4.2%   -8.5% 
Not-Hispanic 
White -2967 ±2146 -2895 ±1918 -11.8% -11.5% 
Not-Hispanic 
Black -2367 ±1723 -1038 ±1649 -22.0%   -9.7% 
Not-Hispanic other   -258   ±917   -381   ±863   -8.7% -12.8% 
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following Ike. 
Both analysis of censuses 2000 and 2010, and comparison of ACS 2007 three-
year estimates and ACS 2010 three-year estimates indicate that during the first three 
years following Ike, non-Hispanic White population experienced the largest absolute 
population loss but non-Hispanic Blacks suffered the largest relative population loss. 
However, comparing 2005-07 to the 2011-13 estimates, only for the non-Hispanic White 
population can I suggest that these changes were statistically significant. It is apparent 
from Table VII that in a longer time frame, non-Hispanic White population continued 
leaving the Island, as it is also apparent in Figure 5. 
Spatial distribution of population by block groups  
Since development patterns and population composition vary significantly across 
Galveston Island, the population change following Hurricane Ike is also expected to vary 
among neighborhoods. To explore the distribution of post-Ike population at 
neighborhood scale, I calculated the absolute and relative population change from pre-
Figure 5. Race-ethnicity 3-year ACS estimates, Galveston 
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Ike to post-Ike for each block group using estimates of 2009 5-year ACS and 2013 5-
year ACS. With the decennial shifts in the boundaries of block groups, some of the block 
groups in Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula have merged, split, or both merged 
and split into new block groups in 2010 so that the number of Block groups have 
reduced from 71 to 65 in 2010. Therefore, first step for calculating population change at 
block group level was to check and find all of those boundary and ID changes and 
prepare a common and comparable set of block groups. 
I made a table with the list of 2009 block groups that are consistent with the 2013 
block groups, both in terms of boundaries and ID, with 5-year population estimates and 
change Values. The average population size of block groups decreased from 1131 in the 
2005-09 period, to 970 in the 2009-13 period. The variability of population size also 
decreased from 534 to 482 in the second estimation, indicating that after Hurricane Ike, 
on average, block group population decreased and the number of smaller block groups 
rose. 
Out of 71 block groups, 51 in Galveston and Bolivar lost population 
between2005-09 and 2009-13 estimation periods. The minimum absolute population loss 
was 5 individuals and the maximum population loss was 787 individuals for one block 
group, while the smallest relative population loss was .7% and the largest relative 
population loss was 54.7%. Eighteen block groups gained population during the 5 years 
following Hurricane Ike, ranging from 5 to 396 individuals, with the highest relative 
gain of 74%. 
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In order to assess the spatial distribution of population loss and gain across Galveston 
Island and Bolivar Peninsula, the block groups’ population table was joined to the 2009 
block groups’ GIS shapefile of Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula in GIS. Maps in 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the spatial distribution of absolute and relative 
population change by block groups in five categories. Maps are zoomed to the east end 
and Urban Core of Galveston where population density is higher and block groups are 
smaller. 
 Both of the block groups that suffered the highest absolute and relative population 
losses and those with population growth are located in the east side of Galveston. 
Figure 6. Absolute population change by Block Group: from ACS 2005-09 to ACS 
2009-13 
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Neighborhoods adjacent to Seawall (on the south side of Urban Core) and the ones 
closer to Galveston Channel suffered relative population losses as high as 55%. It is 
particularly important to note that one of these block groups was the site of Magnolia 
Homes, a public housing project that was demolished after Hurricane Ike. Furthermore, 
as a result of population loss in several of the Urban Core block groups, many of them 
were merged in 2010 census maps. 
Economic recovery 
To understand the economic impact of Hurricane Ike on Galveston and assess 
economic recovery, this analysis addresses three indicators of local economy: 
Figure 7. Relative population change by Block Group: from ACS 2005-09 to ACS 2009-13 
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distribution of jobs by industry, distribution of jobs by earning, and inflow of workers 
into Galveston. 
Distribution of jobs by industry 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether and how the economic 
structure of Galveston has changed as a result of Hurricane Ike through changes in 
contribution of major industries to the job market on the Island. Number of jobs for 
major industries, including the ones with more than 5% share of total jobs, were 
compared from 2002 to 2011 using Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) 
data (http://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/#lodes). The industries with more than 5% share of 
all jobs for Galveston include: Educational Services, Accommodation and Food 
Services, Retain Trade, Finance and Insurance, Healthcare and Social Assistance) 
Absolute and relative change was also compared between 2008 and 2009 (indicating loss 
of jobs) and then between 2009 and 2011 (indicating recovery of jobs).  
As it is displayed in Figure 8, with the exception of more than 1000 jobs increase 
from 2005 to 2004, on the whole the total number of jobs in major industries was slowly 
declining before Hurricane Ike As might be expected given the hurricane a nd the 
economic meltdown, total number of jobs in major industries fell sharply from 22,293 
jobs in 2008 to 18,663 jobs in 2009 which marks more than 16% loss. Since the national 
economic meltdown occurred during the same year, it may be difficult to distinguish 
between the impact of Ike and the national trend on the level of jobs in Galveston. 
Interestingly in the two years after Ike for which data are available, Galveston has not 
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resumed its pre-Ike trends nor do we see a “new” normal emerging, unless that new 
normal is growth, although not reaching pre-Ike levels.  
Educational Services industry has maintained the highest number of jobs by far, 
although it has been declining from about 14,000 jobs in 2002 to 9,400 by 2009, with the 
biggest loss, 1,879, in the year following Hurricane Ike. Jobs in Educational Services 
industry has only started to grow since 2009 up to approximately 11,000 jobs; however 
after three years had not reached its pre-Ike level (11,360 jobs) yet. University of Texas 
Medical Branch (UTMB), Texas A&M Galveston, and Galveston Independent School 
District are the main contributors to the Educational Services industry. UTMB in 
particular is one of the major employers in Galveston Island. The city's largest employer 
is UTMB, employing 8,000 people on the island at its hospitals, medical school and 
Figure 8. Number of jobs by industry (main industries: >5% share), Galveston: 2002-11 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Retail Trade 1974 1996 1995 2047 2048 1919 1852 1715 1898 2105 
Finance and Insurance 2844 2847 2703 2678 2533 2183 2189 2056 1673 1621 
Educational Services 13968 13972 13270 13316 13221 11538 11360 9481 10541 11059 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
2578 2357 2188 2253 2917 2800 2572 1979 2503 2587 
Accommodation and Food 
Services 
3629 3485 3637 3594 4202 4233 4320 3432 4254 4561 
Total  24993 24657 23793 23888 24921 22673 22293 18663 20869 21933 
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research laboratories. It is expected that UTMB will add more jobs with its capital 
expansion program and the plan for bringing a new technology company incubator to 
build on their research. Texas A&M Galveston campus on Pelican Island has more than 
2,000 students, and like UTMB it is growing; in 2012 A&M opened a new student center 
and a research building (Rice, 2012). 
The rest of the jobs were somewhat evenly distributed among other major 
industries in the beginning of 2000s with approximately 2,000-4,000 jobs per industry. 
However, since 2006 with the rise in Accommodation and Food Services and fall in 
Finance and Insurance as well as Retail Trade jobs, the differences had started growing. 
With Hurricane Ike, all industries lost jobs; therefore, differences diminished to various 
extents. Particularly Accommodation and Food Services suffered the sharpest decline 
with 888 jobs after Educational Services with 1,879 jobs lost in the year after Ike, while 
Retail Trade lost only 137 jobs. In September 2008, an estimated 500,000 fewer tourists 
visited Galveston than in the previous month (Angelou-Economics, 2008). 
Among the five major industries displayed in Figure 8, recovery had different 
rates. Retail Trade, Accommodation and Food Services, and Health Care restored the 
level of jobs they had before Hurricane Ike hit by 2011, with Accommodation and Food 
Services going 241 jobs beyond the pre-Ike level. However, Educational Services and 
Finance and Insurance failed to restore the number of jobs to pre-Ike levels, especially 
Finance and Insurance jobs kept declining since Hurricane Ike. Hurricane Ike 
accelerated the declining trend in Finance and Insurance jobs at leas t initially; however it 
brought only a brief pause to the long-term growth of Accommodation and Food 
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Services. In 2007 alone, an estimated 5.4 million tourists visited the City of Galveston. 
With fewer than 60,000 permanent residents, the City of Galveston hosted an annual 
number of visitors that exceeded its own population by a factor of ninety. 
Figure 9 presents the shares of five major industries in Galveston from total 
number of primary jobs for a 10-year period from 2002 to 2011. Changes in the share of 
industries from the job market of Galveston can help understand the impact of Ike on 
economic structure of the Island. From this figure, we can see that the share of 
Educational Services had been falling few years before Hurricane Ike, with the sharpest 
declines between 2005 and 2006 as well as 2006 and 2007. 
Nonetheless, Educational Services, with a share of 36.4%, had the largest share 
of jobs in Galveston by 2011, as it had throughout this 10-year period. The significant 
gap between the shares of Educational Services and the rest of Galveston economy in 
supporting employment on the Island demonstrates the critical role of educational 
institutions in keeping the local economy alive, and the lack of economic diversity in 
Galveston. 
Hurricane Ike put 1 million square feet of UTMB campus under 6 feet of 
saltwater and muck, causing $710 million in damage. UTMB’s John Sealy Hospital and 
its emergency room were swamped by Ike. The hospital’s specialty doctors evacuated 
and scattered across Texas. At least 2,500 UTMB physicians and staffers were laid off 
two months after the storm, while another 600 quit. (Bosque, 2009). Consequently, the 
decision of whether or not to rebuild UTMB and its hospital back in Galveston, which 
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was unclear for approximately a year following Ike, would have had major impacts on 
the future of Galveston. 
Ultimately, with State Legislature’s decision to bring UTMB back to the Island,  
one of the major concerns about the broader impact of Ike on Galveston was removed. 
However, it is important to note that even prior to Ike, as we can see in the Educational 
Services and Health Care jobs trends in Figure 9, UTMB was reducing the size of its 
activities in Galveston. Therefore Hurricane Ike might have acted as an accelerator, or, 
to some extent, a justifier for a long-term regional shift in Texas medical industry.  
In 2006,  UTMB announced that they would have to let go 1,000 employees 
through layoffs, attrition and early retirement due to budget deficit while focusing 
resources on a specialty medical center at Victory Lakes, a well-off suburban enclave in 
Figure 9. Share of industry from total number of jobs, City of Galveston: 2002-11 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Retail Trade 5.8% 5.9% 6.2% 6.4% 6.1% 6.2% 6.0% 6.4% 6.4% 6.9% 
Finance and Insurance 8.4% 8.5% 8.4% 8.3% 7.6% 7.1% 7.1% 7.7% 5.7% 5.3% 
Educational Services 41.2% 41.6% 41.1% 41.4% 39.6% 37.4% 36.8% 35.4% 35.7% 36.4% 
Health Care and Social Assistance 7.6% 7.0% 6.8% 7.0% 8.7% 9.1% 8.3% 7.4% 8.5% 8.5% 
Accommodation and Food 
Services 
10.7% 10.4% 11.3% 11.2% 12.6% 13.7% 14.0% 12.8% 14.4% 15.0% 
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League City with the aim of attracting wealthier, insured patients (Bosque, 2009). 
The shares of Accommodation and Food Services along with Retail Trade have 
been on the rise since 2005 with a short interruption by Ike only to the Accommodation 
industry, which include tourism businesses. Share of this industry will probably grow in 
Galveston’s economy. After Ike several new investments were made in tourism industry 
including the Pleasure Pier- an estimated $60 million investment creating 650 jobs 
(Sjostrom, 2012). Share of Retail Trade and Finance and Insurance, unlike other 
industries, increased in the year following Hurricane Ike. However, for Finance and 
Insurance the pre-Ike falling trend was reestablished stronger by 2010.  
Table VIII provides the change in shares of all industries from job market 
between two points related to Hurricane Ike: 2007 is the year before Ike, and 2011 marks 
the recovery after 3 years. It can be seen from the data in Table VIII that Finance and 
Insurance as well as Educational Services had the biggest drops in their shares of job 
market since Hurricane Ike, while Accommodation and Food Services had the biggest 
rise since Ike. Data from this table can be compared with the data in Figure 9, where we 
can see that the shares of both Finance and Insurance industry and Educational Services 
industry had been already falling, while the share of Accommodation and Food Services 
had been rising since few years before Ike. Therefore, similar to the observation on 
changes in number of jobs, the trends of change in shares of each industry from job 
market show that Ike had no impact on longer-term and broader trends in Galveston’s 
local economy. 
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Distribution of jobs by earnings 
A key factor in determining the composition of jobs, as a proxy for economic 
structure, is earnings. Therefore, to understand the impact of Ike of economic structure 
of Galveston, it is important to address the question of whether and how the distribution 
of jobs by earning has changed after Ike. A simple trend comparison for raw numbers 
and shares of three job categories by earning from 2002 to 2011 was used to explore the 
long-term and more recent changes, as related to Hurricane Ike) in Galveston’s job 
market. 
Table VIII. Change in shares of industries from job market: 2007-2011 
Industry Change in share of jobs 2007-11 (% points) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.0 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction  -0.4 
Utilit ies 0.1 
Construction -0.4 
Manufacturing 0.5 
Wholesale Trade 0.2 
Retail Trade 0.7 
Transportation and Warehousing 0.7 
Information  -0.1 
Finance and Insurance -1.7 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.4 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services  0.1 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 0.0 
Administration & Support, Waste Management 
and Remediation  
0.6 
Educational Services -1.0 
Health Care and Social Assistance -0.6 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation -0.2 
Accommodation and Food Services  1.3 
Other Serv ices (excluding Public 
Admin istration) 
-0.3 
Public Administration -0.1 
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Figure 10 compares the trends of change in the number of jobs by earning from 
2002 to 2011. This figure reveals that there has been a more or less steady decline in the 
number of jobs that earn $1,251-$3,333/month (average earning level jobs) as well as 
lower wage jobs, while there has been a steady rise in the number of higher paying jobs 
in Galveston. It is also apparent that Hurricane Ike in 2008 marked a relatively sharp 
decrease in the number of all types of jobs regardless of earning level. Although since 
2009, all three categories started to grow as an indication of economic recovery, only the 
number of higher paying jobs, which was also on the rise prior to Ike, has reached and 
passed its pre-Ike levels. 
To better understand the change in composition of jobs by earning in long term, 
and related to Hurricane Ike, trends of change in the share of each job category from 
Figure 10. Number of jobs by earnings 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$1,250 per month or less 8,318 7,812 7,765 7,338 7,455 6,915 6,437 5,022 5,866 6,211 
$1,251 to $3,333 per month 15,942 15,518 14,223 14,145 14,897 13,071 12,620 10,981 11,749 11,869 
More than $3,333 per month 9,629 10,258 10,262 10,687 11,061 10,867 11,832 10,804 11,916 12,328 
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total number of jobs were compared from 2002 to 2011. Similar to change in number of 
jobs, Figure 11 shows that there has been a gradual fall in the shares of average paying 
and lower paying jobs since 2002; the share of former category kept declining after Ike, 
while the latter started to increase since 2009. The order of job share has changed 
dramatically in the 2002-11 decade due to the gradual increase in high paying jobs and 
gradual decrease in average and low paying jobs. While close to half of the primary jobs 
paid average wages in 2002, and the other half were evenly distributed between high and 
low paying jobs, over a decade, Galveston’s economy has changed in such a way that 
over forty percent of jobs are in the high paying category, less than forty percent are 
average earning and only twenty percent are primary lower wage jobs. Impact of 
Figure 11. Percent of jobs by earnings 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$1,250 per month or less 24.5% 23.3% 24.1% 22.8% 22.3% 22.4% 20.8% 18.7% 19.9% 20.4% 
$1,251 to $3,333 per month 47.0% 46.2% 44.1% 44.0% 44.6% 42.4% 40.9% 41.0% 39.8% 39.0% 
More than $3,333 per month 28.4% 30.5% 31.8% 33.2% 33.1% 35.2% 38.3% 40.3% 40.4% 40.5% 
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Hurricane Ike on distribution of jobs by earning was short term as the long standing 
trends seem to have been reestablished by 2011.  
Table IX shows the absolute, relative, and share change in jobs from 2008 2011 
across three earning levels. These measures of change demonstrates the level of recovery 
across various jobs. It can be seen in all three columns that average paying primary jobs 
suffered the biggest absolute, relative, and share loss after Hurricane Ike. However, one 
can argue that the change in composition of jobs is not due to Hurricane Ike and is part 
of a long-term and/or regional trend in the job market. 
To distinguish between the impact of Ike and the effects of broader changes in 
regional economy on the changes in Galveston’s job market, Table X provides a 
comparison of the share change of job types in the three years following Hurricane Ike 
among City of Galveston, Galveston County and State of Texas. Share of lower paying 
jobs in Galveston Island fell as it did in the State of Texas, although at a slower rate, 
while it rose by 0.4 in the county. The slight decrease in share of lower paying jobs in 
Table IX. Change in composition of jobs by earning: 2008-2011 
Jobs by Earn ings Change 2008-11 
(#) 
Share change 2008-11 
(% points) 
Change 2008-11 
(%) 
$1,250 per month or less -226 -0.4 -3.5%  
$1,251 to $3,333 per month -751 -1.8 -6.0%  
More than $3,333 per month  496   2.2  4.2%  
Table X. Comparison of share change in job categories by earning: 2008-2011 
Share change: Jobs by earnings Galveston (city) Galveston County Texas 
$1,250 per month or less -0.4  0.4 -1.7 
$1,251 to $3,333 per month -1.8 -1.5 -1.1 
More than $3,333 per month   2.2  1.1   2.8 
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Galveston might be related to the impact of Hurricane Ike on port and tourism industry 
which provide a large part of lower paying jobs, and its difference with the State’s larger 
rate of decline can be attributed to the larger share of industries in Galveston that provide 
such types of jobs compared to other areas in the State. The trend for middle income jobs 
was a decline across the board; however, the decline in share of these jobs was steeper in 
Galveston Island, perhaps as a result of decrease in Educational Services and Health 
Services jobs in the Island after Ike. Finally, it can be seen in the last row of the table 
that the rise in share of higher paying jobs was in line with the trends in the county as 
well as State of Texas, suggesting that regardless of the economic impact of Ike, 
Galveston is just following the general State wide trend of increasing the share of high 
paying jobs, at least in urban areas.  
Inflow of workers  
After exploring the impact of Hurricane Ike on the economic structure of 
Galveston with respect to types of jobs, it is also important to address the change in 
inflow of workers into the Island since Hurricane Ike. A significant component of 
community recovery is population recovery, which can be strongly linked to recovery of 
jobs. However, if the workforce chooses to live outside the community, as was the case 
of Galveston for many years, the link between economic recovery and population 
recovery would not be as strong. With population decline since decades before 
Hurricane Ike, even though economy had been growing, getting people who work on the 
Island to also live on the Island continues to pose a challenge. With Hurricane Ike and 
the vast damage to the housing stock, this challenge grew more serious.  
149 
Inflow-Outflow analysis based on LODESdata was used to examine whether and 
how the ratio of workers who live off the Island (inflow) has changed since Hurricane 
Ike. Figure 12 illustrates the trend in percentage of workers inflow to Galveston from 
2002 to 2011. Percentage of workers that commuted to work in Galveston had been 
gradually falling from over 64% in 2002 to 60% right before Ike hit the Island. From 
2008 there is a very sharp rise in workers’ inflow to over 66% and it continues to 
increase until 2011, although at a slower rate, which might suggest stabilizing at a new 
normal level. A survey of employers by Galveston Economic Development Partnership 
(GEDP) showed that half of those employed in Galveston lived off the island before the 
storm. The corresponding number after Ike was 53 percent. While both of these 
estimates are lower than what LEHD data provides, the trend they present is consistent 
with that data (Rice, 2012). 
Figure 12. Percent of Workers Employed in Galveston 
but Living Outside (primary jobs) 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
percent Employed in Galveston  
but Living Outside 
64.4% 63.0% 61.5% 60.2% 60.2% 59.8% 60.0% 66.1% 68.3% 68.4% 
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58.0% 
60.0% 
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Percent of Workers Employed in Galveston 
but Living Outside (primary jobs) 
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Even though major economic engines are successfully recovering from Ike and 
adding more jobs, the rate of those workers leaving Galveston may also be increasing, 
posing a challenge to the City in providing the tax base and receive federal funding for 
community development. For example, UTMB expects to add 1,000 jobs by 2020; 
however, only 25 percent of those workers were expected to live on the Island. That's the 
same percentage of UTMB employees living in Galveston in 2012 (Rice, 2012). The city 
needs a population of at least 50,000 to continue getting the level of federal aid it 
received before the storm. Lack of affordable housing and shopping centers, expensive 
insurance rates, strict building codes on the coast and scattered vacant lots across the 
Island, that make investment in new development less attractive, and a fading perception 
of low-performing schools were among the major reasons that workers, especially 
UTMB and other middle income employees fail to remain on the island.  
Housing recovery 
Average assessment values by housing type 
This analysis starts with examining average assessment values for each type of 
housing. Table XI compares the average assessed value by housing type from 2008 to 
2012 for the entire sample, and the relative gain or loss from the respective 2008 
averages. The average assessed values are also displayed in Figure 13. Comparing 
averages across the three residential types reveals disparities in both average damage and 
relative recovery trajectories among different housing types. 
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Comparing the 2009 to 2008 averages clearly indicates that on average all 
housing types lost assessed value due to Ike. Examining the relative change also 
indicates that multifamily properties suffered the greatest relative loss in assessed value 
(-39.45%), and hence, suffered higher levels of relative damage on average when 
compared to the other two forms of housing. The average relative losses for single-
family and duplexes are quite similar.  
Figure 13. Percent Change from 2008 Assessed Value for each Residential Type 
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In general, the average assessed values begin to rebound following their lows in 
2009, however the rates of these rebounds are quite different. The averages for single-
family structures rebounds quickly by 2010, and then slowly surpasses the 2008 average, 
albeit barely, by 2012. Multi- family structures, also fall dramatically in 2009, but then 
rather quickly rebound for the next two years, but then, perhaps surprisingly, fall back in 
2012, failing to reach the restoration levels on average. This fallback, was due to the fact 
that some multi- family developments were razed between 2011 and 2012. Thus, 
multifamily complexes failed to reach the restoration levels, on average, even after four 
years, with their average assessed values being 12.6% lower than their pre-Ike level. The 
recovery trajectory for duplexes is simply lethargic. While average losses for duplexes 
were initially comparable to those of single-family structures, they experienced a smaller 
return toward their 2008 assessed values in 2010. However, after that point they 
experienced little if any gain, finishing at roughly 15% below their 2008 average values 
Table XI. Average assessed value by housing type, 2008-2012 only Galveston 
Year Single-Family Multifamily Duplex 
Average 
value 
change from 
2008 
Average value change 
from 2008 
Average value change from 
2008 
2008 $117,662 $225,283 $135,869 
2009 $86,348 -26.61% $136,408 -39.45% $101,474 -25.31% 
2010 $112,306 -4.55% $179,471 -20.34% $113,544 -16.43% 
2011 $114,741 -2.48% $204,128 -9.39% $115,573 -14.94% 
2012 $118,831 0.99% $196,949 -12.58% $115,595 -14.92% 
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by 2012. On the whole, when simply comparing average assessed values, only single-
family structures reached restoration levels, with both multifamily and duplexes lagging 
significantly. These results indicate that duplex and multifamily properties had 
significantly slower rates of recovery and restoration. These trajectories are also 
displayed in Figure 13. Percent Change from 2008 Assessed Value for each Residential 
Type. As can be seen, only single-family structures returned to their 2008 average 
assessed value by 2012, while multifamily and duplexes lagged significantly. 
Restoration time 
While a comparison of average levels of assessed values allows for rather coarse 
assessment of recovery, the use of averages can obscure a good deal of variation in 
recovery trajectories within each housing type. Restoration time can be used to examine 
the variability among types of housing with respect to the number of years it took for 
each housing unit to reach back to its pre-Ike appraised value and either keep it or 
increase it. 
Table XII presents the numbers and percentage of each housing type that reached 
the restoration levels by 2010 (2-years), 2011 (3 years), 2012 (4 years) or failed to reach 
its 2008 assessed value by 2012 (failed to restore). Needless to say, if a structure was not 
damaged (i.e. suffered no assessed value loss between 2008 and 2009), then it is not 
included in this assessment. 
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       The  findings  emergin   from   the   results   presented   in    Table XII 
are  with   consistent   previous  discussion,   but   provide   a   much   more
comprehensive picture of what was happening within each type of housing. By two 
years after the storm, just over 49% of single-family structures have reached restoration 
levels, and just over 9% more reach these levels in the following two years. However, 
41% of single-family housing failed to even reach restoration levels by 2012, four years 
after Ike. Similarly, the percentages of multifamily and duplex structures reach 
restoration levels by 2010 at 27% and 17% respectively. However, very small numbers 
of both groups reach restoration levels in the subsequent years, leaving approximately 
67% of multifamily and 76% of duplexes failing to reach restoration levels even by 
2012. These results indicate that regardless of type of housing, most of those that were 
going to be restored, were restored by two years after the storm, but sizable percentages 
of all housing failed to do so even after four years. For duplexes and multifamily 
Table XII. Number and percent of damaged houses reaching restoration levels for 
each housing type Only Galveston 
restoration time single-family multifamily duplex 
   N  %   N  %   N  % 
2 years   8757  49.56 229   27.33   21  16.80 
3 years     866    4.90   39     4.65     4    3.20 
4 years     739    4.18   11     1.31     5    4.00 
failed to restore   7309   41.36 559   66.71   95   76.00 
Total 17671 100.00 838 100.00 125 100.00 
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housing complexes the vast majority of these structures failed to be restored even four 
year after the storm, and almost half also failed to be restored. 
Average assessment values by the levels of damage and housing type 
To better understand the consequences of damage for housing recovery, the 
average assessed housing values were reexamined, by housing type, after categorizing 
each type into one of three levels of damage, less than 15%, 15-50% or greater than 50% 
based on the percent of assessed value a structure lost between 2008 and 2009. Table XIII 
presents the results of this analysis, but to make their interpretation easier, each value 
has been divided by its respective 2008 assessed value. Hence, values of 1 or greater 
imply restoration has been met, while values less than one indicate that restoration has 
not been achieved. 
Beginning first with the upper panel of this table, which has data for all three 
types of housing that suffered relatively little damage, one can clearly see that single-
family structures on average regained their 2008 assessed values by 2010, surpassing it 
slightly and then finish the period a 1.07, or 7% higher than their 2008 assessment. 
Multifamily structures also regain and slightly surpassed their 2008 average by 2010, but 
fell back slightly in the remaining two years. This again reflects that some of these 
structures were razed rather than repaired. A somewhat similar pattern holds for 
duplexes that suffered minor loss. They nearly reached their pre-Ike average assessed 
values at 96%, but also experience a slight fall back as some of these structures were 
also razed. 
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Moderately damaged multifamily and duplex structures generally failed to reach 
their pre-Ike average appraised values by 2012, but multifamily structures were quite 
close to restoration on average by 2011, falling back slightly in 2012. Moderately 
damaged duplexes did not fare as well as those with only minor damage, in that they did 
not get as close to reaching their restoration levels. Indeed, by 2011 they on average get 
closest to their 2008 average appraisal values at 82% of their re-Ike values. The only 
moderately damaged housing types that reach restoration levels on average are single-
family structures. 
Table XIII. Indexed average appraised values of single-family, multifamily 
and duplex houses before and after hurricane Ike, by extent of damage . 
Only Galveston 
minor damage: loss <15% 
Indexed Average  Improvement value Single-family multifamily duplex 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.92 0.89 0.90 
2010 1.01 1.03 0.96 
2011 1.03 1.00 0.96 
2012 1.07 0.99 0.93 
moderate damage: 15% <=loss <50% 
Indexed Average  Improvement value Single-family multifamily duplex 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.71 0.71 0.71 
2010 0.95 0.87 0.80 
2011 0.97 0.97 0.82 
2012 1.01 0.91 0.82 
extensive damage: loss =>50% 
Indexed Average  Improvement value Single-family multifamily duplex 
2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2009 0.22 0.25 0.22 
2010 0.49 0.53 0.38 
2011 0.60 0.70 0.44 
2012 0.72 0.73 0.50 
 Indexed accord ing to 2008 value
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In general parcels that suffered extensive damage failed to restore to their pre-Ike 
assessed values even after four years. The patterns for single-family and multifamily 
housing are quite similar, showing consistent gains of, but reaching just over 70% of 
their average pre-Ike values by 2012. However, extensively damaged duplex properties 
show a much flatter trajectory, reaching to just 50% of their average pre-Ike values on 
average. On the whole, these findings indicate that the consequences of damage are quite 
dramatic and long- lasting, particularly at higher levels of damage. Restoration times are 
much slower for heavily damaged structures. 
To sum, the most striking observation to emerge from the data analysis was that 
recovery of Galveston and Bolivar has either failed or has been severely thwarted which 
stands in contrast to the literature as well as with minimal quantitative analysis that has 
examined housing recovery which generally held that recovery should occur within two 
to three years particularly with respect to single-family housing, with a lag for multi-
family structures. This observation holds whether considering aggregate and 
disaggregated data. At the aggregate level, average assessed multifamily and duplex 
failed to reach their pre-Ike average values in Galveston even after four years and those 
for single-family structures just did make these levels. Furthermore, when examining 
restoration timing, Substantial percentages of single- family, multi- family and duplexes 
that sustained damage, failed to reach their restoration levels even four years after the 
event. 
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Assessing the relationship between social vulnerability and damage and recovery of 
parcels 
Extent of damage as well as recovery of different housing types might vary due 
to effects of socioeconomic factors which are not accounted for by the average patterns. 
The fact that on average single-family houses and multifamily complexes with minor 
damage returned to their pre-disaster levels two years following Hurricane Ike, while 
duplex houses failed to do so even after four years, might merely be a result of 
variability in social vulnerability rather than signaling a difference among types of 
housing. Understanding the relationship between social vulnerability and rate of housing 
recovery can help planners and policy makers to better target disaster preparedness 
resources and activities. Nine measures related to social vulnerability are summarized at 
block group level and their associations with damage and recovery are assessed at the 
parcel level. 
Analysis presented below examines the neighborhood characteristics that the 
literature suggests can influence housing recovery patterns. Specifically in this analysis 
nine measures related to social vulnerability are summarized at block group level and 
their associations with damage and recovery are assessed at the parcel level. The first 
two are related to race/ethnicity: percent Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black populations. 
The other measures are related to the capacity for obtaining recovery resources: renter-
occupied status at parcel level, percent of the block groups’ housing that is mobile home, 
percent of the block groups’ population in poverty, percent of adult population without 
high school education, percent of population above 65 years old, percent of unemployed 
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labor force, and percent of population who do not speak English well. These social 
vulnerability measures were all obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2009 5 years 
American Community Survey for 2005-2009) at the block group level (except for the 
renter-occupied status that was obtained from tax appraisal dataset) and spatially linked 
to the residential parcels located within each block-group. Based on the existing social 
vulnerability literature, I expected these measures to have negative consequences for 
restoration time as well as rate of recovery. 
Table XIV lists a description of each variable, along with its average and 
standard deviation. Not surprisingly, given the discussion above, two of the three 
recovery variables for all types of residential parcels have negative averages, although 
they barely surpass zero with time. The 2008-10 recovery measure has an average of -
4.43% indicating that on average these residential structures were 4.43% below their 
2008 values in 2010. By 2011 the average rises to -1.84% and it rises still further to 
0.84% in 2012, therefore on average residential structures were .84% above their 2008 
values in 2012. The fact that the standard deviations get larger for each of these 
measures, indicate greater variation in recovery through time as well. The average 
damage for all residential structures in Galveston was 30.04%, indicating the average 
loss in assessed value of a residential property between 2008 and 2009. 
In total, 51% of residential structures are renter-occupied, which is a very high 
percentage relative to many communities. On average 2.97% of occupied housing units 
did not have a telephone and 0.57% of them were mobile homes. The range for the latter 
is pretty narrow, with a maximum of 13.48% in Galveston. These residential structures 
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are located in neighborhoods that are 13.24% non-Hispanic Black and 23.74% Hispanic, 
on average. However, there is considerable variation in racial compositions, with the 
percentage non-Hispanic Black ranging from 0 to72.2% and Hispanic from 0 to78.3%. 
The average for neighborhood poverty was 16.14%, unemployment was 33.71% and 
adults without a high school diploma, 16.14%. Just as with racial/ethnic compositions, 
these also had considerable ranges from very low levels to rather high concentrations of 
unemployment (73.23%), poverty (62.08%) and adults without a high school diploma 
(55.93%). Average percentage of population older than 65 was 16.07% with a maximum 
of 55.06% and 4.45% of neighborhoods’ population could not speak English well with a 
maximum of 32.19%. 
To understand the relationship between housing damage and recovery and the SV 
indicators, partial correlations were examined between damage as well as recovery with 
the neighborhood socioeconomic attributes listed in Table XIV. The partial correlation 
between damage and each neighborhood socioeconomic variable estimates the 
correlation that would be observed between damage and each neighborhood variable 
after controlling for the other neighborhood attributes in the list correlation matrix. Table 
XV provides the results of the partial correlation analysis. 
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Damage presents significant positive associations with six of neighborhood 
social vulnerability indicators, including mobile home, minority status (Black and 
Hispanic), lack of telephone connection, unemployment and lack of language 
communication skills. Therefore, residential parcels in neighborhoods with higher 
percentage of mobile homes, concentrated minority population, more units without a 
telephone, concentration of unemployed residents, and those without adequate English 
skills, suffered higher relative value losses following Hurricane Ike.  
Table XIV. Definitions and descriptive statistics for variables used in correlation 
analysis- Only Galveston 
Variable name Description  Mean St. Dev. 
Recovery08-10 Percent value change between 2008 and 2010 
appraisals* 
-4.43 47.45 
Recovery08-11 Percent value change between 2008 and 2011 
appraisals** 
-1.84 52.38 
Recovery08-12 Percent value change between 2008 and 2012 
appraisals*** 
 0.84 56.53 
Damage Percent value loss between 2008 and 2009 appraisals 30.04 23.72 
Renter-
occupied 
Parcels without homestead exemption (dummy)    0.51   0.50 
Mobile home Percent mobile home   0.57   1.927 
Black Percent non-Hispanic Black  13.24 17.68 
Hispanic  Percent Hispanic 23.74 19.10 
Poverty Percent in poverty  16.14 12.41 
No high school Percent without high school degree 16.14 14.08 
No telephone Percent occupied housing units without a telephone   2.96   4.92 
Unemployment  Percent of Labor force unemployed for age above 16  33.71   9.45 
Speak English 
not well  
Percent Speak English not well or not at all   4.45   5.99 
Elderly  Percent population above 65 16.07   9.12 
* ((imprv. value2010 - imprv. value2008)/ imprv. value2008)*100; ** ((imprv. value2011 - imprv. value2008)/ imprv. value2008)*100; 
*** ((imprv. value2012 - imprv. value2008)/ imprv. value2008)*100 
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Correlation coefficients for mobile home, minority and inadequate language 
skills are larger than other correlations indicating a stronger relationship these three 
social vulnerability factors have on increasing the level of damage houses received. The 
significant negative correlations between damage and poverty as well as lower education 
level and older population are surprising. Because they suggest that damage was less in 
areas with higher poverty, lower levels of education and higher concentrations of 
elderly, which is counter to SV expectations. 
It is expected that housing in socially vulnerable neighborhoods have more 
difficulty restoring to their pre-storm appraised value due to both higher levels of 
damage (Highfield et al., 2010) and limited access to recovery resources (Van Zandt et 
al., 2012). Table  presents partial correlations between restoration time (number of years 
it took damaged houses to restore their pre-Ike value) and each social vulnerability 
indicator, while effects of all other listed social vulnerability indicators on restoration 
time are removed. 
Table XV. Partial correlations of damage with neighborhood characteristics 
Damage (% loss) 
Renter-occupied -0.0136 
Mobile home  0.1070** 
Black   0.1406** 
Hispanic   0.1078** 
poverty -0.0489** 
Occupied housing units without a telephone  0.0385** 
Educational attainment less than high school -0.0731** 
Labor force unemployed for age above 16  0.0882** 
Speak English not well or not at all  0.1068** 
Elderly  -0.0192** 
Sources: American Community Survey 2009 5-year estimates 
* indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.05. ** indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.01.
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There were significant positive partial correlations between restoration time and 
renter-occupied status of a parcel, and mobile home, non-Hispanic Black population, 
lack of telephone connection, and unemployment in the neighborhood. Percentage of 
non-Hispanic Black population has the largest significant positive correlation with 
restoration time, meaning that it took a particularly longer time for houses in 
neighborhoods with higher concentration of renter-occupied housing and Black 
population to restore to their pre-Ike appraised value. Similar to the correlation analysis 
for damage, significant negative correlations between restoration time and poverty as 
well as concentration of older population are surprising. On the whole, it should be noted 
that whether discussion negative or positive correlations, all of the correlations in this 
table are very small to marginal in magnitude, suggesting that much else is driving 
recovery beyond SV issues. 
Social vulnerability of neighborhood is suggested to have an adverse effect on 
access to recovery resources and also on short-term measures of recovery actions such as 
applying for recovery funds, having insurance, and applying for repair/rebuilding 
Table XVI. Partial correlations of restoration time with: 
Restoration time 
 (# years) 
Renter occupied   0.0590** 
Mobile home  0.0593** 
Black population   0.1042** 
Hispanic population  0.0000 
Persons in poverty -0.0810** 
Occupied housing units without a telephone  0.0506** 
Educational attainment less than high school -0.0071 
Labor force unemployed for age above 16  0.0378** 
Speak English not well or not at all  0.0017 
Elderly  -0.0597** 
Sources: American Community Survey 2009 5-year estimates 
* indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.05. ** indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.01.
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permits (Highfield et al., 2014; Peacock et al., 2014; Van Zandt et al., 2012). Table XVII 
presents partial correlations of three measures of recovery (2-year recovery, 3-year 
recovery and 4-year recovery) with each social vulnerability indicator; while the effect 
of all other listed indicators on recovery are removed. 
Percentage of mobile home and proportion of Black population are negatively 
correlated with rates of short-term (2-year), mid-term (3-year), and long-term (4-year) 
recovery.  Since mobile home has a limited range in Galveston’s neighborhoods, Black 
population seems to be the main factor associated with lower rates or recovery. 
Interestingly, Hispanic population and lack of telephone communication are negatively 
correlated only with long-term rate of recovery. 
As it was the case with damage and restoration time, it is surprising that 
neighborhood poverty presents a positive significant correlation with rates of recovery 
between 2008 and 2011, as well as between 2008 and 2012. This rather surprising 
Table XVII. Partial correlations of recovery rate with … 
Recovery 2008-10 Recovery 
2008-11 
Recovery 
2008-12 
Persons in renter occupied housing units -0.0096 -0.0015 -0.0003 
Mobile home -0.0323** -0.0314** -0.0214** 
Black population  -0.0193** -0.0200** -0.0368** 
Hispanic population -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0179*  
Persons in poverty  0.0133  0.0173*   0.0160*  
Occupied housing units without a telephone -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0261** 
Educational attainment less than high 
school 
-0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0061 
Labor force unemployed for age above 16 -0.0012  0.0028 -0.0071 
Speak English not well or not at all  0.0024 -0.0045  0.0077 
Elderly  0.0087  0.0085  0.0085 
Sources: American Community Survey 2009 5-year estimates 
* indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.05. ** indicates two-tailed signif icance at p < 0.01.
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finding for poverty is quite different than that which would have been expected by the 
literature. The unexpected association might be related to the generally slow progress of 
housing recovery, substantial loss of White population and increase in the proportion of 
individuals who live off the Island although they work on the Island, which were all 
discussed in previous sections. 
Conclusion 
This study set out to analyze post-Ike recovery trends in population, economy 
and housing in three different ways. First, I compared pre-Ike to post-Ike rates of change 
for total population, economic structures in terms of jobs, and inflow of workers. 
Second, I examined whether or not each dimension in the study has reached restoration 
level (i.e. restored its pre-Ike level). Third, I compared the losses or damage, restoration, 
and recovery trajectories of the various segments of population (races/ethnicities and 
block groups), economy (industries), and housing (residential types).  
Three major themes emerge from this study. First, pre-Ike trends in population 
(decline), number of jobs, and inflow of workers were either temporally accelerated (if 
declining pre-Ike such as Finance and Insurance jobs) or paused temporally (if growing 
pre-Ike such as jobs in Accommodation and Food Services). Second, recovery from Ike 
in Galveston has been very slow in terms of population return, bringing jobs back, and 
housing recovery. Nevertheless, while the picture is particularly bleak with respect to 
housing, some downward trends were stopped, as in population and job loss, however it 
is difficult to say that restoration levels have been achieved across the board. 
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION 
The overarching question of my dissertation was “how can recovery planning 
processes and the nature of long-term recovery following Hurricane Ike in Galveston 
inform theories of community planning processes in general and recovery planning in 
particular to improve recovery processes?” This inquiry was addressed in three articles 
with more specific questions. The first article engaged in an integrative literature review 
examining theories of community planning, the newly emerging literature on post-
disaster recovery planning, Federal guidelines for post-disaster planning, and the general 
literature on community recovery. The second article undertook a qualitative case study 
analysis of the post-Ike recovery planning process in Galveston, Texas. Finally, the third 
article engaged in a quantitative analysis and assessment of recovery at the community 
level, examining important dimensions of the community including its population, 
economy, businesses, and housing. In the following pages the major findings of each 
article are summarized and synthesized in relation to the other two articles to draw 
lessons for both recovery planning practice and research.  
What I Found in the First Article 
In the first article, I presented an integrative review of the emerging recovery 
planning literature along with the theories of planning and plan quality to lay out a set of 
evaluation criteria of what is a good recovery planning process and what is a good  
recovery plan. Then I applied the resulting criteria from distillation of these bodies of 
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literature to evaluate and critique federal policies for recovery planning. There is some 
degree of consensus among the authors whose work I reviewed that a successful 
recovery planning process (pre- and post- impact) should:  
 Be proactive 
 Be based on accurate data and sound analysis 
 Be a local responsibility, based on local needs   
 Have a long-term focus and broad scope 
 Be driven by strong local leadership 
 Involve diverse voices 
 Establish collaboration and cooperation 
 Recognize and build consensus around conflicting issues 
 Aim at capacity building 
 Adapt and evolve with new input 
 Integrate vulnerability analysis and involve vulnerable citizens  
General plan quality studies, recovery planning guides from planners and disaster 
researchers (for example American Planning Association, PAS report # 567), and more 
recently recovery plan quality studies all offer insights about the features and elements 
of a recovery plan. My summary of these insights includes two aspects of a plan; setting 
a clear direction and establishing the use of the plan. A successful recovery plan sets a 
clear direction for recovery efforts through: 
 Goals that are transformative and restorative; (e.g. Pre- and post-disaster 
mitigation)  
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 A fact base of alternative plausible futures, precise anticipation of the 
consequences of a disaster, projections of all possible direct and indirect 
losses 
 Flexible policies 
 A successful recovery plan should also establish its uses and inﬂuence 
through documenting: 
 Interorganizational coordination and agreements to adapt to change after 
a disaster 
 Participation practices to engage the public before and after the disaster 
event 
 Implementation and monitoring details to track actions and evaluate and 
adapt policies 
I reviewed the federal recovery policy in light of the principals suggested by 
research. The two major federal policy documents that focus on disaster recovery 
planning are first, the Long Term Community Recovery (LTCR) program by FEMA 
under the ESF#14 in NRF and second, the NDRF which replaced ESF#14, particularly 
Community Planning Capacity Building (CPCB) Recovery Support Function (RSF).  
LTCR planning is action-oriented and should support existing planning efforts in 
the community. LTCR program was designed to help communities manage their 
recovery process without a pre-disaster recovery plan, therefore it has a very practical 
and outcome-oriented approach (i.e. recovery projects, not to be confused with recovery 
outcomes). Several key principles of recovery planning suggested in the literature were 
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echoed in LTRC program. But there are issues that were not in line with research 
findings. 
Even though LTCR program was designed based on the premise that taking the 
time to move through its process allows the community to make the most of the 
opportunities created by the recovery process, there was not enough time and capacity 
designated for deliberation, consensus building and sound information analysis under the 
LTCR program. 6 to 12 weeks does not seem to be a reasonable time for developing a 
coherent recovery strategy, engaging the public, and building partnerships, even in a 
timely manner. In such short time frame, reaching some of the LTCR steps above seem 
very difficult, if not impossible, as documented in of case study of Galveston.  
LTCR was aimed at helping communities produce a project-oriented plan. This 
approach in itself hindered a comprehensive approach to recovery and all the data 
collection and analysis that must support every planning decision in a plan. The project-
oriented approach of LTCR can be a result of the short-time frame during which some 
tangible outcomes and directions would be expected from the community and is 
essential to the continued trajectory of recovery. In other words, a planning process if 
perceived as successful, can set the community for success in recovery. The final 
outcome of LTCR support is a list of projects with specified priorities that should lead 
the communities’ recovery. Prioritizing recovery projects in the way suggested by the 
project ranking tool provided by FEMA was shown to be both confusing and leading to 
unrealistic expectations.  
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LTCR continued to evolve until 2011 when its work helped catalyze the 
development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). ESF #14 
transitioned to the Community Planning Capacity Building Recovery Support Function. 
NDRF marks an improvement from ESF#14 in the following ways. The support 
provided by FEMA under NDRF will be more focused on recovery issues and 
continuous, compared to LTCR program. Key ESF #14 concepts are expanded in the 
NDRF and include recovery-specific leadership, organizational structure, planning 
guidance and other components needed to coordinate continuing recovery support to 
individuals, businesses and communities.  
NDRF marks a shift in federal recovery policy toward putting more emphasis on 
pre-disaster recovery planning and building capacity for recovery in communities. 
Unlike LTCR, the NDRF planning RSF support advance recovery planning. Under 
NDRF with FEMA’s support, relevant stakeholders and experts are brought together 
during steady-state planning and when activated post-disaster to identify and resolve 
recovery challenges. ESF14’s approach to designing the process was more prescriptive 
with a number of steps but NDRF is more flexible stating that each community 
determines its process. Also, NDRF’s approach to recovery planning is more proactive 
and mitigation-oriented than the NRF ESF#14. “Community Planning and Capacity 
Building RSF” has an emphasis on integra tion of hazard mitigation throughout the 
continuum of pre- and post-disaster recovery planning and implementation.   
NDRF has changed the time frame of planning too. Whereas the ESFs typically 
operate within a time span of weeks and months, the Community P lanning and Capacity 
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Building RSF operational timeframe is months to years. Finally, NDRF incorporates an 
integrative approach to recovery planning. It integrates mitigation, recovery and other 
pre-disaster plans and activities into existing planning and development activities. 
What I Found in the Second Article 
Qualitative analysis was conducted on data collected through semi-structured 
interviews as well as secondary data including media reports and public documents. In 
general, the goals of this analysis were to understand how Galveston’s post-Ike recovery 
planning process took place and progressed, as well as strengths and weaknesses that 
emerged during that planning process. Another goal for my qualitative analysis was to 
examine whether or not the case of planning in Galveston informs further the issues that 
emerged in the first article and what does it add to our knowledge of challenges in 
recovery planning as well as how to improve it.  
Looking back at their post-Ike planning experiences after four years, my study 
informants discussed their insights and challenges in recovery planning and what they 
would want or do differently if a similar event occurred. All informants emphasized 
need for planning before the disaster and more deliberation and conflict resolution in the 
planning process. Successes and failures of LTCR planning process in Galveston 
provides lessons for other communities that are thinking about or already planning for 
disaster recovery. 
Galveston showcases community engagement and cooperation after Ike. 
Processes of cooperation and engagement comprised positive aspects like empowerment, 
sense of ownership, optimism, unity, and negative aspects like ignoring conflicts, 
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accepting every idea without consensus building, rush and little delibera tion, and limited 
support from authorities. The positive and negative consequences are detailed below: 
 The strong bottom-up community involvement and transparency which was vital 
for the support and credibility of this process in the community.  
 Providing the opportunity for citizens to have a voice in the recovery decisions.  
 The wide community engagement as an opportunity for better planning following 
a disaster since it may not be easy to attract wide public participation in normal 
time planning. 
 Failing to develop a realistic and consensus based vision for future that is 
supported by key policy makers. 
 Failure to have the recovery plan adopted by the city council.  
 Failure to support bottom-up decisions by the local government and federal aid 
providers resulting in many if not most of the 42 projects presented by the Long-
term Recovery Committee remaining unimplemented.  
 The hope embedded in recovery initiatives decided by the community, giving 
way to cynicism and distrust especially in the local government.   
A few of the features that previous research suggests for recovery planning 
process were found in LTRC process in Galveston. Those principals include local 
control on the planning process (Galveston Style), thinking about a broad range of 
possible improvements in a long time frame while planning for recovery (several long-
term infrastructure projects in LTRC plan), giving a voice to a diverse group of citizens 
in a transparent and inclusive process (LTRC community support and engagement).   
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Several of the features of planning process suggested by previous research were 
not found in the LTCR process and as a consequence introduced a number of challenges. 
Since there was not sufficient time and expertise for data collection and analysis, several 
of the recovery projects proposed by the LTRC were study projects rather than actions. 
Also without sound data, LTCR failed to propose alternative long-term recovery 
scenarios and mitigation strategies that could receive community by- in. Lack of strong 
local leadership and even involvement in the LTRC process was also found to be one of 
the major challenges toward approval, adaption and implementation of the plan. 
Implementing recovery plan also needs establishing collaboration among various aid 
providers, government agencies, non-profit organizations, charities, etc. as part of the 
planning process. In general, the LTRC plan fails to provide specific and studied 
proposals for implementing the recovery projects, especially the financial resources.  
The reactive and prescriptive approach of FEMA’s LTCR program and lack of 
an existing recovery planning process in Galveston, made it very difficult to achieve 
some of principals of success suggested by previous studies which reinforce the 
importance of these principals; including capacity and consensus-building, involving 
vulnerable citizens in planning and evolving with new input. The bottom-up community 
engagement in the LTRC process revealed not only the benefits of giving a voice to 
residents but also the conditions needed for such process to succeed. Community 
engagement needs support from local leadership and planning expertise. Community 
engagement cannot and should not replace the planning process; it should be one of 
several elements of recovery planning.  
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What I Found in the Third Article 
This article presented a quantitative measurement of recovery in Galveston, 
Texas following Hurricane Ike (2008) with two purposes. First, I developed a 
measurable definition that integrates significant aspects of recovery. Second, I quantified 
community recovery to describe empirical patterns of population, economic and housing 
recovery.  
At aggregate level, population of Galveston is recovering, although slowly, and 
the general trend in decline has at least in the short run been turned. Galveston has been 
on a steady declining population trend since 1960s. Annual population estimates show 
that Hurricane Ike marked a sudden increase in the long-term decline population trend.  
53 out of 71 block groups in Galveston and Bolivar lost population between 2005-09 and 
2009-13 estimation periods. The maximum population loss was 787 individuals for one 
block group, and the largest relative population loss was 54.7%. Both the block groups 
that suffered the highest population losses and those with population growth are located 
in the east side of Galveston.  Neighborhoods adjacent to Seawall (on the south side of 
Urban Core) and the ones closer to Galveston Channel suffered relative population 
losses as high as 55%.  
Several of my interviews thought population loss is one of the major challenges 
that Galveston has had to face a long time before Ike but ignores. Slow population return 
and even continued population loss after Ike may well be linked to lack of a strong 
vision and misunderstanding of priorities in (recovery) planning. Recovery planning by 
LTRC started by setting a vision for Galveston that emphasized sustainability and 
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resilience in the face of future disasters, however issues that Galveston had been 
struggling with prior to Ike were not (well) integrated in the visioning of LTRC. It can 
be argued that the committee was thinking about ideals Galveston could achieve post-
recovery from Ike. While a few of the projects proposed in the LTRC plan were 
concerned with recovery from Ike, majority of them were targeting beyond the urgent 
recovery issues and even pressing development issues such as population decline.  
I found disparities in population loss and recovery among the four major 
racial/ethnic categories5. During the first three years following Ike, Anglos experienced 
the largest absolute population loss but Blacks suffered the largest relative population 
loss. In a longer time frame, only White population has left the Island and the other 
racial/ethnic populations have experienced minor changes. The later return of Black 
population could be due to the progress of housing recovery program, even though very 
slow, in rebuilding damaged low to moderate income housing.  
The economic recovery of Galveston signifies the role of educational 
institutions (UTMB, Texas A&M Galveston and Galveston Community College) in 
keeping the local economy alive on the one hand and the lack of economic diversity in 
Galveston on the other. Hence, fate of the entire recovery of Galveston was to large part 
depending on the (top-down) decision from the State Legislature whether or not to bring 
UTMB back to Galveston. Even though the decision was in favor of Galveston, UTMB 
was reducing the size of its activities in Galveston. Therefor Hurricane Ike might have 
acted as an accelerator or to some extent a justifier for a long-term regional shift in 
                                                 
5
 Hispanic, not-Hispanic White, not-Hispanic Black, not-Hispanic other 
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Texas medical industry.  The trends of change in shares of each industry from job 
market show that Ike was only as an interruption and acceleration to longer-term and 
broader trends in Galveston’s local economy.  
Finance and Insurance as well as Educational Services had the biggest drops in 
their share of job market since Hurricane Ike (slowest recovery), while Accommodation 
and Food Services had the biggest rise since Ike (fastest recovery). Tourism-related 
industries have recovered pretty well from the damages and losses of Ike. The shares of 
Accommodation and Food Services along with Retail Trade have been on the rise since 
2005 with a short interruption by Ike only to the Accommodation industries which 
largely include tourism businesses. While tourism businesses were prepared for recovery 
with respect to financial resources, tourism in general was also an important focus of the 
LTRC process. projects such as “Take a Seat”, “Historic Preservation”, “Feasibility 
Study of Gambling”, etc. were targeted at seizing the opportunity of tourist attractions  
specially the beach and historic homes and art shops in the Strand Area for boosting 
Island’s economy.  
While number of all jobs by earning categories started to grow since 2009, as an 
indication of economic recovery, only the number of higher paying jobs, which was also 
on the rise prior to Ike, have reached and passed its pre-Ike (2008) level. Average paying 
primary jobs suffered the biggest absolute, relative and share loss after Hurricane Ike. 
However, the change in composition of jobs is part of a long-term and/or regional trend 
in the job market rather than Hurricane Ike.  
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Tourism has recovered and is growing in Galveston, but the number of low 
paying primary jobs will probably continue to fall with the shortage of affordable 
housing and the anecdotal evidence that suggest a rise in number of non-primary low-
wage jobs and workers that have to work two or more jobs to meet their needs. Even 
though major economic engines are successfully recovering from Ike and add more jobs, 
the rate of those workers living off the Island is also increasing, posing a challenge to the 
City in providing the tax base and receiving federal funding for  community 
development. 
Recovery of housing in Galveston and Bolivar has either failed or has been 
severely thwarted in its level of housing recovery, which stands in contrast to the 
literature as well as with minimal quantitative analysis that has examined housing 
recovery. Previous studies generally held that recovery should occur within two to three 
years particularly with respect to single-family housing, with a lag for multi- family 
structures. However in Galveston, substantial percentages of single-family, multi- family 
and duplexes that sustained damage, failed to reach their restoration levels even four 
years after the event. At the aggregate level, average assessed multifamily and duplex 
failed to reach their pre-Ike average values in Galveston even after four years and those 
for single-family structures just did make these levels.  
Recommendations 
For practice 
Challenges and successes of planning in Galveston provide a number of lessons 
for recovery planning practice: 
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 To seize the window of opportunity (community engagement and availability of 
federal recovery funds) a strong planning process is needed which also brings 
influential stakeholders to the table and creates meaningful deliberations.  
 Bring a proactive approach to recovery planning.  
 Federal recovery policy should encourage localities to inclusively plan in 
advance for seizing the post-disaster opportunities for the interest of community 
rather than passively react to the conflicts that emerge after the fact.  
 It is more feasible to establish inclusive and meaningful deliberative planning 
processes which give a voice to different and competing interests before a 
catastrophic event rather than afterwards.  
 Federal recovery policy should encourage long-term collaboration among policy-
makers before the event, to realize the existing and predict the potential issues in 
a disaster situation and build consensus around those issues.  
 Establish and strengthen a network of planners with neighboring communities  
 Obtain community input and buy-in for a strong recovery vision before disasters 
 Form collaborative processes before the disaster and maintain them in the 
aftermath 
 Federal recovery policy should emphasize a distinction between planning for 
short-term and long-term recovery, as well as between frameworks for 
emergency management and recovery management 
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For research 
Further research should ask the following questions about recovery planning to 
further inform our knowledge of the opportunities and challenges in disaster recovery 
planning:  
 Case studies from communities that undertook recovery planning since 2011 
based on NDRF principals should examine whether or not recovery planning 
process have improved in practice with the new NDRF? And How? 
Comparative case studies of the planning process, especially with the new 
NDRF that has a new approach from ESF#14 LTCR program can inform policy 
makers of its value since several of the issues in Galveston were related to the 
LTCR approach to planning. 
 Comparative case studies should inquire: What are the common elements of 
recovery planning micro-processes among those communities that succeed in 
recovery and enhance resilience? This should be based on linking recovery 
planning process with recovery outcomes.  
 In-depth case studies should explore experiences of inc lusion and exclusion 
from post-disaster recovery planning among socially vulnerable populations. 
This will provide insights to design inclusive planning processes and also to 
empower socially vulnerable populations through the opportunity of disaster 
recovery planning. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Code families and codes used for reviewing literature, Atlas.ti output 
Code Family Code 
FEDERAL RECOVERY 
POLICY 
federal policy_critique: dependence 
federal policy_critique: prescriptive 
federal policy_critique: reactive 
federal policy-critiques: short time span 
PLANNING THEORY 
planning theories-inclusive 
PLANNING THEORY_collaborative 
PLANNING THEORY_polotical influence 
PLANNING THEORY_social movement 
PLANNING THEORY_technical beureucratic 
POST-DISASTER SITUATION 
post-disaster situation_need for planning 
post-disaster situation_Dillema: challenge for planning 
post-disaster situation_other challenges for planning 
post-disaster situation_Opportunity: advantages for planning 
post-disaster situation_considerations for planning 
RECOVERY PLAN 
recovery plan_ dimensions 
recovery plan_ information 
recovery plan_ mitigation 
recovery plan_ special regulations 
recovery plan_ troubling 
recovery plan_agreements 
recovery plan_allow public input 
recovery plan_clear priorities 
recovery plan_committment 
recovery plan_consistent 
recovery plan_direction 
recovery plan_flexible 
recovery plan_implementation 
recovery plan_importance 
recovery plan_needs 
recovery plan_resources 
recovery plan_sustainability 
recovery plan_vision 
recovery plan-land use 
RECOVERY PLANNING recovery planning process: adaptive/learning 
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Code Family Code 
PROCESS recovery planning process: address conflicts 
recovery planning process: build capacity 
recovery planning process: collaboration-cooperation 
recovery planning process: data 
recovery planning process: deliberation 
recovery planning process: diversity 
recovery planning process: inclusive 
recovery planning process: integrate vulnerability 
recovery planning process: leadership 
recovery planning process: local 
recovery planning process: multiobjective 
recovery planning process: proactive 
recovery planning process_ long-term 
recovery planning process_partnership 
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APPENDIX 2 
Code-primary document family table, Atlas.ti output 
 Codes / Primary 
Document Families 
FEMA  
NDRF 
critiques 
plan 
quality 
planning 
theories 
post-
disaster  
Recovery 
studies 
TOTALS 
federal 
policy_critique: 
dependence 
0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
federal 
policy_critique: 
prescriptive 
1 0 0 0 6 0 19 
federal 
policy_critique: 
reactive 
0 0 0 0 0 2 23 
federal policy-
critiques: short time 
span 
0 0 0 0 0 1 6 
planning theories 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
planning theories-
inclusive 
2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
PLANNING THEORY_ 
collaborative 
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
PLANNING 
THEORY_social 
movement 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
PLANNING 
THEORY_technical 
beureucratic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
post-disaster 
situation_advantage
s for planning 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
post-disaster 
situation_challenges 
for planning 
0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
post-disaster 
situation_considerati
ons for planning 
0 0 1 0 11 0 29 
post-disaster 
situation_Dillema: 
challenge for 
planning 
1 0 0 0 6 1 15 
post-disaster 
situation_need for 
planning 
5 0 0 0 6 1 13 
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 Codes / Primary 
Document Families 
FEMA  
NDRF 
critiques 
plan 
quality 
planning 
theories 
post-
disaster  
Recovery 
studies 
TOTALS 
post-disaster 
situation 
_Opportunity: 
advantages for 
planning 
2 0 0 0 0 0 9 
recovery plan_ 
dimensions 
2 0 1 0 2 1 8 
recovery plan_ 
information 
1 0 0 0 2 0 11 
recovery plan_ 
mitigation 
7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
recovery plan_ 
special regulations 
0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
recovery plan_ 
troubling 
0 0 0 0 8 0 8 
recovery 
plan_agreements  
1 0 0 0 5 0 15 
recovery plan_clear 
priorities 
1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
recovery 
plan_committment 
1 0 0 0 1 1 3 
recovery 
plan_consistent 
7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
recovery 
plan_direction 
3 0 0 0 1 1 5 
recovery 
plan_flexible 
1 0 0 0 5 0 9 
recovery plan_ 
implementation 
5 0 0 1 0 1 7 
recovery 
plan_importance 
0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
recovery plan_needs 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
recovery 
plan_resources 
0 0 0 0 3 1 12 
recovery 
plan_sustainability 
2 0 0 0 0 2 4 
recovery plan_vision 6 0 1 0 4 0 17 
recovery plan-land 
use 
2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
recovery planning 
process: 
adaptive/learning 
1 0 0 0 4 1 13 
recovery planning 
process: address 
conflicts 
5 0 0 1 0 0 26 
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 Codes / Primary 
Document Families 
FEMA  
NDRF 
critiques 
plan 
quality 
planning 
theories 
post-
disaster  
Recovery 
studies 
TOTALS 
recovery planning 
process: build 
capacity 
0 0 0 0 4 2 23 
recovery planning 
process: 
collaboration-
cooperation 
15 0 0 1 3 1 59 
recovery planning 
process: data 
6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
recovery planning 
process: deliberation 
0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
recovery planning 
process: diversity 
3 0 0 1 0 0 6 
recovery planning 
process: inclusive 
7 0 0 0 6 3 34 
recovery planning 
process: integrate 
vulnerability 
3 0 0 1 4 2 10 
recovery planning 
process: leadership 
6 0 0 0 1 0 7 
recovery planning 
process: local 
4 0 0 0 8 1 49 
recovery planning 
process: 
multiobjective 
5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
recovery planning 
process: proactive 
7 0 0 0 0 2 44 
recovery planning 
process_ long-term 
9 0 0 0 5 0 21 
recovery planning 
process_partnership 
2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
recovery planning 
process_steps 
4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
recovery 
planning_good 
process 
1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
rehabilitative 
functions 
7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
TOTALS: 137 1 6 9 99 30 620 
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APPENDIX 3 
Interview Guide 
This set of questions is designed to be open-ended and give the opportunity to 
informants to express their information and viewpoints without being restricted by 
the interviewer. 
Answers they provide to this question would probably yield interesting and 
important insights that need to be more zoomed into with structured questions. 
I first introduce myself and explain our study objectives and why I needed to talk to 
the interviewee as an important informant to our research.  
I will use the following questions as a list of issues and topics to cover in the 
interview. 
Some new issues might be added during the interview based on the interesting 
issues the informant talks about but the intention is to make sure all the present 
questions are covered. 
 
General Topic: Hurricane Impact 
 I would like to begin, but just spending a little time talking about hurricane Ike 
and its impact on Galveston Island, the city, and its people…In general, how 
would you characterize Hurricane Ike’s impact on Galveston? What kinds of 
things were hit hardest? 
 What kinds of things were least impacted? Can you describe how Galveston 
looked like after Hurricane Ike? Where was most severely damaged? Where was 
least severely damaged? 
 Do you think that Galveston is back to normal or back to the way things were 
before the storm? IF THINGS HAVE RETURN ED TO NORMAL: how long did 
it take? IF NOT: Are some things back to normal? What are these things? What 
things are not yet back to normal? What were the major areas of problems that 
had to be dealt with urgently? How long did it take for the Island to return to 
normal daily life? 
By this question I want to see how people from different positions assess the immediate 
post disaster situation which can affect their assessment of the recovery whether to 
normal predisaster situation or to a relatively better situation. I can also find whether 
my informants have faith and hope in the future for Galveston Island as a vulnerable 
coastal community. This would significantly affect their viewpoint about recovery. 
 
General Topic: Ike Recovery Experience in General 
 Now, let’s shift gears a bit, and focus on the recovery. What do you see as some 
of th major successes in the recovery efforts? What did seem to go well in 
recovery and what things did not seem to be going very well? What kinds of 
things went well for families and households? What are some of the 
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shortcomings or problems? What were some of the issues that people had the 
greatest problems with getting accomplished? Can you tell me what the 
experience of recovery after hurricane Ike is like in general?  
I want the informant to talk about their general picture of what is done and who is 
involved in disaster recovery in Galveston. Starting with such a general descriptive 
question I want to give the informant the opportunity to express their thoughts and 
feelings without being limited by my specific question. This question should be asked 
from those who had/have responsibilities regarding recovery including officials and 
nonofficial and also those who were/are affected by recovery like citizens and those who 
monitored and criticized I like journalists, state and federal authorities. 
 
General Topic: Informants Role in Ike Recovery (recovery process vs. recovery 
planning process) 
 Thinking about many activities undertaken to bring Galveston back after Ike, 
what kind of activities were you involved in? How do you characterize your role 
in recovery after Ike? Were you involved in the recovery planning specifically?  
I want to first verify my informants’ role in recovery process and then ask them to 
evaluate the planning process and recovery process based on the role they had 
 
Special Topic: evaluation of recovery planning process and outcome from the 
viewpoint of those who were involved in it 
 If you took part in the planning process how did you get involved in the planning 
process and what was your role in the planning process? How do you think did 
the outcome of planning inform the actions in the recovery process? How do you 
evaluate the contribution of recovery planning in Galveston Recovery Practice? 
How do you think planning helped to reach a better and quicker recovery? Why 
do you think the role of planning was this way? What would you change about 
recovery planning now based on the lessons you learned through recovery 
planning in Galveston? 
 
Special Topic: evaluation of recovery planning committee work from the viewpoint 
of members and chair 
 For recovery committee members: Now let’s talk about your involvement in the 
recovery planning committee. First of all, in general terms, can you describe to 
me how the recovery planning process was carried out in Galveston after Ike 
from your perspective? What were the major goals? Which agencies and who 
were involved? What steps or stages were taken? Was there any assistance from 
outside provided for recovery planning? Was it helpful? Do you think the process 
has been successful? Were all or some of the goals reached (which ones were and 
were not)? 
 Can you describe the mission and accomplishments of the Galveston Recovery 
Committee? What was the agenda of a typical meeting of the recovery 
committee? How often did the committee met? How many times did you meet? 
How long was a typical meeting? Can you remember when your first and last 
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meeting was? Where did you usually used to meet? How many people attended 
usually? Where did each person usually seat (if they used to seat in fixed seats)? 
What did they talk about in the meetings? Can you remember specific issues and 
interests raised by particular members in the committee or people who attended 
committee meetings? Did you always have a specific agenda for your meetings? 
Can you remember particular members who were most assertive or influential in 
the meetings? Can you describe some of the committee members?  
 (committee chair) Can you tell me about your experience as the committee 
chair/member? How did you get elected/appointed? What were your 
responsibilities? How long did you serve as the chair or committee member? 
What was your primary profession at the time? Did you have any similar 
experience with disaster recovery or other community planning activities? What 
challenges and problems did you face during the recovery planning in the 
committee? What did you like and dislike about this position and job? What did 
you learn through this experience? How did this experience change your views 
about Galveston community, local and federal administration, etc.?  
 
Special Topic: evaluation of inclusiveness of recovery planning process from the 
viewpoint of those who were involved in it 
 Were you able to get any of your concerns or ideas on the agenda for reco very 
planning? Do you think a wide or narrow range of Galvestonians were 
represented on the recovery planning committee? What kinds of strategies were 
applied when there was a conflict on specific issues or decisions? Can you 
describe in more detail some of those conflicting situations? Is there anything 
that you think could be done in a different way to reach a better recovery plan? 
Can you explain to me what are those things and how do you suggest the 
committee would had better approach those issues? What do you see as the 
strengths and weaknesses or shortcomings of this process? 
 How did public have access to recovery planning committee? Did people show 
any interest in what recovery committee was doing? Were there any cases when 
citizens tried to change decisions made by recovery committee or other 
authorities about Galveston recovery that they were not happy with? Can you 
explain in detail some of those situations? How were these situations dealt with? 
Do you think those claims were legitimate? 
 
Special Topic: evaluation of recovery planning process and outcome from the 
viewpoint of those who were involved in it and had other roles in Galveston 
community recovery 
 How do you think did the outcome of planning inform the actions in the recovery 
process? How do you evaluate the contribution of recovery planning in 
Galveston Recovery Practice? How do you think planning helped to reach a 
better and quicker recovery? Why do you think the role of planning was this 
way? What would suggest to change about recovery planning now based on the 
lessons you learned through recovery practice in Galveston?  
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Special Topic: evaluation of housing recovery from the viewpoint of those who were 
involved either in recovery planning or recovery process specifically regarding 
housing 
 What did you see as the major problems people had in rebuilding or repairing 
their homes? What were the major resources (private and public) that were 
available to homeowners? What kind of issues were homeowners facing? What 
problems are people still having? 
 What about rental housing? Were things different for the owners of rental 
housing and for multifamily/apartment owners? 
 Where are the major successes and failures in rebuilding occurring? What might 
be done to address the problems? 
This question should be asked from the housing recovery program managers (former 
and current) and the homeowners who applied for assistance. This will reveal if they 
have different (mis)understandings about the process and how they assess the situation 
regarding housing recovery assistance and the problems each group might have 
encountered.  
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APPENDIX 4 
Code Categories and codes, Atlas.ti output 
Categories and codes Interview 
LTRC 
FEMA 
handouts 
LTRC 
Memo 
LTRC 
Plan 
Media 
Texas Studies TOTALS 
 *EVAL_EVALUATION 
Negative 80 0 0 3 4 6 93 
 *EVAL_EVALUATION 
neutral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 *EVAL_EVALUATION 
Poisitive 71 0 3 2 0 0 76 
 *EVALUATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BUSINESS RECOVERY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
busn recovery_assistance 34 0 0 0 0 0 34 
busn recovery_importance 
resilience 19 0 0 0 0 0 19 
busn recovery_neglect 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 
busn recovery_success 51 0 0 1 0 0 52 
busn recovery-challenge 13 0 0 2 0 0 15 
CHANGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change_ vacation rentals 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Change_officials 28 0 0 0 0 0 28 
change-new residents 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 
CONTEXT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
context_appealing 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
context_bankrupted city 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
context_concurrent events 
with Ike 29 0 0 0 0 0 29 
Context_exposure 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Context_impact 
overshadowed 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
context_old 16 0 0 3 0 0 19 
context_poor population 16 0 0 2 0 1 19 
context_sense of 
community  2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
ECONOMY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
economy_development 56 0 0 1 0 0 57 
economy_recovery  32 0 0 1 0 0 33 
Economy_tourism 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
HOUSING PROGRAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Categories and codes Interview 
LTRC 
FEMA 
handouts 
LTRC 
Memo 
LTRC 
Plan 
Media 
Texas Studies TOTALS 
housing program rules 74 0 0 0 0 0 74 
housing program_ CDM 67 0 0 0 0 0 67 
housing program_ 
government agencies 99 0 0 0 0 0 99 
housing program_ objective 58 0 0 2 1 1 62 
housing program_ slow 123 0 0 0 0 0 123 
housing program_case 
managers 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 
housing 
program_contractors 31 0 0 0 0 0 31 
housing program_DOB 36 0 0 0 0 0 36 
housing 
program_overwhelming for 
city 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
housing program-transition, 
URS inventory  17 0 0 0 0 0 17 
IMPACT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Impact_ population loss 65 0 0 1 0 0 66 
Impact_damage 93 0 0 16 0 0 109 
Impact_displacement 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
impact_long term back to 
normal fight 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Impact_long term forgotten  2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
impact_opportunity 63 0 0 4 0 0 67 
impact_psychological 58 0 0 0 0 0 58 
impact-cohesion 24 0 0 0 1 2 27 
Impact-Economy 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Impact-surprise 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
infrastructure recovery 66 0 0 32 0 0 98 
INSURANCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
insurance_issues 32 0 0 3 0 0 35 
Insurance_underinsured 1 0 0 3 0 0 4 
insurance_waits 18 0 0 0 0 0 18 
LEARNING RECOVERY 
PLANNING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
learning recovery 
planning_challenge 71 0 0 0 0 0 71 
learning recovery 
planning_future disasters 85 0 0 0 0 0 85 
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Categories and codes Interview 
LTRC 
FEMA 
handouts 
LTRC 
Memo 
LTRC 
Plan 
Media 
Texas Studies TOTALS 
learning recovery 
planning_priorities 35 0 0 7 1 0 43 
learning recovery 
planning_vision 30 3 0 4 1 0 38 
LTRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LTRC_ involvement 189 0 3 14 5 7 218 
LTRC_Committment 3 3 6 4 2 5 23 
LTRC_Disagreements 31 2 0 6 11 8 58 
LTRC_disconnect 12 0 0 8 0 0 20 
LTRC_ESF14 top-down 9 2 1 4 0 2 18 
LTRC_feasibility 7 0 0 6 0 1 14 
LTRC_Galveston Style 10 0 1 2 0 3 16 
LTRC_impact 76 0 0 6 7 1 90 
LTRC_implementation 22 0 0 22 5 1 50 
LTRC_inclusive 5 0 0 15 4 4 28 
LTRC_no consensus building 28 1 0 3 1 0 33 
LTRC_plan 135 1 3 26 12 10 187 
LTRC_planners 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
LTRC_procedure 89 0 1 17 1 3 111 
LTRC_public input 0 2 1 15 3 3 24 
LTRC_raised expectations 1 0 0 3 0 1 5 
LTRC_support plan 0 0 0 0 13 9 22 
LTRC_technical assistance 28 1 6 6 0 1 42 
LTRC_time 34 0 0 5 0 0 39 
LTRC_Transparency 7 2 1 5 0 2 17 
LTRC-alternative 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
LTRC-initiation 19 0 0 5 0 0 24 
LTRC-organization 10 0 0 3 0 1 14 
LTRC-Ranking 1 1 0 54 0 2 58 
MITIGATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mitigation_tools 26 0 0 28 2 1 57 
MIXED INCOME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mixed income_objection 
rationale 28 0 0 0 0 0 28 
mixed income_support 
rationale 46 0 0 0 0 0 46 
PLANNING DEPARTMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
planning department_ 
permitting 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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Categories and codes Interview 
LTRC 
FEMA 
handouts 
LTRC 
Memo 
LTRC 
Plan 
Media 
Texas Studies TOTALS 
planning 
department_comprehensive 
plan 3 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Planning 
department_parallel 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Pre_Ike Issues_ 
infrastructure 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
PRE-IKE ISSUES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
pre-Ike Issues_decent 
rentals 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pre-Ike Issues_old city-old 
codes 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
pre-Ike Issues_population 
loss_consequences 30 0 0 0 0 0 30 
pre-Ike Issues_population 
loss_reason 78 0 0 0 0 1 79 
pre-Ike Issues_schools 
improving 6 0 0 1 0 0 7 
pre-Ike Issues_vacant 
housing 11 0 0 2 0 3 16 
PUBLIC HOUSING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
public housing 
debate_importance, 
consequence 111 0 0 5 0 0 116 
public housing_advocacy 19 0 0 0 0 0 19 
public housing_decisions 89 0 0 0 0 0 89 
public housing_GHA 12 0 0 1 0 0 13 
public housing_objections 
rationale 143 0 0 0 0 2 145 
public housing_plans 
solutions 117 0 0 0 0 0 117 
public housing_right of 
return 12 0 0 0 0 0 12 
public housing_stakeholders 22 0 0 0 0 0 22 
public housing-GLO 
mediator 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
public housing-support 
rationale 82 0 0 0 0 1 83 
RECOVERY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Recovery_ differential 33 0 0 0 0 0 33 
recovery_ marginalized 36 0 0 1 0 0 37 
recovery_challenges from 
federal agencies 25 0 0 0 0 1 26 
recovery_effect of resilience 15 0 0 4 0 1 20 
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Categories and codes Interview 
LTRC 
FEMA 
handouts 
LTRC 
Memo 
LTRC 
Plan 
Media 
Texas Studies TOTALS 
recovery_effect of 
vulnerability 75 0 0 1 0 1 77 
recovery_frustration from 
unknowns 4 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Recovery_funds 33 0 0 11 2 1 47 
recovery_historic 
preservation 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Recovery_preparations 62 0 0 0 0 0 62 
recovery_progress 68 0 0 1 0 1 70 
recovery_role of external 
organizations 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Recovery_role of leadership 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 
Recovery_role of local 
government 65 0 0 8 14 10 97 
Recovery_role of 
organizations 51 0 0 0 1 0 52 
Recovery_temporary 
housing 22 0 0 0 0 0 22 
recovery_top down 
management 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Recovery-compared to 
NOLA 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
recovery-Needs  7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
RESPONSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
response_challenge 31 0 0 1 0 0 32 
response_experienced by 
Ike 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
response_success 33 0 0 0 0 0 33 
TOTALS: 3808 18 26 387 92 100 4431 
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APPENDIX 5 
Research question memo, Atlas.ti output 
 
Memos 
______________________________________________________________________ 
HU: Galveston Recovery 
File: [C:\Users\sara\Desktop\Galveston Recovery.hpr7] 
Edited by: Super 
Date/T ime: 2015-05-27 16:20:27 
______________________________________________________________________ 
MEMO: Research question 1.1.initiation of LTRC (0 Quotations) (Super, 2015-05-01 19:37:33) 
No codes 
No memos 
Type: Theory 
RQ1: How was recovery planning undertaken in Galveston? 
RQ1.1. How did the planning process started? How is the initiation approach evaluated? 
Review all the quotations for code LTRC_ initiation: then a cooccurance of initiation and 
evaluation 
Negative 
I have 11 quotations but only 3 of them didn’t contain any evaluation of the time and the way 
LTRC was initiated 
Quote 3:94, 3:251 and 33:1 and 34:23 these quotes talk about council starting the ESF14 process 
and making the comprehensive plan committee the core of LTRC and keep adding members for 
6 weeks to reach 330 members 
 
Query: ("*EVAL_EVALUATION Negative" COOCCUR "LTRC-initiation") 
 
There were a lot of eyebrows raised, and sly smiles, and as I told the Committee in late March, 
people rooting for us, but betting against us. 
 
There were a lot of eyebrows raised, and sly smiles, and as I told the Committee in late March, people rooting for us, 
but betting against us. 
Betty: I think we began to get mired in politics in the late October, early November of 2008 we had a tug of war 
between the mayor and the city council about who is going to appoint a long term recovery committee to do any kind 
of planning on behalf of the city the mayor had made an appointment of the chairman and she  
had council members were saying that you don’t have the right to do that and so she resented this guy`s appointment 
Betty: literally unbenounced to me, at the time of the storm I chaired the comprehensive plan committee and at a 
council meeting in November they appointed the comprehensive plan committee as the long term recovery committee. 
I got a phone call, I remember I was grocery shopping and a friend called saying that you might want to turn on the 
television, I think they just appointed you chair of the recovery committee. I said I don’t know. That is really bad, I 
mean that is a bad plan, you don’t even ask the chair, you don’t ask the person or the people , nobody talked to 
anybody on the comprehensive plan committee and they just appointed us  
 
My interpretation 
Only the very last quote from Betty is negatively evaluating the initiation approach which was top -down by the City 
Council. The Chairperson criticized the initiation but after accepting the position she had no control on the rest of the 
initiation process which later had a significant impact on the credibility and impact of the LTRC plan. 
 
 
 
